On favoritism in auctions with entry

Autores
Arozamena, Leandro Roberto; Weinschelbaum, Federico
Año de publicación
2011
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller's welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders' welfare more than her own "private" utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal.
Fil: Arozamena, Leandro Roberto. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina
Materia
AUCTIONS
ENDOGENOUS NUMBER OF BIDDERS
FAVORITISM
FREE ENTRY
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/191933
Acceder
id CONICETDig_f2c0550ff30935f50c0d73221907567d
oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/191933
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling On favoritism in auctions with entryArozamena, Leandro RobertoWeinschelbaum, FedericoAUCTIONSENDOGENOUS NUMBER OF BIDDERSFAVORITISMFREE ENTRYhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller's welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders' welfare more than her own "private" utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal.Fil: Arozamena, Leandro Roberto. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; ArgentinaFil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés; ArgentinaElsevier2011-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/191933Arozamena, Leandro Roberto; Weinschelbaum, Federico; On favoritism in auctions with entry; Elsevier; Economics Letters; 110; 3; 3-2011; 265-2670165-1765CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.036info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517651000409Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-11-05T10:08:25Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/191933instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-11-05 10:08:26.035CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On favoritism in auctions with entry
title On favoritism in auctions with entry
spellingShingle On favoritism in auctions with entry
Arozamena, Leandro Roberto
AUCTIONS
ENDOGENOUS NUMBER OF BIDDERS
FAVORITISM
FREE ENTRY
title_short On favoritism in auctions with entry
title_full On favoritism in auctions with entry
title_fullStr On favoritism in auctions with entry
title_full_unstemmed On favoritism in auctions with entry
title_sort On favoritism in auctions with entry
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Arozamena, Leandro Roberto
Weinschelbaum, Federico
author Arozamena, Leandro Roberto
author_facet Arozamena, Leandro Roberto
Weinschelbaum, Federico
author_role author
author2 Weinschelbaum, Federico
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv AUCTIONS
ENDOGENOUS NUMBER OF BIDDERS
FAVORITISM
FREE ENTRY
topic AUCTIONS
ENDOGENOUS NUMBER OF BIDDERS
FAVORITISM
FREE ENTRY
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller's welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders' welfare more than her own "private" utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal.
Fil: Arozamena, Leandro Roberto. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina
description We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller's welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders' welfare more than her own "private" utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011-03
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/191933
Arozamena, Leandro Roberto; Weinschelbaum, Federico; On favoritism in auctions with entry; Elsevier; Economics Letters; 110; 3; 3-2011; 265-267
0165-1765
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/191933
identifier_str_mv Arozamena, Leandro Roberto; Weinschelbaum, Federico; On favoritism in auctions with entry; Elsevier; Economics Letters; 110; 3; 3-2011; 265-267
0165-1765
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.036
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517651000409X
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1847977588762345472
score 13.087074

Publicaciones similares