Against normative judgement internalism

• Autores: del Corral de Felipe, Miranda
• Año de publicación: 2013
• Idioma: inglés
• Tipo de recurso: artículo
• Materia: AKRASIA; ENKRASIA; NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS; NORMATIVE REQUIREMENTS; PRACTICAL REASONING
• Institución: Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas

Normative judgement internalism claims that enkrasia is an ideal of rational agency that poses a necessary link between making a normative judgement, and forming an intention to act according to that judgement. Against this view, I argue that enkrasia does not require the formation of new intentional states; instead, it requires that the agent´s intentions do not contravene her normative judgements. The main argument for considering that an intention ought to follow from a normative judgement is the claim that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. I will argue that this account is mistaken: practical reasoning aims at justifying certain actions or intentions, and thus its conclusion is a normative judgement. Defenders of NJI might argue, though, that intentions ought to follow from our normative judgements, because of certain requirements affecting not only practical reasoning, but rational agency. I argue that this conception of enkrasia is too demanding. Enkrasia, I suggest, is better understood as a restriction over our intentions: they ought not enter into conflict with our judgements.
Fil: del Corral de Felipe, Miranda. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina