Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach

Autores
Accinelli Gamba, Elvio; Martins, Felipe; Quintas, Luis Guillermo
Año de publicación
2019
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In this paper we study the mathematical foundations of different evolutionary models thatanalyze the evolution of a society composed of two populations with antagonistic interests.Populations are involved in a conflict whose solution depends on the action chosen by eachindividual. None of them are able to impose a solution on the other population. Two individuals,one from each population, are randomly chosen to play a game. In a strategic way,each individual of each population, must choose one of two feasible strategies. The solutionobtained for each population will be the result of the aggregated action of the individuals.
Fil: Accinelli Gamba, Elvio. Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí; México
Fil: Martins, Felipe. Universidad de Porto; Portugal
Fil: Quintas, Luis Guillermo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Materia
GAMES
EQUILIBRIUM
STABILITY
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/136669
Acceder
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network_acronym_str CONICETDig
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approachAccinelli Gamba, ElvioMartins, FelipeQuintas, Luis GuillermoGAMESEQUILIBRIUMSTABILITYhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1In this paper we study the mathematical foundations of different evolutionary models thatanalyze the evolution of a society composed of two populations with antagonistic interests.Populations are involved in a conflict whose solution depends on the action chosen by eachindividual. None of them are able to impose a solution on the other population. Two individuals,one from each population, are randomly chosen to play a game. In a strategic way,each individual of each population, must choose one of two feasible strategies. The solutionobtained for each population will be the result of the aggregated action of the individuals.Fil: Accinelli Gamba, Elvio. Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí; MéxicoFil: Martins, Felipe. Universidad de Porto; PortugalFil: Quintas, Luis Guillermo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaUniversidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí2019-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/136669Accinelli Gamba, Elvio; Martins, Felipe; Quintas, Luis Guillermo; Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach; Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí; Perspectivas; 13; 1; 6-2019; 75-802007-2104CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://publicaciones.eco.uaslp.mx/Volumen23.htminfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://publicaciones.eco.uaslp.mx/VOL23/Volumen_13.0_4.PDFinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-11-05T09:35:05Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/136669instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-11-05 09:35:05.58CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach
title Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach
spellingShingle Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach
Accinelli Gamba, Elvio
GAMES
EQUILIBRIUM
STABILITY
title_short Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach
title_full Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach
title_fullStr Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach
title_full_unstemmed Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach
title_sort Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Accinelli Gamba, Elvio
Martins, Felipe
Quintas, Luis Guillermo
author Accinelli Gamba, Elvio
author_facet Accinelli Gamba, Elvio
Martins, Felipe
Quintas, Luis Guillermo
author_role author
author2 Martins, Felipe
Quintas, Luis Guillermo
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv GAMES
EQUILIBRIUM
STABILITY
topic GAMES
EQUILIBRIUM
STABILITY
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In this paper we study the mathematical foundations of different evolutionary models thatanalyze the evolution of a society composed of two populations with antagonistic interests.Populations are involved in a conflict whose solution depends on the action chosen by eachindividual. None of them are able to impose a solution on the other population. Two individuals,one from each population, are randomly chosen to play a game. In a strategic way,each individual of each population, must choose one of two feasible strategies. The solutionobtained for each population will be the result of the aggregated action of the individuals.
Fil: Accinelli Gamba, Elvio. Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí; México
Fil: Martins, Felipe. Universidad de Porto; Portugal
Fil: Quintas, Luis Guillermo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
description In this paper we study the mathematical foundations of different evolutionary models thatanalyze the evolution of a society composed of two populations with antagonistic interests.Populations are involved in a conflict whose solution depends on the action chosen by eachindividual. None of them are able to impose a solution on the other population. Two individuals,one from each population, are randomly chosen to play a game. In a strategic way,each individual of each population, must choose one of two feasible strategies. The solutionobtained for each population will be the result of the aggregated action of the individuals.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-06
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/136669
Accinelli Gamba, Elvio; Martins, Felipe; Quintas, Luis Guillermo; Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach; Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí; Perspectivas; 13; 1; 6-2019; 75-80
2007-2104
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/136669
identifier_str_mv Accinelli Gamba, Elvio; Martins, Felipe; Quintas, Luis Guillermo; Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach; Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí; Perspectivas; 13; 1; 6-2019; 75-80
2007-2104
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://publicaciones.eco.uaslp.mx/Volumen23.htm
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://publicaciones.eco.uaslp.mx/VOL23/Volumen_13.0_4.PDF
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1847976768821002240
score 13.087074

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