Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina

Autores
Zaourak, Gabriel Roberto
Año de publicación
2020
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
tesis de maestría
Estado
versión corregida
Colaborador/a o director/a de tesis
Fattal Jaef, Roberto
Descripción
Fil: Zaourak, Gabriel Roberto. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
What is the efficiency cost of rent-seeking activities in Argentina? In this paper, I quantitatively show that rent-seeking activities in the form of bribes have aggregate effects through two channels. First, they generate misallocation of resources across firms, because they prevent resources from flowing to the most productive ones, reallocating them instead to those that succeed at rent-seeking. Second, such activities affect the allocation of resources within firms, because they drive resources away from innovation activities. These two channels can help explain why Argentina has both more misallocation across firms and less investment in research and development than developed economies explaining a sizable portion of the Argentinian low productivity.
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Repositorio
Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa)
Institución
Universidad de San Andrés
OAI Identificador
oai:repositorio.udesa.edu.ar:10908/18834
Acceder
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network_name_str Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa)
spelling Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in ArgentinaZaourak, Gabriel RobertoFil: Zaourak, Gabriel Roberto. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.What is the efficiency cost of rent-seeking activities in Argentina? In this paper, I quantitatively show that rent-seeking activities in the form of bribes have aggregate effects through two channels. First, they generate misallocation of resources across firms, because they prevent resources from flowing to the most productive ones, reallocating them instead to those that succeed at rent-seeking. Second, such activities affect the allocation of resources within firms, because they drive resources away from innovation activities. These two channels can help explain why Argentina has both more misallocation across firms and less investment in research and development than developed economies explaining a sizable portion of the Argentinian low productivity.Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de EconomíaFattal Jaef, Roberto10/28/2021 17:25Z10/28/2021 17:25Z2020-03Tesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/updatedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdccinfo:ar-repo/semantics/tesisDeMaestriaapplication/pdfapplication/pdfZaourak, G. R. (2020). Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina. [Tesis de maestría, Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía]. Repositorio Digital San Andrés. http://hdl.handle.net/10908/18834http://hdl.handle.net/10908/18834enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/reponame:Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa)instname:Universidad de San Andrés2026-03-26T12:18:17Zoai:repositorio.udesa.edu.ar:10908/18834instacron:Universidad de San AndrésInstitucionalhttp://repositorio.udesa.edu.ar/jspui/Universidad privadaNo correspondehttp://repositorio.udesa.edu.ar/oai/requestmsanroman@udesa.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:23632026-03-26 12:18:17.51Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa) - Universidad de San Andrésfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina
title Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina
spellingShingle Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina
Zaourak, Gabriel Roberto
title_short Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina
title_full Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina
title_fullStr Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina
title_full_unstemmed Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina
title_sort Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Zaourak, Gabriel Roberto
author Zaourak, Gabriel Roberto
author_facet Zaourak, Gabriel Roberto
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Fattal Jaef, Roberto
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Fil: Zaourak, Gabriel Roberto. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
What is the efficiency cost of rent-seeking activities in Argentina? In this paper, I quantitatively show that rent-seeking activities in the form of bribes have aggregate effects through two channels. First, they generate misallocation of resources across firms, because they prevent resources from flowing to the most productive ones, reallocating them instead to those that succeed at rent-seeking. Second, such activities affect the allocation of resources within firms, because they drive resources away from innovation activities. These two channels can help explain why Argentina has both more misallocation across firms and less investment in research and development than developed economies explaining a sizable portion of the Argentinian low productivity.
description Fil: Zaourak, Gabriel Roberto. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 10/28/2021 17:25Z
10/28/2021 17:25Z
2020-03
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Tesis
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
info:eu-repo/semantics/updatedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdcc
info:ar-repo/semantics/tesisDeMaestria
format masterThesis
status_str updatedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv Zaourak, G. R. (2020). Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina. [Tesis de maestría, Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía]. Repositorio Digital San Andrés. http://hdl.handle.net/10908/18834
http://hdl.handle.net/10908/18834
identifier_str_mv Zaourak, G. R. (2020). Rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in Argentina. [Tesis de maestría, Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía]. Repositorio Digital San Andrés. http://hdl.handle.net/10908/18834
url http://hdl.handle.net/10908/18834
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa)
instname:Universidad de San Andrés
reponame_str Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa)
collection Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa)
instname_str Universidad de San Andrés
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa) - Universidad de San Andrés
repository.mail.fl_str_mv msanroman@udesa.edu.ar
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score 12.977003

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