Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty

Autores
Rios Festner, Daniel; Blanco, Gerardo; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel
Año de publicación
2020
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In actual energy-only markets, the high volatility of power prices affects the expected returns of generators. When dealing with irreversibility under uncertainty, deferring decisions to commit in new power plants, waiting for better information, is therefore a rational approach. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that such investment pattern determines the occurrence of construction cycles, which strongly compromise supply security. In order to supplement generators´ revenues, several remuneration mechanisms have been devised over past years. Along this line, this work addresses the long-run dynamics of capacity adequacy and market efficiency with both a price-based and a quantity-based capacity remuneration policy. For that purpose, a recently-developed, stochastic simulation model is used as a benchmark. Hence, the optimal postponement of generation investment decisions is integrated into a long-run power market model by formulating the decision-making problem in the framework of Real Options Analysis. Results suggest that policymakers may exchange supply security (effectiveness) for energy prices to be paid by consumers (efficiency) when designing and implementing capacity remuneration mechanisms. By doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the design of incentive policies and efficient power markets by considering the microeconomics of investors? decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty.
Fil: Rios Festner, Daniel. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; Paraguay
Fil: Blanco, Gerardo. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; Paraguay
Fil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
Materia
CAPACITY MARKETS
CAPACITY PAYMENTS
GENERATION INVESTMENTS
REAL OPTIONS
SUPPLY RELIABILITY
SYSTEM DYNAMICS
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/143581

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spelling Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertaintyRios Festner, DanielBlanco, GerardoOlsina, Fernando GabrielCAPACITY MARKETSCAPACITY PAYMENTSGENERATION INVESTMENTSREAL OPTIONSSUPPLY RELIABILITYSYSTEM DYNAMICShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/2.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2In actual energy-only markets, the high volatility of power prices affects the expected returns of generators. When dealing with irreversibility under uncertainty, deferring decisions to commit in new power plants, waiting for better information, is therefore a rational approach. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that such investment pattern determines the occurrence of construction cycles, which strongly compromise supply security. In order to supplement generators´ revenues, several remuneration mechanisms have been devised over past years. Along this line, this work addresses the long-run dynamics of capacity adequacy and market efficiency with both a price-based and a quantity-based capacity remuneration policy. For that purpose, a recently-developed, stochastic simulation model is used as a benchmark. Hence, the optimal postponement of generation investment decisions is integrated into a long-run power market model by formulating the decision-making problem in the framework of Real Options Analysis. Results suggest that policymakers may exchange supply security (effectiveness) for energy prices to be paid by consumers (efficiency) when designing and implementing capacity remuneration mechanisms. By doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the design of incentive policies and efficient power markets by considering the microeconomics of investors? decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty.Fil: Rios Festner, Daniel. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; ParaguayFil: Blanco, Gerardo. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; ParaguayFil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; ArgentinaElsevier2020-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/143581Rios Festner, Daniel; Blanco, Gerardo; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 137; 2-2020; 111185, 1-150301-4215CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301421519307712info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111185info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T15:43:08Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/143581instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 15:43:09.249CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty
title Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty
spellingShingle Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty
Rios Festner, Daniel
CAPACITY MARKETS
CAPACITY PAYMENTS
GENERATION INVESTMENTS
REAL OPTIONS
SUPPLY RELIABILITY
SYSTEM DYNAMICS
title_short Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty
title_full Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty
title_fullStr Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty
title_full_unstemmed Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty
title_sort Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Rios Festner, Daniel
Blanco, Gerardo
Olsina, Fernando Gabriel
author Rios Festner, Daniel
author_facet Rios Festner, Daniel
Blanco, Gerardo
Olsina, Fernando Gabriel
author_role author
author2 Blanco, Gerardo
Olsina, Fernando Gabriel
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv CAPACITY MARKETS
CAPACITY PAYMENTS
GENERATION INVESTMENTS
REAL OPTIONS
SUPPLY RELIABILITY
SYSTEM DYNAMICS
topic CAPACITY MARKETS
CAPACITY PAYMENTS
GENERATION INVESTMENTS
REAL OPTIONS
SUPPLY RELIABILITY
SYSTEM DYNAMICS
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In actual energy-only markets, the high volatility of power prices affects the expected returns of generators. When dealing with irreversibility under uncertainty, deferring decisions to commit in new power plants, waiting for better information, is therefore a rational approach. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that such investment pattern determines the occurrence of construction cycles, which strongly compromise supply security. In order to supplement generators´ revenues, several remuneration mechanisms have been devised over past years. Along this line, this work addresses the long-run dynamics of capacity adequacy and market efficiency with both a price-based and a quantity-based capacity remuneration policy. For that purpose, a recently-developed, stochastic simulation model is used as a benchmark. Hence, the optimal postponement of generation investment decisions is integrated into a long-run power market model by formulating the decision-making problem in the framework of Real Options Analysis. Results suggest that policymakers may exchange supply security (effectiveness) for energy prices to be paid by consumers (efficiency) when designing and implementing capacity remuneration mechanisms. By doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the design of incentive policies and efficient power markets by considering the microeconomics of investors? decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty.
Fil: Rios Festner, Daniel. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; Paraguay
Fil: Blanco, Gerardo. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; Paraguay
Fil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
description In actual energy-only markets, the high volatility of power prices affects the expected returns of generators. When dealing with irreversibility under uncertainty, deferring decisions to commit in new power plants, waiting for better information, is therefore a rational approach. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that such investment pattern determines the occurrence of construction cycles, which strongly compromise supply security. In order to supplement generators´ revenues, several remuneration mechanisms have been devised over past years. Along this line, this work addresses the long-run dynamics of capacity adequacy and market efficiency with both a price-based and a quantity-based capacity remuneration policy. For that purpose, a recently-developed, stochastic simulation model is used as a benchmark. Hence, the optimal postponement of generation investment decisions is integrated into a long-run power market model by formulating the decision-making problem in the framework of Real Options Analysis. Results suggest that policymakers may exchange supply security (effectiveness) for energy prices to be paid by consumers (efficiency) when designing and implementing capacity remuneration mechanisms. By doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the design of incentive policies and efficient power markets by considering the microeconomics of investors? decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-02
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/143581
Rios Festner, Daniel; Blanco, Gerardo; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 137; 2-2020; 111185, 1-15
0301-4215
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/143581
identifier_str_mv Rios Festner, Daniel; Blanco, Gerardo; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 137; 2-2020; 111185, 1-15
0301-4215
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301421519307712
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111185
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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