The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina

Autores
Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Lodola, Germán Jorge
Año de publicación
2011
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
How do fiscal institutions shape the ability of presidents and state governors in a federation to manipulate federal money with coalition building goals? This article proposes a two-level theory of intergovernmental transfers based upon variation in the level of discretionality over the use of federal money that fiscal institutions grant to national and subnational executives. We use subnational level data in Argentina to show that not taking discretionality into account leads to wrong inferences about the electoral returns of intergovernmental transfers. We find that presidents extract different political utility from discretionary and nondiscretionary transfers. While discretionary transfers enable them to directly target voters bypassing opposition provincial governors, nondiscretionary transfers pay off more to co-partisan governors by guaranteeing security in the reception of transfer monies.
Fil: Bonvecchi, Alejandro. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Lodola, Germán Jorge. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
FISCAL FEDERALISM
ARGENTINA
COALITIONS
PRESIDENTS
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/191924
Acceder
id CONICETDig_c62d4e520b3f7232318acbb11aa82987
oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/191924
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in ArgentinaBonvecchi, AlejandroLodola, Germán JorgeFISCAL FEDERALISMARGENTINACOALITIONSPRESIDENTShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5How do fiscal institutions shape the ability of presidents and state governors in a federation to manipulate federal money with coalition building goals? This article proposes a two-level theory of intergovernmental transfers based upon variation in the level of discretionality over the use of federal money that fiscal institutions grant to national and subnational executives. We use subnational level data in Argentina to show that not taking discretionality into account leads to wrong inferences about the electoral returns of intergovernmental transfers. We find that presidents extract different political utility from discretionary and nondiscretionary transfers. While discretionary transfers enable them to directly target voters bypassing opposition provincial governors, nondiscretionary transfers pay off more to co-partisan governors by guaranteeing security in the reception of transfer monies.Fil: Bonvecchi, Alejandro. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Lodola, Germán Jorge. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaOxford University Press2011-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/191924Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Lodola, Germán Jorge; The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina; Oxford University Press; Publius: The Journal of Federalism; 41; 2; 3-2011; 179-2061747-7107CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/41/2/179.abstract?keytype=ref&ijkey=jlhbfWkEVH90f7Cinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/publius/pjq024info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T14:57:42Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/191924instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 14:57:42.432CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina
title The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina
spellingShingle The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina
Bonvecchi, Alejandro
FISCAL FEDERALISM
ARGENTINA
COALITIONS
PRESIDENTS
title_short The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina
title_full The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina
title_fullStr The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina
title_full_unstemmed The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina
title_sort The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Bonvecchi, Alejandro
Lodola, Germán Jorge
author Bonvecchi, Alejandro
author_facet Bonvecchi, Alejandro
Lodola, Germán Jorge
author_role author
author2 Lodola, Germán Jorge
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv FISCAL FEDERALISM
ARGENTINA
COALITIONS
PRESIDENTS
topic FISCAL FEDERALISM
ARGENTINA
COALITIONS
PRESIDENTS
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv How do fiscal institutions shape the ability of presidents and state governors in a federation to manipulate federal money with coalition building goals? This article proposes a two-level theory of intergovernmental transfers based upon variation in the level of discretionality over the use of federal money that fiscal institutions grant to national and subnational executives. We use subnational level data in Argentina to show that not taking discretionality into account leads to wrong inferences about the electoral returns of intergovernmental transfers. We find that presidents extract different political utility from discretionary and nondiscretionary transfers. While discretionary transfers enable them to directly target voters bypassing opposition provincial governors, nondiscretionary transfers pay off more to co-partisan governors by guaranteeing security in the reception of transfer monies.
Fil: Bonvecchi, Alejandro. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Lodola, Germán Jorge. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description How do fiscal institutions shape the ability of presidents and state governors in a federation to manipulate federal money with coalition building goals? This article proposes a two-level theory of intergovernmental transfers based upon variation in the level of discretionality over the use of federal money that fiscal institutions grant to national and subnational executives. We use subnational level data in Argentina to show that not taking discretionality into account leads to wrong inferences about the electoral returns of intergovernmental transfers. We find that presidents extract different political utility from discretionary and nondiscretionary transfers. While discretionary transfers enable them to directly target voters bypassing opposition provincial governors, nondiscretionary transfers pay off more to co-partisan governors by guaranteeing security in the reception of transfer monies.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011-03
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/191924
Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Lodola, Germán Jorge; The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina; Oxford University Press; Publius: The Journal of Federalism; 41; 2; 3-2011; 179-206
1747-7107
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/191924
identifier_str_mv Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Lodola, Germán Jorge; The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina; Oxford University Press; Publius: The Journal of Federalism; 41; 2; 3-2011; 179-206
1747-7107
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/41/2/179.abstract?keytype=ref&ijkey=jlhbfWkEVH90f7C
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/publius/pjq024
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1846083116234440704
score 12.891075

Publicaciones similares