Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind
- Autores
- Destéfano, Mariela Natalia
- Año de publicación
- 2021
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- No one can deny that enactive approaches to the mind are here to stay. However, much of this revolution has been built on the grounds of conceptual confusions and hurried anlyses that undermine enactive claims. The aim of this paper is to weaken the charge of intellectualism against cognitivism developed by Hutto and Myin. This charge turns to be central to the enactive purpose of setting up a fully postcognitivist position. I will follow a strategy of conceptual elucidation of “intellectualism”. Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) present two alternative characterizations of this notion. The first is tied to the Cartesian conception of the mind (which I will call “Cartesian intellectualism”), and the second is tied to the idea that there is no cognition without content (which I will call “semantic intellectualism”). I would like to go into the problems considering cognititivsm either as Cartesian or semantic intellectualism.
Fil: Destéfano, Mariela Natalia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina - Materia
-
Computational theory of mind
Enactivism
Cartesianism
Mental representation - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/158397
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mindDestéfano, Mariela NataliaComputational theory of mindEnactivismCartesianismMental representationhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6No one can deny that enactive approaches to the mind are here to stay. However, much of this revolution has been built on the grounds of conceptual confusions and hurried anlyses that undermine enactive claims. The aim of this paper is to weaken the charge of intellectualism against cognitivism developed by Hutto and Myin. This charge turns to be central to the enactive purpose of setting up a fully postcognitivist position. I will follow a strategy of conceptual elucidation of “intellectualism”. Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) present two alternative characterizations of this notion. The first is tied to the Cartesian conception of the mind (which I will call “Cartesian intellectualism”), and the second is tied to the idea that there is no cognition without content (which I will call “semantic intellectualism”). I would like to go into the problems considering cognititivsm either as Cartesian or semantic intellectualism.Fil: Destéfano, Mariela Natalia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaRosenberg & Sellier2021-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/158397Destéfano, Mariela Natalia; Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind; Rosenberg & Sellier; Phenomenology and Mind; 21; 12-2021; 142-1532280-78532239-4028CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.rosenbergesellier.it/ita/scheda-libro?aaeref=2187info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.17454/pam-2111info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T10:03:42Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/158397instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 10:03:43.236CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind |
title |
Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind |
spellingShingle |
Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind Destéfano, Mariela Natalia Computational theory of mind Enactivism Cartesianism Mental representation |
title_short |
Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind |
title_full |
Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind |
title_fullStr |
Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind |
title_full_unstemmed |
Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind |
title_sort |
Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Destéfano, Mariela Natalia |
author |
Destéfano, Mariela Natalia |
author_facet |
Destéfano, Mariela Natalia |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Computational theory of mind Enactivism Cartesianism Mental representation |
topic |
Computational theory of mind Enactivism Cartesianism Mental representation |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
No one can deny that enactive approaches to the mind are here to stay. However, much of this revolution has been built on the grounds of conceptual confusions and hurried anlyses that undermine enactive claims. The aim of this paper is to weaken the charge of intellectualism against cognitivism developed by Hutto and Myin. This charge turns to be central to the enactive purpose of setting up a fully postcognitivist position. I will follow a strategy of conceptual elucidation of “intellectualism”. Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) present two alternative characterizations of this notion. The first is tied to the Cartesian conception of the mind (which I will call “Cartesian intellectualism”), and the second is tied to the idea that there is no cognition without content (which I will call “semantic intellectualism”). I would like to go into the problems considering cognititivsm either as Cartesian or semantic intellectualism. Fil: Destéfano, Mariela Natalia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina |
description |
No one can deny that enactive approaches to the mind are here to stay. However, much of this revolution has been built on the grounds of conceptual confusions and hurried anlyses that undermine enactive claims. The aim of this paper is to weaken the charge of intellectualism against cognitivism developed by Hutto and Myin. This charge turns to be central to the enactive purpose of setting up a fully postcognitivist position. I will follow a strategy of conceptual elucidation of “intellectualism”. Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) present two alternative characterizations of this notion. The first is tied to the Cartesian conception of the mind (which I will call “Cartesian intellectualism”), and the second is tied to the idea that there is no cognition without content (which I will call “semantic intellectualism”). I would like to go into the problems considering cognititivsm either as Cartesian or semantic intellectualism. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-12 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/158397 Destéfano, Mariela Natalia; Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind; Rosenberg & Sellier; Phenomenology and Mind; 21; 12-2021; 142-153 2280-7853 2239-4028 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/158397 |
identifier_str_mv |
Destéfano, Mariela Natalia; Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind; Rosenberg & Sellier; Phenomenology and Mind; 21; 12-2021; 142-153 2280-7853 2239-4028 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.rosenbergesellier.it/ita/scheda-libro?aaeref=2187 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.17454/pam-2111 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/ |
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openAccess |
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/ |
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application/pdf application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
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Rosenberg & Sellier |
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reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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13.13397 |