Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission
- Autores
- Quesada, Lucía; Peryache, Eloïc
- Año de publicación
- 2002
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- documento de conferencia
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- In this paper we extend Lizzeri’s simple model of information transmission through certification intermediaries. A seller with no means to signal his quality has the possibility to be certified by an institution that owns a technology to discover the true quality and can credibly commit to a disclosure rule. We study the incentives of this institution to disclose information to the buyers. When buyers are risk neutral, the intermediary cannot help to increase the total surplus and, therefore, there is no disclosure of information at equilibrium. Moreover, there always exists an equilibrium with no revelation of information. However, with an unrestricted space of contracts, self selection of sellers indirectly transmits some information. On the other hand, when buyers are risk averse, the intermediary can increase total surplus by inducing better risk sharing. We show that the equilibrium is to offer a menu of contracts where information will be fully disclosed for all types above a certain threshold and no announcement is made for the others.
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas - Materia
-
Ciencias Económicas
Intermediary, Certification, Information Transmission, Quality.
monopolio
JEL: D42, D82, L15 - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Repositorio
.jpg)
- Institución
- Universidad Nacional de La Plata
- OAI Identificador
- oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/57140
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Monopoly Intermediary and Information TransmissionQuesada, LucíaPeryache, EloïcCiencias EconómicasIntermediary, Certification, Information Transmission, Quality.monopolioJEL: D42, D82, L15In this paper we extend Lizzeri’s simple model of information transmission through certification intermediaries. A seller with no means to signal his quality has the possibility to be certified by an institution that owns a technology to discover the true quality and can credibly commit to a disclosure rule. We study the incentives of this institution to disclose information to the buyers. When buyers are risk neutral, the intermediary cannot help to increase the total surplus and, therefore, there is no disclosure of information at equilibrium. Moreover, there always exists an equilibrium with no revelation of information. However, with an unrestricted space of contracts, self selection of sellers indirectly transmits some information. On the other hand, when buyers are risk averse, the intermediary can increase total surplus by inducing better risk sharing. We show that the equilibrium is to offer a menu of contracts where information will be fully disclosed for all types above a certain threshold and no announcement is made for the others.Facultad de Ciencias Económicas2002-07-19info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionObjeto de conferenciahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/57140enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/semi/semi190702.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-17T09:49:38Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/57140Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-17 09:49:39.077SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission |
| title |
Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission |
| spellingShingle |
Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission Quesada, Lucía Ciencias Económicas Intermediary, Certification, Information Transmission, Quality. monopolio JEL: D42, D82, L15 |
| title_short |
Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission |
| title_full |
Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission |
| title_fullStr |
Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission |
| title_sort |
Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Quesada, Lucía Peryache, Eloïc |
| author |
Quesada, Lucía |
| author_facet |
Quesada, Lucía Peryache, Eloïc |
| author_role |
author |
| author2 |
Peryache, Eloïc |
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author |
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Ciencias Económicas Intermediary, Certification, Information Transmission, Quality. monopolio JEL: D42, D82, L15 |
| topic |
Ciencias Económicas Intermediary, Certification, Information Transmission, Quality. monopolio JEL: D42, D82, L15 |
| dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
In this paper we extend Lizzeri’s simple model of information transmission through certification intermediaries. A seller with no means to signal his quality has the possibility to be certified by an institution that owns a technology to discover the true quality and can credibly commit to a disclosure rule. We study the incentives of this institution to disclose information to the buyers. When buyers are risk neutral, the intermediary cannot help to increase the total surplus and, therefore, there is no disclosure of information at equilibrium. Moreover, there always exists an equilibrium with no revelation of information. However, with an unrestricted space of contracts, self selection of sellers indirectly transmits some information. On the other hand, when buyers are risk averse, the intermediary can increase total surplus by inducing better risk sharing. We show that the equilibrium is to offer a menu of contracts where information will be fully disclosed for all types above a certain threshold and no announcement is made for the others. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas |
| description |
In this paper we extend Lizzeri’s simple model of information transmission through certification intermediaries. A seller with no means to signal his quality has the possibility to be certified by an institution that owns a technology to discover the true quality and can credibly commit to a disclosure rule. We study the incentives of this institution to disclose information to the buyers. When buyers are risk neutral, the intermediary cannot help to increase the total surplus and, therefore, there is no disclosure of information at equilibrium. Moreover, there always exists an equilibrium with no revelation of information. However, with an unrestricted space of contracts, self selection of sellers indirectly transmits some information. On the other hand, when buyers are risk averse, the intermediary can increase total surplus by inducing better risk sharing. We show that the equilibrium is to offer a menu of contracts where information will be fully disclosed for all types above a certain threshold and no announcement is made for the others. |
| publishDate |
2002 |
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2002-07-19 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Objeto de conferencia http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794 info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia |
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