Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game

Autores
Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe
Año de publicación
2015
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction.
Fil: Levine, David K.. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos
Fil: Modica, Salvatore. Università Degli Studi Di Palermo;
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina
Fil: Zurita, Felipe. Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile
Materia
Impatience
Evolution
Replicator Dynamics
Evolutionary Game Theory
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/113041
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/113041
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff gameLevine, David K.Modica, SalvatoreWeinschelbaum, FedericoZurita, FelipeImpatienceEvolutionReplicator DynamicsEvolutionary Game Theoryhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction.Fil: Levine, David K.. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados UnidosFil: Modica, Salvatore. Università Degli Studi Di Palermo;Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés; ArgentinaFil: Zurita, Felipe. Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; ChileAmerican Economic Association2015-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/113041Levine, David K. ; Modica, Salvatore ; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe ; Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game; American Economic Association; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; 7; 3; 8-2015; 295-3171945-7685CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20130188info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/mic.20130188info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:58:42Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/113041instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:58:42.687CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game
title Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game
spellingShingle Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game
Levine, David K.
Impatience
Evolution
Replicator Dynamics
Evolutionary Game Theory
title_short Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game
title_full Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game
title_fullStr Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game
title_full_unstemmed Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game
title_sort Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Levine, David K.
Modica, Salvatore
Weinschelbaum, Federico
Zurita, Felipe
author Levine, David K.
author_facet Levine, David K.
Modica, Salvatore
Weinschelbaum, Federico
Zurita, Felipe
author_role author
author2 Modica, Salvatore
Weinschelbaum, Federico
Zurita, Felipe
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Impatience
Evolution
Replicator Dynamics
Evolutionary Game Theory
topic Impatience
Evolution
Replicator Dynamics
Evolutionary Game Theory
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction.
Fil: Levine, David K.. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos
Fil: Modica, Salvatore. Università Degli Studi Di Palermo;
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina
Fil: Zurita, Felipe. Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile
description The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-08
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/113041
Levine, David K. ; Modica, Salvatore ; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe ; Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game; American Economic Association; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; 7; 3; 8-2015; 295-317
1945-7685
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/113041
identifier_str_mv Levine, David K. ; Modica, Salvatore ; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe ; Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game; American Economic Association; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; 7; 3; 8-2015; 295-317
1945-7685
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20130188
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/mic.20130188
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Economic Association
publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Economic Association
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1844613747586367488
score 13.070432

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