Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind

Autores
Destéfano, Mariela Natalia
Año de publicación
2021
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
No one can deny that enactive approaches to the mind are here to stay. However, much of this revolution has been built on the grounds of conceptual confusions and hurried anlyses that undermine enactive claims. The aim of this paper is to weaken the charge of intellectualism against cognitivism developed by Hutto and Myin. This charge turns to be central to the enactive purpose of setting up a fully postcognitivist position. I will follow a strategy of conceptual elucidation of “intellectualism”. Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) present two alternative characterizations of this notion. The first is tied to the Cartesian conception of the mind (which I will call “Cartesian intellectualism”), and the second is tied to the idea that there is no cognition without content (which I will call “semantic intellectualism”). I would like to go into the problems considering cognititivsm either as Cartesian or semantic intellectualism.
Fil: Destéfano, Mariela Natalia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Materia
Computational theory of mind
Enactivism
Cartesianism
Mental representation
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/158397
Acceder
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spelling Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mindDestéfano, Mariela NataliaComputational theory of mindEnactivismCartesianismMental representationhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6No one can deny that enactive approaches to the mind are here to stay. However, much of this revolution has been built on the grounds of conceptual confusions and hurried anlyses that undermine enactive claims. The aim of this paper is to weaken the charge of intellectualism against cognitivism developed by Hutto and Myin. This charge turns to be central to the enactive purpose of setting up a fully postcognitivist position. I will follow a strategy of conceptual elucidation of “intellectualism”. Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) present two alternative characterizations of this notion. The first is tied to the Cartesian conception of the mind (which I will call “Cartesian intellectualism”), and the second is tied to the idea that there is no cognition without content (which I will call “semantic intellectualism”). I would like to go into the problems considering cognititivsm either as Cartesian or semantic intellectualism.Fil: Destéfano, Mariela Natalia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaRosenberg & Sellier2021-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/158397Destéfano, Mariela Natalia; Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind; Rosenberg & Sellier; Phenomenology and Mind; 21; 12-2021; 142-1532280-78532239-4028CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.rosenbergesellier.it/ita/scheda-libro?aaeref=2187info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.17454/pam-2111info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:21:19Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/158397instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:21:20.265CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind
title Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind
spellingShingle Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind
Destéfano, Mariela Natalia
Computational theory of mind
Enactivism
Cartesianism
Mental representation
title_short Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind
title_full Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind
title_fullStr Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind
title_full_unstemmed Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind
title_sort Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Destéfano, Mariela Natalia
author Destéfano, Mariela Natalia
author_facet Destéfano, Mariela Natalia
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Computational theory of mind
Enactivism
Cartesianism
Mental representation
topic Computational theory of mind
Enactivism
Cartesianism
Mental representation
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv No one can deny that enactive approaches to the mind are here to stay. However, much of this revolution has been built on the grounds of conceptual confusions and hurried anlyses that undermine enactive claims. The aim of this paper is to weaken the charge of intellectualism against cognitivism developed by Hutto and Myin. This charge turns to be central to the enactive purpose of setting up a fully postcognitivist position. I will follow a strategy of conceptual elucidation of “intellectualism”. Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) present two alternative characterizations of this notion. The first is tied to the Cartesian conception of the mind (which I will call “Cartesian intellectualism”), and the second is tied to the idea that there is no cognition without content (which I will call “semantic intellectualism”). I would like to go into the problems considering cognititivsm either as Cartesian or semantic intellectualism.
Fil: Destéfano, Mariela Natalia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina
description No one can deny that enactive approaches to the mind are here to stay. However, much of this revolution has been built on the grounds of conceptual confusions and hurried anlyses that undermine enactive claims. The aim of this paper is to weaken the charge of intellectualism against cognitivism developed by Hutto and Myin. This charge turns to be central to the enactive purpose of setting up a fully postcognitivist position. I will follow a strategy of conceptual elucidation of “intellectualism”. Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) present two alternative characterizations of this notion. The first is tied to the Cartesian conception of the mind (which I will call “Cartesian intellectualism”), and the second is tied to the idea that there is no cognition without content (which I will call “semantic intellectualism”). I would like to go into the problems considering cognititivsm either as Cartesian or semantic intellectualism.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-12
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/158397
Destéfano, Mariela Natalia; Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind; Rosenberg & Sellier; Phenomenology and Mind; 21; 12-2021; 142-153
2280-7853
2239-4028
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/158397
identifier_str_mv Destéfano, Mariela Natalia; Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind; Rosenberg & Sellier; Phenomenology and Mind; 21; 12-2021; 142-153
2280-7853
2239-4028
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.rosenbergesellier.it/ita/scheda-libro?aaeref=2187
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.17454/pam-2111
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Rosenberg & Sellier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Rosenberg & Sellier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.069144

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