Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets

Autores
Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Pringles, Rolando Marcelo; Larisson, Carlos Hugo; Garces, Francisco Felipe
Año de publicación
2014
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Electric power is a critical input to modern economies. Generation adequacy and security of supply in power systems running under competition are currently topics of high concern for consumers, regulators and governments. In a market setting, generation investments and adequacy can only be achieved by an appropriate regulatory framework that sets efficient remuneration to power capacity. Theoretically, energy-only electricity markets are efficient and no additional mechanism is needed. Nonetheless, the energy-only market design suffers from serious drawbacks. Therefore, jointly with the evolution of electricity markets, many remunerating mechanisms for generation capacity have been proposed. Explicit capacity payment was the first remunerating approach implemented and perhaps still the most applied. However, this price-based regulation has been applied no without severe difficulties and criticism. In this paper, a new reliability payment mechanism is envisioned. Capacity of each generating unit is paid according to its effective contribution to overall system reliability. The proposed scheme has many attractive features and preserves the theoretical efficiency properties of energy-only markets. Fairness, incentive compatibility, market power mitigation and settlement rules are investigated in this work. The article also examines the requirements for system data and models in order to implement the proposed capacity mechanism. A numerical example on a real hydrothermal system serves for illustrating the practicability of the proposed approach and the resulting reliability payments to the generation units.
Fil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
Fil: Pringles, Rolando Marcelo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
Fil: Larisson, Carlos Hugo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
Fil: Garces, Francisco Felipe. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
Materia
Adequacy
Supply Reliability
Power Generation
Price Spikes
Investment
Regulation
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/33012

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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity marketsOlsina, Fernando GabrielPringles, Rolando MarceloLarisson, Carlos HugoGarces, Francisco FelipeAdequacySupply ReliabilityPower GenerationPrice SpikesInvestmentRegulationhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/2.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2Electric power is a critical input to modern economies. Generation adequacy and security of supply in power systems running under competition are currently topics of high concern for consumers, regulators and governments. In a market setting, generation investments and adequacy can only be achieved by an appropriate regulatory framework that sets efficient remuneration to power capacity. Theoretically, energy-only electricity markets are efficient and no additional mechanism is needed. Nonetheless, the energy-only market design suffers from serious drawbacks. Therefore, jointly with the evolution of electricity markets, many remunerating mechanisms for generation capacity have been proposed. Explicit capacity payment was the first remunerating approach implemented and perhaps still the most applied. However, this price-based regulation has been applied no without severe difficulties and criticism. In this paper, a new reliability payment mechanism is envisioned. Capacity of each generating unit is paid according to its effective contribution to overall system reliability. The proposed scheme has many attractive features and preserves the theoretical efficiency properties of energy-only markets. Fairness, incentive compatibility, market power mitigation and settlement rules are investigated in this work. The article also examines the requirements for system data and models in order to implement the proposed capacity mechanism. A numerical example on a real hydrothermal system serves for illustrating the practicability of the proposed approach and the resulting reliability payments to the generation units.Fil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; ArgentinaFil: Pringles, Rolando Marcelo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; ArgentinaFil: Larisson, Carlos Hugo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; ArgentinaFil: Garces, Francisco Felipe. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; ArgentinaElsevier2014-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/33012Garces, Francisco Felipe; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Larisson, Carlos Hugo; Pringles, Rolando Marcelo; Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 73; 6-2014; 211-2240301-4215CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.05.014info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030142151400295Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T14:45:34Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/33012instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 14:45:35.172CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets
title Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets
spellingShingle Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets
Olsina, Fernando Gabriel
Adequacy
Supply Reliability
Power Generation
Price Spikes
Investment
Regulation
title_short Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets
title_full Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets
title_fullStr Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets
title_full_unstemmed Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets
title_sort Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Olsina, Fernando Gabriel
Pringles, Rolando Marcelo
Larisson, Carlos Hugo
Garces, Francisco Felipe
author Olsina, Fernando Gabriel
author_facet Olsina, Fernando Gabriel
Pringles, Rolando Marcelo
Larisson, Carlos Hugo
Garces, Francisco Felipe
author_role author
author2 Pringles, Rolando Marcelo
Larisson, Carlos Hugo
Garces, Francisco Felipe
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Adequacy
Supply Reliability
Power Generation
Price Spikes
Investment
Regulation
topic Adequacy
Supply Reliability
Power Generation
Price Spikes
Investment
Regulation
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/2
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Electric power is a critical input to modern economies. Generation adequacy and security of supply in power systems running under competition are currently topics of high concern for consumers, regulators and governments. In a market setting, generation investments and adequacy can only be achieved by an appropriate regulatory framework that sets efficient remuneration to power capacity. Theoretically, energy-only electricity markets are efficient and no additional mechanism is needed. Nonetheless, the energy-only market design suffers from serious drawbacks. Therefore, jointly with the evolution of electricity markets, many remunerating mechanisms for generation capacity have been proposed. Explicit capacity payment was the first remunerating approach implemented and perhaps still the most applied. However, this price-based regulation has been applied no without severe difficulties and criticism. In this paper, a new reliability payment mechanism is envisioned. Capacity of each generating unit is paid according to its effective contribution to overall system reliability. The proposed scheme has many attractive features and preserves the theoretical efficiency properties of energy-only markets. Fairness, incentive compatibility, market power mitigation and settlement rules are investigated in this work. The article also examines the requirements for system data and models in order to implement the proposed capacity mechanism. A numerical example on a real hydrothermal system serves for illustrating the practicability of the proposed approach and the resulting reliability payments to the generation units.
Fil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
Fil: Pringles, Rolando Marcelo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
Fil: Larisson, Carlos Hugo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
Fil: Garces, Francisco Felipe. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentina
description Electric power is a critical input to modern economies. Generation adequacy and security of supply in power systems running under competition are currently topics of high concern for consumers, regulators and governments. In a market setting, generation investments and adequacy can only be achieved by an appropriate regulatory framework that sets efficient remuneration to power capacity. Theoretically, energy-only electricity markets are efficient and no additional mechanism is needed. Nonetheless, the energy-only market design suffers from serious drawbacks. Therefore, jointly with the evolution of electricity markets, many remunerating mechanisms for generation capacity have been proposed. Explicit capacity payment was the first remunerating approach implemented and perhaps still the most applied. However, this price-based regulation has been applied no without severe difficulties and criticism. In this paper, a new reliability payment mechanism is envisioned. Capacity of each generating unit is paid according to its effective contribution to overall system reliability. The proposed scheme has many attractive features and preserves the theoretical efficiency properties of energy-only markets. Fairness, incentive compatibility, market power mitigation and settlement rules are investigated in this work. The article also examines the requirements for system data and models in order to implement the proposed capacity mechanism. A numerical example on a real hydrothermal system serves for illustrating the practicability of the proposed approach and the resulting reliability payments to the generation units.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-06
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/33012
Garces, Francisco Felipe; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Larisson, Carlos Hugo; Pringles, Rolando Marcelo; Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 73; 6-2014; 211-224
0301-4215
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/33012
identifier_str_mv Garces, Francisco Felipe; Olsina, Fernando Gabriel; Larisson, Carlos Hugo; Pringles, Rolando Marcelo; Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets; Elsevier; Energy Policy; 73; 6-2014; 211-224
0301-4215
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.05.014
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030142151400295X
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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