Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos

Autores
Chisari, Omar Osvaldo; Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo
Año de publicación
2011
Idioma
español castellano
Tipo de recurso
libro
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Competitive markets could yield socially optimum results, but although market fail in many cases. If the regulation is successful in generating competition or in replicating its incentives, the next problem to solve is to face the inherent tendency of the competition dynamic toward concentration, cartelization or monopolization of the markets. Mechanisms to ensure or to preserve competition gain importance. Regulation could be conceived as an evolutionary process starting in natural monopoly regulation and ending in competition policy. In many cases, competition is infeasible with the current state of the technology (such as in water and sanitation), whether in other infrastructure sectors it can be possible (such as in segments of telephony or power generation. Regulation is compatible with state provision, and there can be separated the provision, control and supervision of the providers, even when the former are in public hands. Normally tariffs are regulated in infrastructure sectors, also quality and safety standards. Regulation nevertheless is a second best device, since it is costly. We develop a list of topics on market failures, natural monopoly, information problems, different kind of regulatory mechanisms, access prices, the basic Ramsey model of prices, applied to regulation, universal service obligation, the quality of product and service regulation, cost of capital in regulated industries, efficiency and benchmarking, and we conclude discussing the link between infrastructure and growth.
Fil: Chisari, Omar Osvaldo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto de Economía; Argentina
Fil: Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto de Economía; Argentina
Materia
Regulación
Servicios públicos
Organización industrial
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/188079
Acceder
id CONICETDig_a27e91b2c7956dc2c98f98848f0f50af
oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/188079
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicosChisari, Omar OsvaldoFerro, Gustavo AdolfoRegulaciónServicios públicosOrganización industrialhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5Competitive markets could yield socially optimum results, but although market fail in many cases. If the regulation is successful in generating competition or in replicating its incentives, the next problem to solve is to face the inherent tendency of the competition dynamic toward concentration, cartelization or monopolization of the markets. Mechanisms to ensure or to preserve competition gain importance. Regulation could be conceived as an evolutionary process starting in natural monopoly regulation and ending in competition policy. In many cases, competition is infeasible with the current state of the technology (such as in water and sanitation), whether in other infrastructure sectors it can be possible (such as in segments of telephony or power generation. Regulation is compatible with state provision, and there can be separated the provision, control and supervision of the providers, even when the former are in public hands. Normally tariffs are regulated in infrastructure sectors, also quality and safety standards. Regulation nevertheless is a second best device, since it is costly. We develop a list of topics on market failures, natural monopoly, information problems, different kind of regulatory mechanisms, access prices, the basic Ramsey model of prices, applied to regulation, universal service obligation, the quality of product and service regulation, cost of capital in regulated industries, efficiency and benchmarking, and we conclude discussing the link between infrastructure and growth.Fil: Chisari, Omar Osvaldo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto de Economía; ArgentinaFil: Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto de Economía; ArgentinaUniversidad Argentina de la Empresa2011info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/bookinfo:ar-repo/semantics/librohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2f33application/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/188079Chisari, Omar Osvaldo; Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo; Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos; Universidad Argentina de la Empresa; 65; 2011; 143978-987-519-145-7CONICET DigitalCONICETspainfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.uade.edu.ar/docsdownload/publicaciones/4_226_1817_std065_2011.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-10T13:19:56Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/188079instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-10 13:19:57.248CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos
title Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos
spellingShingle Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos
Chisari, Omar Osvaldo
Regulación
Servicios públicos
Organización industrial
title_short Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos
title_full Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos
title_fullStr Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos
title_full_unstemmed Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos
title_sort Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Chisari, Omar Osvaldo
Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo
author Chisari, Omar Osvaldo
author_facet Chisari, Omar Osvaldo
Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo
author_role author
author2 Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Regulación
Servicios públicos
Organización industrial
topic Regulación
Servicios públicos
Organización industrial
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Competitive markets could yield socially optimum results, but although market fail in many cases. If the regulation is successful in generating competition or in replicating its incentives, the next problem to solve is to face the inherent tendency of the competition dynamic toward concentration, cartelization or monopolization of the markets. Mechanisms to ensure or to preserve competition gain importance. Regulation could be conceived as an evolutionary process starting in natural monopoly regulation and ending in competition policy. In many cases, competition is infeasible with the current state of the technology (such as in water and sanitation), whether in other infrastructure sectors it can be possible (such as in segments of telephony or power generation. Regulation is compatible with state provision, and there can be separated the provision, control and supervision of the providers, even when the former are in public hands. Normally tariffs are regulated in infrastructure sectors, also quality and safety standards. Regulation nevertheless is a second best device, since it is costly. We develop a list of topics on market failures, natural monopoly, information problems, different kind of regulatory mechanisms, access prices, the basic Ramsey model of prices, applied to regulation, universal service obligation, the quality of product and service regulation, cost of capital in regulated industries, efficiency and benchmarking, and we conclude discussing the link between infrastructure and growth.
Fil: Chisari, Omar Osvaldo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto de Economía; Argentina
Fil: Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto de Economía; Argentina
description Competitive markets could yield socially optimum results, but although market fail in many cases. If the regulation is successful in generating competition or in replicating its incentives, the next problem to solve is to face the inherent tendency of the competition dynamic toward concentration, cartelization or monopolization of the markets. Mechanisms to ensure or to preserve competition gain importance. Regulation could be conceived as an evolutionary process starting in natural monopoly regulation and ending in competition policy. In many cases, competition is infeasible with the current state of the technology (such as in water and sanitation), whether in other infrastructure sectors it can be possible (such as in segments of telephony or power generation. Regulation is compatible with state provision, and there can be separated the provision, control and supervision of the providers, even when the former are in public hands. Normally tariffs are regulated in infrastructure sectors, also quality and safety standards. Regulation nevertheless is a second best device, since it is costly. We develop a list of topics on market failures, natural monopoly, information problems, different kind of regulatory mechanisms, access prices, the basic Ramsey model of prices, applied to regulation, universal service obligation, the quality of product and service regulation, cost of capital in regulated industries, efficiency and benchmarking, and we conclude discussing the link between infrastructure and growth.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/book
info:ar-repo/semantics/libro
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2f33
status_str publishedVersion
format book
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/188079
Chisari, Omar Osvaldo; Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo; Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos; Universidad Argentina de la Empresa; 65; 2011; 143
978-987-519-145-7
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/188079
identifier_str_mv Chisari, Omar Osvaldo; Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo; Tópicos de economía de la regulación de los servicios públicos; Universidad Argentina de la Empresa; 65; 2011; 143
978-987-519-145-7
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.uade.edu.ar/docsdownload/publicaciones/4_226_1817_std065_2011.pdf
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Argentina de la Empresa
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Argentina de la Empresa
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1842981091851370496
score 12.48226

Publicaciones similares