Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game

Autores
Hernández Lahme, Damián Gabriel; Zanette, Damian Horacio
Año de publicación
2014
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We study a population involved in a cyclic game of three strategies – the rock-paper-scissors game – whose agents interact through groups of three individuals (triplets), considering the possibility that two weak agents cooperate and beat a strong one. In a wide range of parameters the system presents a stable heteroclinic cycle, which implies that in a finite population some of the strategies become extinct and others survive. We find that the cooperation within triplets only benefits the survival of the strategy if the cooperation probability is above a certain threshold. We study the survival probabilities of the different strategies as a function of the cooperation parameters through a analytic approximation and compare with simulations, obtaining a good agreement. Results are generalizable to other systems with heteroclinic cycles.
Fil: Hernández Lahme, Damián Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Centro Atómico Bariloche; Argentina
Fil: Zanette, Damian Horacio. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Centro Atómico Bariloche; Argentina
Materia
Game
Evolutionary
Cooperation
Triplets
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/26671
Acceder
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network_acronym_str CONICETDig
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors gameHernández Lahme, Damián GabrielZanette, Damian HoracioGameEvolutionaryCooperationTripletshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1We study a population involved in a cyclic game of three strategies – the rock-paper-scissors game – whose agents interact through groups of three individuals (triplets), considering the possibility that two weak agents cooperate and beat a strong one. In a wide range of parameters the system presents a stable heteroclinic cycle, which implies that in a finite population some of the strategies become extinct and others survive. We find that the cooperation within triplets only benefits the survival of the strategy if the cooperation probability is above a certain threshold. We study the survival probabilities of the different strategies as a function of the cooperation parameters through a analytic approximation and compare with simulations, obtaining a good agreement. Results are generalizable to other systems with heteroclinic cycles.Fil: Hernández Lahme, Damián Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Centro Atómico Bariloche; ArgentinaFil: Zanette, Damian Horacio. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Centro Atómico Bariloche; ArgentinaSpringer2014-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/26671Hernández Lahme, Damián Gabriel; Zanette, Damian Horacio; Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game; Springer; European Physical Journal B - Condensed Matter; 87; 19; 1-2014; 191-1971434-60281434-6036CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://link.springer.com/article/10.1140/epjb/e2013-40797-3info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1140/epjb/e2013-40797-3info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:46:58Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/26671instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:46:58.333CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game
title Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game
spellingShingle Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game
Hernández Lahme, Damián Gabriel
Game
Evolutionary
Cooperation
Triplets
title_short Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game
title_full Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game
title_fullStr Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game
title_full_unstemmed Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game
title_sort Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Hernández Lahme, Damián Gabriel
Zanette, Damian Horacio
author Hernández Lahme, Damián Gabriel
author_facet Hernández Lahme, Damián Gabriel
Zanette, Damian Horacio
author_role author
author2 Zanette, Damian Horacio
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Game
Evolutionary
Cooperation
Triplets
topic Game
Evolutionary
Cooperation
Triplets
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We study a population involved in a cyclic game of three strategies – the rock-paper-scissors game – whose agents interact through groups of three individuals (triplets), considering the possibility that two weak agents cooperate and beat a strong one. In a wide range of parameters the system presents a stable heteroclinic cycle, which implies that in a finite population some of the strategies become extinct and others survive. We find that the cooperation within triplets only benefits the survival of the strategy if the cooperation probability is above a certain threshold. We study the survival probabilities of the different strategies as a function of the cooperation parameters through a analytic approximation and compare with simulations, obtaining a good agreement. Results are generalizable to other systems with heteroclinic cycles.
Fil: Hernández Lahme, Damián Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Centro Atómico Bariloche; Argentina
Fil: Zanette, Damian Horacio. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Centro Atómico Bariloche; Argentina
description We study a population involved in a cyclic game of three strategies – the rock-paper-scissors game – whose agents interact through groups of three individuals (triplets), considering the possibility that two weak agents cooperate and beat a strong one. In a wide range of parameters the system presents a stable heteroclinic cycle, which implies that in a finite population some of the strategies become extinct and others survive. We find that the cooperation within triplets only benefits the survival of the strategy if the cooperation probability is above a certain threshold. We study the survival probabilities of the different strategies as a function of the cooperation parameters through a analytic approximation and compare with simulations, obtaining a good agreement. Results are generalizable to other systems with heteroclinic cycles.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/26671
Hernández Lahme, Damián Gabriel; Zanette, Damian Horacio; Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game; Springer; European Physical Journal B - Condensed Matter; 87; 19; 1-2014; 191-197
1434-6028
1434-6036
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/26671
identifier_str_mv Hernández Lahme, Damián Gabriel; Zanette, Damian Horacio; Cooperation within triplets in the rock-paper-scissors game; Springer; European Physical Journal B - Condensed Matter; 87; 19; 1-2014; 191-197
1434-6028
1434-6036
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://link.springer.com/article/10.1140/epjb/e2013-40797-3
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1140/epjb/e2013-40797-3
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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