Decentralization, political competition and corruption

Autores
Albornoz, Facundo; Cabrales, Antonio
Año de publicación
2013
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We study the effect of decentralization on corruption in a political agency model from the perspective of a region. In a model where corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time, decentralization makes it easier for citizens to detect corrupt incumbents. As a consequence, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption is conditional on political competition: decentralization is associated with lower (higher) levels of corruption for sufficiently high (low) levels of political competition. We test this prediction and find that it is empirically supported. Also, we show how the preferences of voters and politicians about fiscal decentralization can diverge in situations where political competition is weak.
Fil: Albornoz, Facundo. University Of California At Los Angeles; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Politica de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Politica de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Fil: Cabrales, Antonio. University College London; Estados Unidos
Materia
Decentralization
Centralization
Political Agency
Corruption
Quality of Politicians
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/17801
Acceder
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spelling Decentralization, political competition and corruptionAlbornoz, FacundoCabrales, AntonioDecentralizationCentralizationPolitical AgencyCorruptionQuality of Politicianshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We study the effect of decentralization on corruption in a political agency model from the perspective of a region. In a model where corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time, decentralization makes it easier for citizens to detect corrupt incumbents. As a consequence, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption is conditional on political competition: decentralization is associated with lower (higher) levels of corruption for sufficiently high (low) levels of political competition. We test this prediction and find that it is empirically supported. Also, we show how the preferences of voters and politicians about fiscal decentralization can diverge in situations where political competition is weak.Fil: Albornoz, Facundo. University Of California At Los Angeles; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Politica de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Politica de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaFil: Cabrales, Antonio. University College London; Estados UnidosNorth-holland2013-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/17801Albornoz, Facundo; Cabrales, Antonio; Decentralization, political competition and corruption; North-holland; Journal Of Development Economics; 105; 11-2013; 103-1110304-3878enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387813001065info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.07.007info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:49:27Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/17801instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:49:28.239CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Decentralization, political competition and corruption
title Decentralization, political competition and corruption
spellingShingle Decentralization, political competition and corruption
Albornoz, Facundo
Decentralization
Centralization
Political Agency
Corruption
Quality of Politicians
title_short Decentralization, political competition and corruption
title_full Decentralization, political competition and corruption
title_fullStr Decentralization, political competition and corruption
title_full_unstemmed Decentralization, political competition and corruption
title_sort Decentralization, political competition and corruption
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Albornoz, Facundo
Cabrales, Antonio
author Albornoz, Facundo
author_facet Albornoz, Facundo
Cabrales, Antonio
author_role author
author2 Cabrales, Antonio
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Decentralization
Centralization
Political Agency
Corruption
Quality of Politicians
topic Decentralization
Centralization
Political Agency
Corruption
Quality of Politicians
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We study the effect of decentralization on corruption in a political agency model from the perspective of a region. In a model where corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time, decentralization makes it easier for citizens to detect corrupt incumbents. As a consequence, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption is conditional on political competition: decentralization is associated with lower (higher) levels of corruption for sufficiently high (low) levels of political competition. We test this prediction and find that it is empirically supported. Also, we show how the preferences of voters and politicians about fiscal decentralization can diverge in situations where political competition is weak.
Fil: Albornoz, Facundo. University Of California At Los Angeles; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Politica de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Politica de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Fil: Cabrales, Antonio. University College London; Estados Unidos
description We study the effect of decentralization on corruption in a political agency model from the perspective of a region. In a model where corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time, decentralization makes it easier for citizens to detect corrupt incumbents. As a consequence, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption is conditional on political competition: decentralization is associated with lower (higher) levels of corruption for sufficiently high (low) levels of political competition. We test this prediction and find that it is empirically supported. Also, we show how the preferences of voters and politicians about fiscal decentralization can diverge in situations where political competition is weak.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/17801
Albornoz, Facundo; Cabrales, Antonio; Decentralization, political competition and corruption; North-holland; Journal Of Development Economics; 105; 11-2013; 103-111
0304-3878
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/17801
identifier_str_mv Albornoz, Facundo; Cabrales, Antonio; Decentralization, political competition and corruption; North-holland; Journal Of Development Economics; 105; 11-2013; 103-111
0304-3878
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387813001065
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.07.007
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv North-holland
publisher.none.fl_str_mv North-holland
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397

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