Secure information flow by self-composition

Autores
Barthe, Gilles; D'argenio, Pedro Ruben; Rezk, Tamara
Año de publicación
2011
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Information flow policies are confidentiality policies that control information leakage through program execution. A common way to enforce secure information flow is through information flow type systems. Although type systems are compositional and usually enjoy decidable type checking or inference, their extensibility is very poor: type systems need to be redefined and proved sound for each new variation of security policy and programming language for which secure information flow verification is desired. In contrast, program logics offer a general mechanism for enforcing a variety of safety policies, and for this reason are favoured in Proof Carrying Code, which is a promising security architecture for mobile code. However, the encoding of information flow policies in program logics is not straightforward because they refer to a relation between two program executions. The purpose of this paper is to investigate logical formulations of secure information flow based on the idea of self-composition, which reduces the problem of secure information flow of a program P to a safety property for a program derived from P by composing P with a renaming of itself. Self-composition enables the use of standard techniques for information flow policy verification, such as program logics and model checking, that are suitable in Proof Carrying Code infrastructures. We illustrate the applicability of self-composition in several settings, including different security policies such as non-interference and controlled forms of declassification, and programming languages including an imperative language with parallel composition, a non-deterministic language and, finally, a language with shared mutable data structures.
Fil: Barthe, Gilles. No especifíca;
Fil: D'argenio, Pedro Ruben. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Matemática, Astronomía y Física. Sección Ciencias de la Computación; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba; Argentina
Fil: Rezk, Tamara. No especifíca;
Materia
INFORMATION FLOW
SELF-COMPOSITION
LANGUAGE-BASED SECURITY
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/195163

id CONICETDig_d21a25c5be3ebf004967c5d2294223fd
oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/195163
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Secure information flow by self-compositionBarthe, GillesD'argenio, Pedro RubenRezk, TamaraINFORMATION FLOWSELF-COMPOSITIONLANGUAGE-BASED SECURITYhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1Information flow policies are confidentiality policies that control information leakage through program execution. A common way to enforce secure information flow is through information flow type systems. Although type systems are compositional and usually enjoy decidable type checking or inference, their extensibility is very poor: type systems need to be redefined and proved sound for each new variation of security policy and programming language for which secure information flow verification is desired. In contrast, program logics offer a general mechanism for enforcing a variety of safety policies, and for this reason are favoured in Proof Carrying Code, which is a promising security architecture for mobile code. However, the encoding of information flow policies in program logics is not straightforward because they refer to a relation between two program executions. The purpose of this paper is to investigate logical formulations of secure information flow based on the idea of self-composition, which reduces the problem of secure information flow of a program P to a safety property for a program derived from P by composing P with a renaming of itself. Self-composition enables the use of standard techniques for information flow policy verification, such as program logics and model checking, that are suitable in Proof Carrying Code infrastructures. We illustrate the applicability of self-composition in several settings, including different security policies such as non-interference and controlled forms of declassification, and programming languages including an imperative language with parallel composition, a non-deterministic language and, finally, a language with shared mutable data structures.Fil: Barthe, Gilles. No especifíca;Fil: D'argenio, Pedro Ruben. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Matemática, Astronomía y Física. Sección Ciencias de la Computación; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba; ArgentinaFil: Rezk, Tamara. No especifíca;Cambridge University Press2011-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/195163Barthe, Gilles; D'argenio, Pedro Ruben; Rezk, Tamara; Secure information flow by self-composition; Cambridge University Press; Mathematical Structures In Computer Science; 21; 6; 12-2011; 1207-12520960-1295CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/mathematical-structures-in-computer-science/article/abs/secure-information-flow-by-selfcomposition/E4DE2A8A9B914434160A4AAFA8A5FB7Binfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1017/S0960129511000193info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:52:11Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/195163instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:52:11.388CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Secure information flow by self-composition
title Secure information flow by self-composition
spellingShingle Secure information flow by self-composition
Barthe, Gilles
INFORMATION FLOW
