Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers

Autores
Accinelli, Elvio; London, Silvia; Punzo, Lionello F.; Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.
Año de publicación
2010
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We consider an economy with two types of firms (innovative and non-innovative) and two types of workers (skilled and unskilled), where workers´ decisions are driven by imitative behavior, and thus the evolution of such an economy depends on the initial distribution of the firms. We show that there exists a continuous of high level steady states and only one low level and asymptotically stable equilibrium. There exists a threshold value on the initial number of firms to be overcome it to located in the basin of attraction of one of the high level equilibrium. We show that in each high level equilibrium there coexists a share of innovative firms with a share of non-innovative firms, and a share of skilled workers (human capital) coexisting with a share of unskilled workers. But if the initial share of innovative firms is lowerthan the threshold value, then the economy evolves to a low level equilibrium wholly composed by non-innovative firms and unskilled workers. Finally, we characterise the equilibria as the evolutionarily stable strategies against a field.
Fil: Accinelli, Elvio. Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí.; México
Fil: London, Silvia. Universidad Nacional del Sur; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca; Argentina
Fil: Punzo, Lionello F.. University of Siena; Italia
Fil: Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.. University of Siena; Italia
Materia
Imitative Behavior
Threshold Value
Poverty Traps
Strategic Complementarities
Two Population Normal Form Game
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/105860
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and WorkersAccinelli, ElvioLondon, SilviaPunzo, Lionello F.Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.Imitative BehaviorThreshold ValuePoverty TrapsStrategic ComplementaritiesTwo Population Normal Form Gamehttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We consider an economy with two types of firms (innovative and non-innovative) and two types of workers (skilled and unskilled), where workers´ decisions are driven by imitative behavior, and thus the evolution of such an economy depends on the initial distribution of the firms. We show that there exists a continuous of high level steady states and only one low level and asymptotically stable equilibrium. There exists a threshold value on the initial number of firms to be overcome it to located in the basin of attraction of one of the high level equilibrium. We show that in each high level equilibrium there coexists a share of innovative firms with a share of non-innovative firms, and a share of skilled workers (human capital) coexisting with a share of unskilled workers. But if the initial share of innovative firms is lowerthan the threshold value, then the economy evolves to a low level equilibrium wholly composed by non-innovative firms and unskilled workers. Finally, we characterise the equilibria as the evolutionarily stable strategies against a field.Fil: Accinelli, Elvio. Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí.; MéxicoFil: London, Silvia. Universidad Nacional del Sur; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca; ArgentinaFil: Punzo, Lionello F.. University of Siena; ItaliaFil: Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.. University of Siena; ItaliaEconomics and Econometrics Research Institute2010-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/105860Accinelli, Elvio; London, Silvia; Punzo, Lionello F.; Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.; Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers; Economics and Econometrics Research Institute; Journal of Economics and Econometrics; 53; 1; 12-2010; 90-1102032-96522032-9660CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.eeri.eu/documents/jee/JEE_2010_01_04.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://ideas.repec.org/a/eei/journl/v53y2010i1p90-110.htmlinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:35:56Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/105860instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:35:57.147CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers
title Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers
spellingShingle Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers
Accinelli, Elvio
Imitative Behavior
Threshold Value
Poverty Traps
Strategic Complementarities
Two Population Normal Form Game
title_short Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers
title_full Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers
title_fullStr Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers
title_sort Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Accinelli, Elvio
London, Silvia
Punzo, Lionello F.
Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.
author Accinelli, Elvio
author_facet Accinelli, Elvio
London, Silvia
Punzo, Lionello F.
Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.
author_role author
author2 London, Silvia
Punzo, Lionello F.
Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Imitative Behavior
Threshold Value
Poverty Traps
Strategic Complementarities
Two Population Normal Form Game
topic Imitative Behavior
Threshold Value
Poverty Traps
Strategic Complementarities
Two Population Normal Form Game
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We consider an economy with two types of firms (innovative and non-innovative) and two types of workers (skilled and unskilled), where workers´ decisions are driven by imitative behavior, and thus the evolution of such an economy depends on the initial distribution of the firms. We show that there exists a continuous of high level steady states and only one low level and asymptotically stable equilibrium. There exists a threshold value on the initial number of firms to be overcome it to located in the basin of attraction of one of the high level equilibrium. We show that in each high level equilibrium there coexists a share of innovative firms with a share of non-innovative firms, and a share of skilled workers (human capital) coexisting with a share of unskilled workers. But if the initial share of innovative firms is lowerthan the threshold value, then the economy evolves to a low level equilibrium wholly composed by non-innovative firms and unskilled workers. Finally, we characterise the equilibria as the evolutionarily stable strategies against a field.
Fil: Accinelli, Elvio. Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí.; México
Fil: London, Silvia. Universidad Nacional del Sur; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca; Argentina
Fil: Punzo, Lionello F.. University of Siena; Italia
Fil: Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.. University of Siena; Italia
description We consider an economy with two types of firms (innovative and non-innovative) and two types of workers (skilled and unskilled), where workers´ decisions are driven by imitative behavior, and thus the evolution of such an economy depends on the initial distribution of the firms. We show that there exists a continuous of high level steady states and only one low level and asymptotically stable equilibrium. There exists a threshold value on the initial number of firms to be overcome it to located in the basin of attraction of one of the high level equilibrium. We show that in each high level equilibrium there coexists a share of innovative firms with a share of non-innovative firms, and a share of skilled workers (human capital) coexisting with a share of unskilled workers. But if the initial share of innovative firms is lowerthan the threshold value, then the economy evolves to a low level equilibrium wholly composed by non-innovative firms and unskilled workers. Finally, we characterise the equilibria as the evolutionarily stable strategies against a field.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010-12
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/105860
Accinelli, Elvio; London, Silvia; Punzo, Lionello F.; Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.; Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers; Economics and Econometrics Research Institute; Journal of Economics and Econometrics; 53; 1; 12-2010; 90-110
2032-9652
2032-9660
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/105860
identifier_str_mv Accinelli, Elvio; London, Silvia; Punzo, Lionello F.; Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.; Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers; Economics and Econometrics Research Institute; Journal of Economics and Econometrics; 53; 1; 12-2010; 90-110
2032-9652
2032-9660
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.eeri.eu/documents/jee/JEE_2010_01_04.pdf
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://ideas.repec.org/a/eei/journl/v53y2010i1p90-110.html
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Economics and Econometrics Research Institute
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Economics and Econometrics Research Institute
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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