Random multi-player games

Autores
Kontorovsky, Natalia Lucía; Pinasco, Juan Pablo; Vazquez, Federico
Año de publicación
2022
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also, local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many situations, however, interactions between different numbers of players in each round could take place, and this case cannot be reduced to pairwise interactions. In this work, we formalize and generalize the definition of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) to be able to include a scenario in which the game is played by two players with probability p and by three players with the complementary probability 1-p. We show the existence of equilibria in pure and mixed strategies depending on the probability p, on a concrete example of the duel-truel game. We find a range of p values for which the game has a mixed equilibrium and the proportion of players in each strategy depends on the particular value of p. We prove that each of these mixed equilibrium points is ESS. A more realistic way to study this dynamics with high-order interactions is to look at how it evolves in complex networks. We introduce and study an agent-based model on a network with a fixed number of nodes, which evolves as the replicator equation predicts. By studying the dynamics of this model on random networks, we find that the phase transitions between the pure and mixed equilibria depend on probability p and also on the mean degree of the network. We derive mean-field and pair approximation equations that give results in good agreement with simulations on different networks.
Fil: Kontorovsky, Natalia Lucía. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Calculo. - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Calculo; Argentina
Fil: Pinasco, Juan Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Investigaciones Matemáticas "Luis A. Santaló". Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Investigaciones Matemáticas "Luis A. Santaló"; Argentina
Fil: Vazquez, Federico. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Calculo. - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Calculo; Argentina
Materia
game theory
evolutionary
multiplayer
random
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/203611

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spelling Random multi-player gamesKontorovsky, Natalia LucíaPinasco, Juan PabloVazquez, Federicogame theoryevolutionarymultiplayerrandomhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also, local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many situations, however, interactions between different numbers of players in each round could take place, and this case cannot be reduced to pairwise interactions. In this work, we formalize and generalize the definition of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) to be able to include a scenario in which the game is played by two players with probability p and by three players with the complementary probability 1-p. We show the existence of equilibria in pure and mixed strategies depending on the probability p, on a concrete example of the duel-truel game. We find a range of p values for which the game has a mixed equilibrium and the proportion of players in each strategy depends on the particular value of p. We prove that each of these mixed equilibrium points is ESS. A more realistic way to study this dynamics with high-order interactions is to look at how it evolves in complex networks. We introduce and study an agent-based model on a network with a fixed number of nodes, which evolves as the replicator equation predicts. By studying the dynamics of this model on random networks, we find that the phase transitions between the pure and mixed equilibria depend on probability p and also on the mean degree of the network. We derive mean-field and pair approximation equations that give results in good agreement with simulations on different networks.Fil: Kontorovsky, Natalia Lucía. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Calculo. - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Calculo; ArgentinaFil: Pinasco, Juan Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Investigaciones Matemáticas "Luis A. Santaló". Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Investigaciones Matemáticas "Luis A. Santaló"; ArgentinaFil: Vazquez, Federico. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Calculo. - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Calculo; ArgentinaAmerican Institute of Physics2022-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/203611Kontorovsky, Natalia Lucía; Pinasco, Juan Pablo; Vazquez, Federico; Random multi-player games; American Institute of Physics; Chaos; 32; 3; 3-2022; 1-141054-15001089-7682CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://pubs.aip.org/aip/cha/article/32/3/033128/2835766/Random-multi-player-gamesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1063/5.0080137info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:46:11Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/203611instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:46:11.884CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Random multi-player games
title Random multi-player games
spellingShingle Random multi-player games
Kontorovsky, Natalia Lucía
game theory
evolutionary
multiplayer
random
title_short Random multi-player games
title_full Random multi-player games
title_fullStr Random multi-player games
title_full_unstemmed Random multi-player games
title_sort Random multi-player games
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Kontorovsky, Natalia Lucía
Pinasco, Juan Pablo
Vazquez, Federico
author Kontorovsky, Natalia Lucía
author_facet Kontorovsky, Natalia Lucía
Pinasco, Juan Pablo
Vazquez, Federico
author_role author
author2 Pinasco, Juan Pablo
Vazquez, Federico
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv game theory
evolutionary
multiplayer
random
topic game theory
evolutionary
multiplayer
random
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also, local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many situations, however, interactions between different numbers of players in each round could take place, and this case cannot be reduced to pairwise interactions. In this work, we formalize and generalize the definition of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) to be able to include a scenario in which the game is played by two players with probability p and by three players with the complementary probability 1-p. We show the existence of equilibria in pure and mixed strategies depending on the probability p, on a concrete example of the duel-truel game. We find a range of p values for which the game has a mixed equilibrium and the proportion of players in each strategy depends on the particular value of p. We prove that each of these mixed equilibrium points is ESS. A more realistic way to study this dynamics with high-order interactions is to look at how it evolves in complex networks. We introduce and study an agent-based model on a network with a fixed number of nodes, which evolves as the replicator equation predicts. By studying the dynamics of this model on random networks, we find that the phase transitions between the pure and mixed equilibria depend on probability p and also on the mean degree of the network. We derive mean-field and pair approximation equations that give results in good agreement with simulations on different networks.
Fil: Kontorovsky, Natalia Lucía. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Calculo. - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Calculo; Argentina
Fil: Pinasco, Juan Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Investigaciones Matemáticas "Luis A. Santaló". Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Investigaciones Matemáticas "Luis A. Santaló"; Argentina
Fil: Vazquez, Federico. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Calculo. - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Calculo; Argentina
description The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also, local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many situations, however, interactions between different numbers of players in each round could take place, and this case cannot be reduced to pairwise interactions. In this work, we formalize and generalize the definition of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) to be able to include a scenario in which the game is played by two players with probability p and by three players with the complementary probability 1-p. We show the existence of equilibria in pure and mixed strategies depending on the probability p, on a concrete example of the duel-truel game. We find a range of p values for which the game has a mixed equilibrium and the proportion of players in each strategy depends on the particular value of p. We prove that each of these mixed equilibrium points is ESS. A more realistic way to study this dynamics with high-order interactions is to look at how it evolves in complex networks. We introduce and study an agent-based model on a network with a fixed number of nodes, which evolves as the replicator equation predicts. By studying the dynamics of this model on random networks, we find that the phase transitions between the pure and mixed equilibria depend on probability p and also on the mean degree of the network. We derive mean-field and pair approximation equations that give results in good agreement with simulations on different networks.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-03
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/203611
Kontorovsky, Natalia Lucía; Pinasco, Juan Pablo; Vazquez, Federico; Random multi-player games; American Institute of Physics; Chaos; 32; 3; 3-2022; 1-14
1054-1500
1089-7682
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/203611
identifier_str_mv Kontorovsky, Natalia Lucía; Pinasco, Juan Pablo; Vazquez, Federico; Random multi-player games; American Institute of Physics; Chaos; 32; 3; 3-2022; 1-14
1054-1500
1089-7682
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://pubs.aip.org/aip/cha/article/32/3/033128/2835766/Random-multi-player-games
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1063/5.0080137
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Institute of Physics
publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Institute of Physics
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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