Descartes on Corporeal Substances
- Autores
- Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge
- Año de publicación
- 2015
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.
Fil: Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge. Universidad Nacional del Litoral. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias. Departamento de Filosofía; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina - Materia
-
SUBSTANCE
BODY
MONISM
DEPENDENCE - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/113238
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Descartes on Corporeal SubstancesZerbudis, Ezequiel JorgeSUBSTANCEBODYMONISMDEPENDENCEhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.Fil: Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge. Universidad Nacional del Litoral. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias. Departamento de Filosofía; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaSocietat de Filosofia del País Valencia2015-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/113238Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge; Descartes on Corporeal Substances; Societat de Filosofia del País Valencia; Quaderns de Filosofía; 2; 2; 10-2015; 29-542341-14142341-3042CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.7203/qfia.2.2.6852info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://ojs.uv.es/index.php/qfilosofia/article/view/6852info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:25:29Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/113238instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:25:29.973CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Descartes on Corporeal Substances |
title |
Descartes on Corporeal Substances |
spellingShingle |
Descartes on Corporeal Substances Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge SUBSTANCE BODY MONISM DEPENDENCE |
title_short |
Descartes on Corporeal Substances |
title_full |
Descartes on Corporeal Substances |
title_fullStr |
Descartes on Corporeal Substances |
title_full_unstemmed |
Descartes on Corporeal Substances |
title_sort |
Descartes on Corporeal Substances |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge |
author |
Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge |
author_facet |
Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
SUBSTANCE BODY MONISM DEPENDENCE |
topic |
SUBSTANCE BODY MONISM DEPENDENCE |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means. Fil: Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge. Universidad Nacional del Litoral. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias. Departamento de Filosofía; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina |
description |
I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015-10 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/113238 Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge; Descartes on Corporeal Substances; Societat de Filosofia del País Valencia; Quaderns de Filosofía; 2; 2; 10-2015; 29-54 2341-1414 2341-3042 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/113238 |
identifier_str_mv |
Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge; Descartes on Corporeal Substances; Societat de Filosofia del País Valencia; Quaderns de Filosofía; 2; 2; 10-2015; 29-54 2341-1414 2341-3042 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.7203/qfia.2.2.6852 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://ojs.uv.es/index.php/qfilosofia/article/view/6852 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Societat de Filosofia del País Valencia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Societat de Filosofia del País Valencia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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1844614253585104896 |
score |
13.070432 |