A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality
- Autores
- Satne, Glenda Lucila
- Año de publicación
- 2016
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- Social accounts of objective content, like the one advanced by Tomasello (2014), are traditionally challenged by an 'essential tension' (Hutto and Satne 2015). The tension is the following: While sociality is deemed to be at the basis of thinking, in order to explain sociality, some form of thinking seems to be necessarily presupposed. In this contribution I analyse Tomasello's two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking vis-à-vis this challenge. While his theory is in principle suited to address it, I claim that the specifics of the first step and the notion of perspective that infuse it are problematic in this regard. I end by briefly sketching an alternative.
Fil: Satne, Glenda Lucila. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. University Of Wollongong; Australia. University Alberto Hurtado; Chile - Materia
-
COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY
JOINT INTENTIONALITY
NATURAL HISTORY
OBJECTIVE CONTENT
TOMASELLO - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/89474
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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spelling |
A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionalitySatne, Glenda LucilaCOLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITYJOINT INTENTIONALITYNATURAL HISTORYOBJECTIVE CONTENTTOMASELLOhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Social accounts of objective content, like the one advanced by Tomasello (2014), are traditionally challenged by an 'essential tension' (Hutto and Satne 2015). The tension is the following: While sociality is deemed to be at the basis of thinking, in order to explain sociality, some form of thinking seems to be necessarily presupposed. In this contribution I analyse Tomasello's two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking vis-à-vis this challenge. While his theory is in principle suited to address it, I claim that the specifics of the first step and the notion of perspective that infuse it are problematic in this regard. I end by briefly sketching an alternative.Fil: Satne, Glenda Lucila. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. University Of Wollongong; Australia. University Alberto Hurtado; ChileDe Gruyter2016-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.documentapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/89474Satne, Glenda Lucila; A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality; De Gruyter; Journal of Social Ontology; 2; 1; 3-2016; 105-1162196-9663CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jso.2016.2.issue-1/jso-2015-0053/jso-2015-0053.xmlinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1515/jso-2015-0053info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:47:24Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/89474instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:47:24.94CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality |
title |
A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality |
spellingShingle |
A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality Satne, Glenda Lucila COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY JOINT INTENTIONALITY NATURAL HISTORY OBJECTIVE CONTENT TOMASELLO |
title_short |
A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality |
title_full |
A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality |
title_fullStr |
A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality |
title_full_unstemmed |
A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality |
title_sort |
A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Satne, Glenda Lucila |
author |
Satne, Glenda Lucila |
author_facet |
Satne, Glenda Lucila |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY JOINT INTENTIONALITY NATURAL HISTORY OBJECTIVE CONTENT TOMASELLO |
topic |
COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY JOINT INTENTIONALITY NATURAL HISTORY OBJECTIVE CONTENT TOMASELLO |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Social accounts of objective content, like the one advanced by Tomasello (2014), are traditionally challenged by an 'essential tension' (Hutto and Satne 2015). The tension is the following: While sociality is deemed to be at the basis of thinking, in order to explain sociality, some form of thinking seems to be necessarily presupposed. In this contribution I analyse Tomasello's two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking vis-à-vis this challenge. While his theory is in principle suited to address it, I claim that the specifics of the first step and the notion of perspective that infuse it are problematic in this regard. I end by briefly sketching an alternative. Fil: Satne, Glenda Lucila. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. University Of Wollongong; Australia. University Alberto Hurtado; Chile |
description |
Social accounts of objective content, like the one advanced by Tomasello (2014), are traditionally challenged by an 'essential tension' (Hutto and Satne 2015). The tension is the following: While sociality is deemed to be at the basis of thinking, in order to explain sociality, some form of thinking seems to be necessarily presupposed. In this contribution I analyse Tomasello's two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking vis-à-vis this challenge. While his theory is in principle suited to address it, I claim that the specifics of the first step and the notion of perspective that infuse it are problematic in this regard. I end by briefly sketching an alternative. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-03 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/89474 Satne, Glenda Lucila; A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality; De Gruyter; Journal of Social Ontology; 2; 1; 3-2016; 105-116 2196-9663 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/89474 |
identifier_str_mv |
Satne, Glenda Lucila; A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking: Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality; De Gruyter; Journal of Social Ontology; 2; 1; 3-2016; 105-116 2196-9663 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jso.2016.2.issue-1/jso-2015-0053/jso-2015-0053.xml info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1515/jso-2015-0053 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
De Gruyter |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
De Gruyter |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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13.13397 |