Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty
- Autores
- Rios Festner, Daniel; Blanco, Gerardo; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel
- Año de publicación
- 2020
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- In actual energy-only markets, the high volatility of power prices affects the expected returns of generators. When dealing with irreversibility under uncertainty, deferring decisions to commit in new power plants, waiting for better information, is therefore a rational approach. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that such investment pattern determines the occurrence of construction cycles, which strongly compromise supply security. In order to supplement generators´ revenues, several remuneration mechanisms have been devised over past years. Along this line, this work addresses the long-run dynamics of capacity adequacy and market efficiency with both a price-based and a quantity-based capacity remuneration policy. For that purpose, a recently-developed, stochastic simulation model is used as a benchmark. Hence, the optimal postponement of generation investment decisions is integrated into a long-run power market model by formulating the decision-making problem in the framework of Real Options Analysis. Results suggest that policymakers may exchange supply security (effectiveness) for energy prices to be paid by consumers (efficiency) when designing and implementing capacity remuneration mechanisms. By doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the design of incentive policies and efficient power markets by considering the microeconomics of investors? decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty.
Fil: Rios Festner, Daniel. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; Paraguay
Fil: Blanco, Gerardo. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; Paraguay
Fil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina - Materia
-
CAPACITY MARKETS
CAPACITY PAYMENTS
GENERATION INVESTMENTS
REAL OPTIONS
SUPPLY RELIABILITY
SYSTEM DYNAMICS - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/143581
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
id |
CONICETDig_6ca9417f4b5718787e11b6c27763e799 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/143581 |
network_acronym_str |
CONICETDig |
repository_id_str |
3498 |
network_name_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
spelling |
Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertaintyRios Festner, DanielBlanco, GerardoOlsina, Fernando GabrielCAPACITY MARKETSCAPACITY PAYMENTSGENERATION INVESTMENTSREAL OPTIONSSUPPLY RELIABILITYSYSTEM DYNAMICShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/2.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2In actual energy-only markets, the high volatility of power prices affects the expected returns of generators. When dealing with irreversibility under uncertainty, deferring decisions to commit in new power plants, waiting for better information, is therefore a rational approach. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that such investment pattern determines the occurrence of construction cycles, which strongly compromise supply security. In order to supplement generators´ revenues, several remuneration mechanisms have been devised over past years. Along this line, this work addresses the long-run dynamics of capacity adequacy and market efficiency with both a price-based and a quantity-based capacity remuneration policy. For that purpose, a recently-developed, stochastic simulation model is used as a benchmark. Hence, the optimal postponement of generation investment decisions is integrated into a long-run power market model by formulating the decision-making problem in the framework of Real Options Analysis. Results suggest that policymakers may exchange supply security (effectiveness) for energy prices to be paid by consumers (efficiency) when designing and implementing capacity remuneration mechanisms. By doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the design of incentive policies and efficient power markets by considering the microeconomics of investors? decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty.Fil: Rios Festner, Daniel. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; ParaguayFil: Blanco, Gerardo. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; ParaguayFil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; ArgentinaElsevier2020-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/143581Rios Festner, Daniel; Blanco, Gerardo; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 137; 2-2020; 111185, 1-150301-4215CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301421519307712info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111185info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T15:43:08Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/143581instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 15:43:09.249CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty |
title |
Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty |
spellingShingle |
Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty Rios Festner, Daniel CAPACITY MARKETS CAPACITY PAYMENTS GENERATION INVESTMENTS REAL OPTIONS SUPPLY RELIABILITY SYSTEM DYNAMICS |
title_short |
Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty |
title_full |
Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty |
title_fullStr |
Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty |
title_full_unstemmed |
Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty |
title_sort |
Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Rios Festner, Daniel Blanco, Gerardo Olsina, Fernando Gabriel |
author |
Rios Festner, Daniel |
author_facet |
Rios Festner, Daniel Blanco, Gerardo Olsina, Fernando Gabriel |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Blanco, Gerardo Olsina, Fernando Gabriel |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
CAPACITY MARKETS CAPACITY PAYMENTS GENERATION INVESTMENTS REAL OPTIONS SUPPLY RELIABILITY SYSTEM DYNAMICS |
topic |
CAPACITY MARKETS CAPACITY PAYMENTS GENERATION INVESTMENTS REAL OPTIONS SUPPLY RELIABILITY SYSTEM DYNAMICS |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2.2 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
In actual energy-only markets, the high volatility of power prices affects the expected returns of generators. When dealing with irreversibility under uncertainty, deferring decisions to commit in new power plants, waiting for better information, is therefore a rational approach. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that such investment pattern determines the occurrence of construction cycles, which strongly compromise supply security. In order to supplement generators´ revenues, several remuneration mechanisms have been devised over past years. Along this line, this work addresses the long-run dynamics of capacity adequacy and market efficiency with both a price-based and a quantity-based capacity remuneration policy. For that purpose, a recently-developed, stochastic simulation model is used as a benchmark. Hence, the optimal postponement of generation investment decisions is integrated into a long-run power market model by formulating the decision-making problem in the framework of Real Options Analysis. Results suggest that policymakers may exchange supply security (effectiveness) for energy prices to be paid by consumers (efficiency) when designing and implementing capacity remuneration mechanisms. By doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the design of incentive policies and efficient power markets by considering the microeconomics of investors? decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty. Fil: Rios Festner, Daniel. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; Paraguay Fil: Blanco, Gerardo. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; Paraguay Fil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina |
description |
In actual energy-only markets, the high volatility of power prices affects the expected returns of generators. When dealing with irreversibility under uncertainty, deferring decisions to commit in new power plants, waiting for better information, is therefore a rational approach. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that such investment pattern determines the occurrence of construction cycles, which strongly compromise supply security. In order to supplement generators´ revenues, several remuneration mechanisms have been devised over past years. Along this line, this work addresses the long-run dynamics of capacity adequacy and market efficiency with both a price-based and a quantity-based capacity remuneration policy. For that purpose, a recently-developed, stochastic simulation model is used as a benchmark. Hence, the optimal postponement of generation investment decisions is integrated into a long-run power market model by formulating the decision-making problem in the framework of Real Options Analysis. Results suggest that policymakers may exchange supply security (effectiveness) for energy prices to be paid by consumers (efficiency) when designing and implementing capacity remuneration mechanisms. By doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the design of incentive policies and efficient power markets by considering the microeconomics of investors? decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-02 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/143581 Rios Festner, Daniel; Blanco, Gerardo; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 137; 2-2020; 111185, 1-15 0301-4215 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/143581 |
identifier_str_mv |
Rios Festner, Daniel; Blanco, Gerardo; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 137; 2-2020; 111185, 1-15 0301-4215 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301421519307712 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111185 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
reponame_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
collection |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
instname_str |
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
_version_ |
1846083537700126720 |
score |
13.22299 |