Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content

Autores
Satne, Glenda Lucila
Año de publicación
2013
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Until very recently, the field of cognitive science was (almost) in complete agreement in characterizing the mind as a computational mechanism dealing with brain-based representations to produce actions. Accordingly, cognition was defined as always involving represented information and neurally-based computational processes operating on it. In the last decade or so, an alternative to the representational brain paradigm started to emerge, especially from those who defend a conception of human minds as embodied and embedded in physical and social environments (systems in which brain, bodies, and the world are thought to form an indivisible whole). Is this emerging paradigm—enactivism—a genuine alternative to the representational–computational model of the mind or just an extension of it? Answering this question is the...
Fil: Satne, Glenda Lucila. Universidad de Copenhagen; Dinamarca. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
Enactivism
Intentionality
Teleosemiotics
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/28519
Acceder
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spelling Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without contentSatne, Glenda LucilaEnactivismIntentionalityTeleosemioticshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Until very recently, the field of cognitive science was (almost) in complete agreement in characterizing the mind as a computational mechanism dealing with brain-based representations to produce actions. Accordingly, cognition was defined as always involving represented information and neurally-based computational processes operating on it. In the last decade or so, an alternative to the representational brain paradigm started to emerge, especially from those who defend a conception of human minds as embodied and embedded in physical and social environments (systems in which brain, bodies, and the world are thought to form an indivisible whole). Is this emerging paradigm—enactivism—a genuine alternative to the representational–computational model of the mind or just an extension of it? Answering this question is the...Fil: Satne, Glenda Lucila. Universidad de Copenhagen; Dinamarca. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaOxford University Press2013-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/28519Satne, Glenda Lucila; Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content; Oxford University Press; The Philosophical Quarterly; 64; 254; 11-2013; 202-2040031-80941467-9213CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/pq/pqt032info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/64/254/202/1540008?redirectedFrom=fulltextinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T10:00:13Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/28519instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 10:00:13.595CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content
title Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content
spellingShingle Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content
Satne, Glenda Lucila
Enactivism
Intentionality
Teleosemiotics
title_short Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content
title_full Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content
title_fullStr Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content
title_full_unstemmed Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content
title_sort Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Satne, Glenda Lucila
author Satne, Glenda Lucila
author_facet Satne, Glenda Lucila
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Enactivism
Intentionality
Teleosemiotics
topic Enactivism
Intentionality
Teleosemiotics
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Until very recently, the field of cognitive science was (almost) in complete agreement in characterizing the mind as a computational mechanism dealing with brain-based representations to produce actions. Accordingly, cognition was defined as always involving represented information and neurally-based computational processes operating on it. In the last decade or so, an alternative to the representational brain paradigm started to emerge, especially from those who defend a conception of human minds as embodied and embedded in physical and social environments (systems in which brain, bodies, and the world are thought to form an indivisible whole). Is this emerging paradigm—enactivism—a genuine alternative to the representational–computational model of the mind or just an extension of it? Answering this question is the...
Fil: Satne, Glenda Lucila. Universidad de Copenhagen; Dinamarca. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description Until very recently, the field of cognitive science was (almost) in complete agreement in characterizing the mind as a computational mechanism dealing with brain-based representations to produce actions. Accordingly, cognition was defined as always involving represented information and neurally-based computational processes operating on it. In the last decade or so, an alternative to the representational brain paradigm started to emerge, especially from those who defend a conception of human minds as embodied and embedded in physical and social environments (systems in which brain, bodies, and the world are thought to form an indivisible whole). Is this emerging paradigm—enactivism—a genuine alternative to the representational–computational model of the mind or just an extension of it? Answering this question is the...
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/28519
Satne, Glenda Lucila; Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content; Oxford University Press; The Philosophical Quarterly; 64; 254; 11-2013; 202-204
0031-8094
1467-9213
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/28519
identifier_str_mv Satne, Glenda Lucila; Review: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without content; Oxford University Press; The Philosophical Quarterly; 64; 254; 11-2013; 202-204
0031-8094
1467-9213
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/pq/pqt032
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/64/254/202/1540008?redirectedFrom=fulltext
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397

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