SELF-COMPOSITION
LANGUAGE-BASED SECURITY
title_short Secure information flow by self-composition
title_full Secure information flow by self-composition
title_fullStr Secure information flow by self-composition
title_full_unstemmed Secure information flow by self-composition
title_sort Secure information flow by self-composition
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Barthe, Gilles
D'argenio, Pedro Ruben
Rezk, Tamara
author Barthe, Gilles
author_facet Barthe, Gilles
D'argenio, Pedro Ruben
Rezk, Tamara
author_role author
author2 D'argenio, Pedro Ruben
Rezk, Tamara
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv INFORMATION FLOW
SELF-COMPOSITION
LANGUAGE-BASED SECURITY
topic INFORMATION FLOW
SELF-COMPOSITION
LANGUAGE-BASED SECURITY
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Information flow policies are confidentiality policies that control information leakage through program execution. A common way to enforce secure information flow is through information flow type systems. Although type systems are compositional and usually enjoy decidable type checking or inference, their extensibility is very poor: type systems need to be redefined and proved sound for each new variation of security policy and programming language for which secure information flow verification is desired. In contrast, program logics offer a general mechanism for enforcing a variety of safety policies, and for this reason are favoured in Proof Carrying Code, which is a promising security architecture for mobile code. However, the encoding of information flow policies in program logics is not straightforward because they refer to a relation between two program executions. The purpose of this paper is to investigate logical formulations of secure information flow based on the idea of self-composition, which reduces the problem of secure information flow of a program P to a safety property for a program derived from P by composing P with a renaming of itself. Self-composition enables the use of standard techniques for information flow policy verification, such as program logics and model checking, that are suitable in Proof Carrying Code infrastructures. We illustrate the applicability of self-composition in several settings, including different security policies such as non-interference and controlled forms of declassification, and programming languages including an imperative language with parallel composition, a non-deterministic language and, finally, a language with shared mutable data structures.
Fil: Barthe, Gilles. No especifíca;
Fil: D'argenio, Pedro Ruben. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Matemática, Astronomía y Física. Sección Ciencias de la Computación; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba; Argentina
Fil: Rezk, Tamara. No especifíca;
description Information flow policies are confidentiality policies that control information leakage through program execution. A common way to enforce secure information flow is through information flow type systems. Although type systems are compositional and usually enjoy decidable type checking or inference, their extensibility is very poor: type systems need to be redefined and proved sound for each new variation of security policy and programming language for which secure information flow verification is desired. In contrast, program logics offer a general mechanism for enforcing a variety of safety policies, and for this reason are favoured in Proof Carrying Code, which is a promising security architecture for mobile code. However, the encoding of information flow policies in program logics is not straightforward because they refer to a relation between two program executions. The purpose of this paper is to investigate logical formulations of secure information flow based on the idea of self-composition, which reduces the problem of secure information flow of a program P to a safety property for a program derived from P by composing P with a renaming of itself. Self-composition enables the use of standard techniques for information flow policy verification, such as program logics and model checking, that are suitable in Proof Carrying Code infrastructures. We illustrate the applicability of self-composition in several settings, including different security policies such as non-interference and controlled forms of declassification, and programming languages including an imperative language with parallel composition, a non-deterministic language and, finally, a language with shared mutable data structures.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011-12
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/195163
Barthe, Gilles; D'argenio, Pedro Ruben; Rezk, Tamara; Secure information flow by self-composition; Cambridge University Press; Mathematical Structures In Computer Science; 21; 6; 12-2011; 1207-1252
0960-1295
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/195163
identifier_str_mv Barthe, Gilles; D'argenio, Pedro Ruben; Rezk, Tamara; Secure information flow by self-composition; Cambridge University Press; Mathematical Structures In Computer Science; 21; 6; 12-2011; 1207-1252
0960-1295
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/mathematical-structures-in-computer-science/article/abs/secure-information-flow-by-selfcomposition/E4DE2A8A9B914434160A4AAFA8A5FB7B
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1017/S0960129511000193
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cambridge University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cambridge University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1844613601895120896
score 13.070432