Descartes on Corporeal Substances

Autores
Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge
Año de publicación
2015
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.
Fil: Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge. Universidad Nacional del Litoral. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias. Departamento de Filosofía; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
SUBSTANCE
BODY
MONISM
DEPENDENCE
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/113238
Acceder
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spelling Descartes on Corporeal SubstancesZerbudis, Ezequiel JorgeSUBSTANCEBODYMONISMDEPENDENCEhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.Fil: Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge. Universidad Nacional del Litoral. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias. Departamento de Filosofía; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaSocietat de Filosofia del País Valencia2015-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/113238Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge; Descartes on Corporeal Substances; Societat de Filosofia del País Valencia; Quaderns de Filosofía; 2; 2; 10-2015; 29-542341-14142341-3042CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.7203/qfia.2.2.6852info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://ojs.uv.es/index.php/qfilosofia/article/view/6852info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T11:58:11Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/113238instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 11:58:11.844CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Descartes on Corporeal Substances
title Descartes on Corporeal Substances
spellingShingle Descartes on Corporeal Substances
Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge
SUBSTANCE
BODY
MONISM
DEPENDENCE
title_short Descartes on Corporeal Substances
title_full Descartes on Corporeal Substances
title_fullStr Descartes on Corporeal Substances
title_full_unstemmed Descartes on Corporeal Substances
title_sort Descartes on Corporeal Substances
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge
author Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge
author_facet Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv SUBSTANCE
BODY
MONISM
DEPENDENCE
topic SUBSTANCE
BODY
MONISM
DEPENDENCE
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.
Fil: Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge. Universidad Nacional del Litoral. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias. Departamento de Filosofía; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-10
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/113238
Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge; Descartes on Corporeal Substances; Societat de Filosofia del País Valencia; Quaderns de Filosofía; 2; 2; 10-2015; 29-54
2341-1414
2341-3042
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/113238
identifier_str_mv Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge; Descartes on Corporeal Substances; Societat de Filosofia del País Valencia; Quaderns de Filosofía; 2; 2; 10-2015; 29-54
2341-1414
2341-3042
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.7203/qfia.2.2.6852
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://ojs.uv.es/index.php/qfilosofia/article/view/6852
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Societat de Filosofia del País Valencia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Societat de Filosofia del País Valencia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 12.982451

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