Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market

Autores
Millan Guerra, Beatriz Alejandra
Año de publicación
2011
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de conferencia
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We study in one-to-one matching market a process of sequential entry, in which participants enter in themarket one at a time, in some arbitrary given order. We identified a large family of orders (optimal orders) whichconverges to the optimal matching. We also show that the last agent who enters the market will receive his/her optimaloutcome under stable matchingsStable matching, sequential entry, optimal matching
Fil: Millan Guerra, Beatriz Alejandra. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina
III Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Bahía Blanca
Argentina
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada Computacional e Industrial
Materia
STABLE MATCHING
SEQUENTIAL ENTRY
OPTIMAL MATCHING
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/266696
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/266696
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repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Sequential entry in one-to-one matching marketMillan Guerra, Beatriz AlejandraSTABLE MATCHINGSEQUENTIAL ENTRYOPTIMAL MATCHINGhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1We study in one-to-one matching market a process of sequential entry, in which participants enter in themarket one at a time, in some arbitrary given order. We identified a large family of orders (optimal orders) whichconverges to the optimal matching. We also show that the last agent who enters the market will receive his/her optimaloutcome under stable matchingsStable matching, sequential entry, optimal matchingFil: Millan Guerra, Beatriz Alejandra. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; ArgentinaIII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e IndustrialBahía BlancaArgentinaAsociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada Computacional e IndustrialAsociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial2011info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectCongresoJournalhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/266696Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market; III Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Bahía Blanca; Argentina; 2011; 53-56CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MACI-Vol-3-2011.pdfNacionalinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:13:28Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/266696instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:13:28.872CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market
title Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market
spellingShingle Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market
Millan Guerra, Beatriz Alejandra
STABLE MATCHING
SEQUENTIAL ENTRY
OPTIMAL MATCHING
title_short Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market
title_full Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market
title_fullStr Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market
title_full_unstemmed Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market
title_sort Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Millan Guerra, Beatriz Alejandra
author Millan Guerra, Beatriz Alejandra
author_facet Millan Guerra, Beatriz Alejandra
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv STABLE MATCHING
SEQUENTIAL ENTRY
OPTIMAL MATCHING
topic STABLE MATCHING
SEQUENTIAL ENTRY
OPTIMAL MATCHING
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We study in one-to-one matching market a process of sequential entry, in which participants enter in themarket one at a time, in some arbitrary given order. We identified a large family of orders (optimal orders) whichconverges to the optimal matching. We also show that the last agent who enters the market will receive his/her optimaloutcome under stable matchingsStable matching, sequential entry, optimal matching
Fil: Millan Guerra, Beatriz Alejandra. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina
III Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Bahía Blanca
Argentina
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada Computacional e Industrial
description We study in one-to-one matching market a process of sequential entry, in which participants enter in themarket one at a time, in some arbitrary given order. We identified a large family of orders (optimal orders) whichconverges to the optimal matching. We also show that the last agent who enters the market will receive his/her optimaloutcome under stable matchingsStable matching, sequential entry, optimal matching
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
Congreso
Journal
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia
status_str publishedVersion
format conferenceObject
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/266696
Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market; III Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Bahía Blanca; Argentina; 2011; 53-56
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/266696
identifier_str_mv Sequential entry in one-to-one matching market; III Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Bahía Blanca; Argentina; 2011; 53-56
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MACI-Vol-3-2011.pdf
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Nacional
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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