Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments

Autores
Guiñazú, Nadia Cecilia; Neme, Pablo Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorge Armando
Año de publicación
2025
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley’s foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and commitments vary. Specifically, we analyze a dynamic matching game in which firms make offers to workers in each period, considering three types of commitment: (i) no commitment from either side, (ii) firm commitment, and (iii) worker commitment. Our main contributions are threefold: (i) we show that stable matchings can be supported as stationary equilibria under different commitment scenarios, depending on the strategies adopted by firms and workers; (ii) we characterize the conditions under which agents are willing to switch partners, highlighting the role of discount factors in shaping equilibrium outcomes; and (iii) we provide a unified framework that connects dynamic incentives with classical stability, bridging the gap between cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to matching.
Fil: Guiñazú, Nadia Cecilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Neme, Pablo Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Oviedo, Jorge Armando. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Materia
Dynamic matching game
Stationary equilibria
Commitment
Stable matching
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/273126
Acceder
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repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitmentsGuiñazú, Nadia CeciliaNeme, Pablo AlejandroOviedo, Jorge ArmandoDynamic matching gameStationary equilibriaCommitmentStable matchinghttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley’s foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and commitments vary. Specifically, we analyze a dynamic matching game in which firms make offers to workers in each period, considering three types of commitment: (i) no commitment from either side, (ii) firm commitment, and (iii) worker commitment. Our main contributions are threefold: (i) we show that stable matchings can be supported as stationary equilibria under different commitment scenarios, depending on the strategies adopted by firms and workers; (ii) we characterize the conditions under which agents are willing to switch partners, highlighting the role of discount factors in shaping equilibrium outcomes; and (iii) we provide a unified framework that connects dynamic incentives with classical stability, bridging the gap between cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to matching.Fil: Guiñazú, Nadia Cecilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaFil: Neme, Pablo Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaFil: Oviedo, Jorge Armando. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaAmerican Institute of Mathematical Sciences2025-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/273126Guiñazú, Nadia Cecilia; Neme, Pablo Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments; American Institute of Mathematical Sciences; Journal of Dynamics and Games; 2025; 7-2025; 1-192164-60662164-6074CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aimsciences.org//article/doi/10.3934/jdg.2025039info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.3934/jdg.2025039info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-11-12T09:43:45Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/273126instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-11-12 09:43:45.514CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments
title Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments
spellingShingle Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments
Guiñazú, Nadia Cecilia
Dynamic matching game
Stationary equilibria
Commitment
Stable matching
title_short Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments
title_full Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments
title_fullStr Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments
title_sort Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Guiñazú, Nadia Cecilia
Neme, Pablo Alejandro
Oviedo, Jorge Armando
author Guiñazú, Nadia Cecilia
author_facet Guiñazú, Nadia Cecilia
Neme, Pablo Alejandro
Oviedo, Jorge Armando
author_role author
author2 Neme, Pablo Alejandro
Oviedo, Jorge Armando
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Dynamic matching game
Stationary equilibria
Commitment
Stable matching
topic Dynamic matching game
Stationary equilibria
Commitment
Stable matching
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley’s foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and commitments vary. Specifically, we analyze a dynamic matching game in which firms make offers to workers in each period, considering three types of commitment: (i) no commitment from either side, (ii) firm commitment, and (iii) worker commitment. Our main contributions are threefold: (i) we show that stable matchings can be supported as stationary equilibria under different commitment scenarios, depending on the strategies adopted by firms and workers; (ii) we characterize the conditions under which agents are willing to switch partners, highlighting the role of discount factors in shaping equilibrium outcomes; and (iii) we provide a unified framework that connects dynamic incentives with classical stability, bridging the gap between cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to matching.
Fil: Guiñazú, Nadia Cecilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Neme, Pablo Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Oviedo, Jorge Armando. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
description This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley’s foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and commitments vary. Specifically, we analyze a dynamic matching game in which firms make offers to workers in each period, considering three types of commitment: (i) no commitment from either side, (ii) firm commitment, and (iii) worker commitment. Our main contributions are threefold: (i) we show that stable matchings can be supported as stationary equilibria under different commitment scenarios, depending on the strategies adopted by firms and workers; (ii) we characterize the conditions under which agents are willing to switch partners, highlighting the role of discount factors in shaping equilibrium outcomes; and (iii) we provide a unified framework that connects dynamic incentives with classical stability, bridging the gap between cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to matching.
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025-07
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/273126
Guiñazú, Nadia Cecilia; Neme, Pablo Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments; American Institute of Mathematical Sciences; Journal of Dynamics and Games; 2025; 7-2025; 1-19
2164-6066
2164-6074
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/273126
identifier_str_mv Guiñazú, Nadia Cecilia; Neme, Pablo Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments; American Institute of Mathematical Sciences; Journal of Dynamics and Games; 2025; 7-2025; 1-19
2164-6066
2164-6074
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aimsciences.org//article/doi/10.3934/jdg.2025039
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.3934/jdg.2025039
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Institute of Mathematical Sciences
publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Institute of Mathematical Sciences
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 12.976206

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