Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina

Autores
Krakowski, Krzysztof; Ronconi, Lucas
Año de publicación
2025
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Does compliance with low-cost civic duties increase accountability-seeking behaviors among citizenry? We address this question by conducting a field experiment at train stations in Buenos Aires. We create exogenous variation in compliance with paying the public transportation fare by: (i) highlighting sanctions for non-compliance and ii) appealing to social norms whereby 90% passengers pay the ticket. We find that both sanctions and norms treatments raise compliance. However, only appeals to social norms make treated passengers more willing to sign a petition demanding quality public transportation service—our measure of accountability-seeking behavior. To probe the mechanisms explaining these patterns, we show that compliance invoked by adherence to norms makes subjects feel more entitled to demand accountability and trust the government to a greater extent. Our findings suggest that raising compliance through appeals to social norms may thus have wider benefits for civic behaviors.
Fil: Krakowski, Krzysztof. Kings College London (kcl);
Fil: Ronconi, Lucas. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín; Argentina. Alianza para la Educación de Profesionales de la Salud; Kenia. Instituto de Economía Laboral; Alemania
Materia
ARGENTINA
COMPLIANCE
RECIPROCITY
ACCOUNTABILITY
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/265268

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spelling Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in ArgentinaKrakowski, KrzysztofRonconi, LucasARGENTINACOMPLIANCERECIPROCITYACCOUNTABILITYhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5Does compliance with low-cost civic duties increase accountability-seeking behaviors among citizenry? We address this question by conducting a field experiment at train stations in Buenos Aires. We create exogenous variation in compliance with paying the public transportation fare by: (i) highlighting sanctions for non-compliance and ii) appealing to social norms whereby 90% passengers pay the ticket. We find that both sanctions and norms treatments raise compliance. However, only appeals to social norms make treated passengers more willing to sign a petition demanding quality public transportation service—our measure of accountability-seeking behavior. To probe the mechanisms explaining these patterns, we show that compliance invoked by adherence to norms makes subjects feel more entitled to demand accountability and trust the government to a greater extent. Our findings suggest that raising compliance through appeals to social norms may thus have wider benefits for civic behaviors.Fil: Krakowski, Krzysztof. Kings College London (kcl);Fil: Ronconi, Lucas. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín; Argentina. Alianza para la Educación de Profesionales de la Salud; Kenia. Instituto de Economía Laboral; AlemaniaNorth-Holland2025-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/265268Krakowski, Krzysztof; Ronconi, Lucas; Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina; North-Holland; Journal of Development Economics; 175; 103492; 6-2025; 1-570304-3878CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0304387825000434info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103492info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T10:04:21Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/265268instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 10:04:21.698CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina
title Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina
spellingShingle Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina
Krakowski, Krzysztof
ARGENTINA
COMPLIANCE
RECIPROCITY
ACCOUNTABILITY
title_short Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina
title_full Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina
title_fullStr Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina
title_full_unstemmed Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina
title_sort Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Krakowski, Krzysztof
Ronconi, Lucas
author Krakowski, Krzysztof
author_facet Krakowski, Krzysztof
Ronconi, Lucas
author_role author
author2 Ronconi, Lucas
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv ARGENTINA
COMPLIANCE
RECIPROCITY
ACCOUNTABILITY
topic ARGENTINA
COMPLIANCE
RECIPROCITY
ACCOUNTABILITY
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Does compliance with low-cost civic duties increase accountability-seeking behaviors among citizenry? We address this question by conducting a field experiment at train stations in Buenos Aires. We create exogenous variation in compliance with paying the public transportation fare by: (i) highlighting sanctions for non-compliance and ii) appealing to social norms whereby 90% passengers pay the ticket. We find that both sanctions and norms treatments raise compliance. However, only appeals to social norms make treated passengers more willing to sign a petition demanding quality public transportation service—our measure of accountability-seeking behavior. To probe the mechanisms explaining these patterns, we show that compliance invoked by adherence to norms makes subjects feel more entitled to demand accountability and trust the government to a greater extent. Our findings suggest that raising compliance through appeals to social norms may thus have wider benefits for civic behaviors.
Fil: Krakowski, Krzysztof. Kings College London (kcl);
Fil: Ronconi, Lucas. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín; Argentina. Alianza para la Educación de Profesionales de la Salud; Kenia. Instituto de Economía Laboral; Alemania
description Does compliance with low-cost civic duties increase accountability-seeking behaviors among citizenry? We address this question by conducting a field experiment at train stations in Buenos Aires. We create exogenous variation in compliance with paying the public transportation fare by: (i) highlighting sanctions for non-compliance and ii) appealing to social norms whereby 90% passengers pay the ticket. We find that both sanctions and norms treatments raise compliance. However, only appeals to social norms make treated passengers more willing to sign a petition demanding quality public transportation service—our measure of accountability-seeking behavior. To probe the mechanisms explaining these patterns, we show that compliance invoked by adherence to norms makes subjects feel more entitled to demand accountability and trust the government to a greater extent. Our findings suggest that raising compliance through appeals to social norms may thus have wider benefits for civic behaviors.
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025-06
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/265268
Krakowski, Krzysztof; Ronconi, Lucas; Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina; North-Holland; Journal of Development Economics; 175; 103492; 6-2025; 1-57
0304-3878
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/265268
identifier_str_mv Krakowski, Krzysztof; Ronconi, Lucas; Compliance and accountability-seeking: Evidence from a field experiment in Argentina; North-Holland; Journal of Development Economics; 175; 103492; 6-2025; 1-57
0304-3878
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0304387825000434
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103492
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv North-Holland
publisher.none.fl_str_mv North-Holland
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397