Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets
- Autores
- Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Pringles, Rolando Marcelo; Larisson, Carlos Hugo; Garces, Francisco Felipe
- Año de publicación
- 2014
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- Electric power is a critical input to modern economies. Generation adequacy and security of supply in power systems running under competition are currently topics of high concern for consumers, regulators and governments. In a market setting, generation investments and adequacy can only be achieved by an appropriate regulatory framework that sets efficient remuneration to power capacity. Theoretically, energy-only electricity markets are efficient and no additional mechanism is needed. Nonetheless, the energy-only market design suffers from serious drawbacks. Therefore, jointly with the evolution of electricity markets, many remunerating mechanisms for generation capacity have been proposed. Explicit capacity payment was the first remunerating approach implemented and perhaps still the most applied. However, this price-based regulation has been applied no without severe difficulties and criticism. In this paper, a new reliability payment mechanism is envisioned. Capacity of each generating unit is paid according to its effective contribution to overall system reliability. The proposed scheme has many attractive features and preserves the theoretical efficiency properties of energy-only markets. Fairness, incentive compatibility, market power mitigation and settlement rules are investigated in this work. The article also examines the requirements for system data and models in order to implement the proposed capacity mechanism. A numerical example on a real hydrothermal system serves for illustrating the practicability of the proposed approach and the resulting reliability payments to the generation units.
Fil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
Fil: Pringles, Rolando Marcelo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
Fil: Larisson, Carlos Hugo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
Fil: Garces, Francisco Felipe. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina - Materia
-
Adequacy
Supply Reliability
Power Generation
Price Spikes
Investment
Regulation - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/33012
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity marketsOlsina, Fernando GabrielPringles, Rolando MarceloLarisson, Carlos HugoGarces, Francisco FelipeAdequacySupply ReliabilityPower GenerationPrice SpikesInvestmentRegulationhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/2.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2Electric power is a critical input to modern economies. Generation adequacy and security of supply in power systems running under competition are currently topics of high concern for consumers, regulators and governments. In a market setting, generation investments and adequacy can only be achieved by an appropriate regulatory framework that sets efficient remuneration to power capacity. Theoretically, energy-only electricity markets are efficient and no additional mechanism is needed. Nonetheless, the energy-only market design suffers from serious drawbacks. Therefore, jointly with the evolution of electricity markets, many remunerating mechanisms for generation capacity have been proposed. Explicit capacity payment was the first remunerating approach implemented and perhaps still the most applied. However, this price-based regulation has been applied no without severe difficulties and criticism. In this paper, a new reliability payment mechanism is envisioned. Capacity of each generating unit is paid according to its effective contribution to overall system reliability. The proposed scheme has many attractive features and preserves the theoretical efficiency properties of energy-only markets. Fairness, incentive compatibility, market power mitigation and settlement rules are investigated in this work. The article also examines the requirements for system data and models in order to implement the proposed capacity mechanism. A numerical example on a real hydrothermal system serves for illustrating the practicability of the proposed approach and the resulting reliability payments to the generation units.Fil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; ArgentinaFil: Pringles, Rolando Marcelo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; ArgentinaFil: Larisson, Carlos Hugo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; ArgentinaFil: Garces, Francisco Felipe. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; ArgentinaElsevier2014-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/33012Garces, Francisco Felipe; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Larisson, Carlos Hugo; Pringles, Rolando Marcelo; Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 73; 6-2014; 211-2240301-4215CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.05.014info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030142151400295Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T14:45:34Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/33012instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 14:45:35.172CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets |
title |
Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets |
spellingShingle |
Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets Olsina, Fernando Gabriel Adequacy Supply Reliability Power Generation Price Spikes Investment Regulation |
title_short |
Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets |
title_full |
Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets |
title_fullStr |
Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets |
title_full_unstemmed |
Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets |
title_sort |
Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Olsina, Fernando Gabriel Pringles, Rolando Marcelo Larisson, Carlos Hugo Garces, Francisco Felipe |
author |
Olsina, Fernando Gabriel |
author_facet |
Olsina, Fernando Gabriel Pringles, Rolando Marcelo Larisson, Carlos Hugo Garces, Francisco Felipe |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Pringles, Rolando Marcelo Larisson, Carlos Hugo Garces, Francisco Felipe |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Adequacy Supply Reliability Power Generation Price Spikes Investment Regulation |
topic |
Adequacy Supply Reliability Power Generation Price Spikes Investment Regulation |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2.2 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Electric power is a critical input to modern economies. Generation adequacy and security of supply in power systems running under competition are currently topics of high concern for consumers, regulators and governments. In a market setting, generation investments and adequacy can only be achieved by an appropriate regulatory framework that sets efficient remuneration to power capacity. Theoretically, energy-only electricity markets are efficient and no additional mechanism is needed. Nonetheless, the energy-only market design suffers from serious drawbacks. Therefore, jointly with the evolution of electricity markets, many remunerating mechanisms for generation capacity have been proposed. Explicit capacity payment was the first remunerating approach implemented and perhaps still the most applied. However, this price-based regulation has been applied no without severe difficulties and criticism. In this paper, a new reliability payment mechanism is envisioned. Capacity of each generating unit is paid according to its effective contribution to overall system reliability. The proposed scheme has many attractive features and preserves the theoretical efficiency properties of energy-only markets. Fairness, incentive compatibility, market power mitigation and settlement rules are investigated in this work. The article also examines the requirements for system data and models in order to implement the proposed capacity mechanism. A numerical example on a real hydrothermal system serves for illustrating the practicability of the proposed approach and the resulting reliability payments to the generation units. Fil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina Fil: Pringles, Rolando Marcelo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina Fil: Larisson, Carlos Hugo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina Fil: Garces, Francisco Felipe. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina |
description |
Electric power is a critical input to modern economies. Generation adequacy and security of supply in power systems running under competition are currently topics of high concern for consumers, regulators and governments. In a market setting, generation investments and adequacy can only be achieved by an appropriate regulatory framework that sets efficient remuneration to power capacity. Theoretically, energy-only electricity markets are efficient and no additional mechanism is needed. Nonetheless, the energy-only market design suffers from serious drawbacks. Therefore, jointly with the evolution of electricity markets, many remunerating mechanisms for generation capacity have been proposed. Explicit capacity payment was the first remunerating approach implemented and perhaps still the most applied. However, this price-based regulation has been applied no without severe difficulties and criticism. In this paper, a new reliability payment mechanism is envisioned. Capacity of each generating unit is paid according to its effective contribution to overall system reliability. The proposed scheme has many attractive features and preserves the theoretical efficiency properties of energy-only markets. Fairness, incentive compatibility, market power mitigation and settlement rules are investigated in this work. The article also examines the requirements for system data and models in order to implement the proposed capacity mechanism. A numerical example on a real hydrothermal system serves for illustrating the practicability of the proposed approach and the resulting reliability payments to the generation units. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-06 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/33012 Garces, Francisco Felipe; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Larisson, Carlos Hugo; Pringles, Rolando Marcelo; Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 73; 6-2014; 211-224 0301-4215 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/33012 |
identifier_str_mv |
Garces, Francisco Felipe; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Larisson, Carlos Hugo; Pringles, Rolando Marcelo; Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 73; 6-2014; 211-224 0301-4215 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.05.014 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030142151400295X |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
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reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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13.22299 |