Social Status and Corruption

Autores
Galiani, Sebastian; Weinschelbaum, Federico
Año de publicación
2013
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We study the interaction between social and economic incentives in determining the level of corruption. Using social rewards as incentives for civil servants may help to reduce corruption. In our model, a decrease in corruption produces an externality that reduces the cost of hiring civil servants. In particular, it makes wage schemes which avert corruption (efficiency wages) cheaper. We show that the existence of this externality reduces the ?optimal? level of corruption in a society, the greater the power of social status, the lower the level of corruption.
Fil: Galiani, Sebastian. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
Social Status
Corruption
Wage Incentives
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/28317
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Social Status and CorruptionGaliani, SebastianWeinschelbaum, FedericoSocial StatusCorruptionWage Incentiveshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We study the interaction between social and economic incentives in determining the level of corruption. Using social rewards as incentives for civil servants may help to reduce corruption. In our model, a decrease in corruption produces an externality that reduces the cost of hiring civil servants. In particular, it makes wage schemes which avert corruption (efficiency wages) cheaper. We show that the existence of this externality reduces the ?optimal? level of corruption in a society, the greater the power of social status, the lower the level of corruption.Fil: Galiani, Sebastian. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados UnidosFil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaNordic Journal of Political Economy2013-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/28317Galiani, Sebastian; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Social Status and Corruption; Nordic Journal of Political Economy; Nordic Journal of Political Economy; 38; 10-2013; 1-180345-8555CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.nopecjournal.org/NOPEC_2013_1_a01.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:57:45Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/28317instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:57:45.83CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Social Status and Corruption
title Social Status and Corruption
spellingShingle Social Status and Corruption
Galiani, Sebastian
Social Status
Corruption
Wage Incentives
title_short Social Status and Corruption
title_full Social Status and Corruption
title_fullStr Social Status and Corruption
title_full_unstemmed Social Status and Corruption
title_sort Social Status and Corruption
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Galiani, Sebastian
Weinschelbaum, Federico
author Galiani, Sebastian
author_facet Galiani, Sebastian
Weinschelbaum, Federico
author_role author
author2 Weinschelbaum, Federico
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Social Status
Corruption
Wage Incentives
topic Social Status
Corruption
Wage Incentives
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We study the interaction between social and economic incentives in determining the level of corruption. Using social rewards as incentives for civil servants may help to reduce corruption. In our model, a decrease in corruption produces an externality that reduces the cost of hiring civil servants. In particular, it makes wage schemes which avert corruption (efficiency wages) cheaper. We show that the existence of this externality reduces the ?optimal? level of corruption in a society, the greater the power of social status, the lower the level of corruption.
Fil: Galiani, Sebastian. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description We study the interaction between social and economic incentives in determining the level of corruption. Using social rewards as incentives for civil servants may help to reduce corruption. In our model, a decrease in corruption produces an externality that reduces the cost of hiring civil servants. In particular, it makes wage schemes which avert corruption (efficiency wages) cheaper. We show that the existence of this externality reduces the ?optimal? level of corruption in a society, the greater the power of social status, the lower the level of corruption.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-10
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/28317
Galiani, Sebastian; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Social Status and Corruption; Nordic Journal of Political Economy; Nordic Journal of Political Economy; 38; 10-2013; 1-18
0345-8555
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/28317
identifier_str_mv Galiani, Sebastian; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Social Status and Corruption; Nordic Journal of Political Economy; Nordic Journal of Political Economy; 38; 10-2013; 1-18
0345-8555
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.nopecjournal.org/NOPEC_2013_1_a01.pdf
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nordic Journal of Political Economy
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nordic Journal of Political Economy
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397

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