On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria

Autores
Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José
Año de publicación
2014
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Second, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.
Fil: Massó, Jordi. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina
Materia
Assignment game
Core
Set-wise stability
Competitive equilibrium
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso embargado
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/5802
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive EquilibriaMassó, JordiNeme, Alejandro JoséAssignment gameCoreSet-wise stabilityCompetitive equilibriumhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Second, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.Fil: Massó, Jordi. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona; EspañaFil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; ArgentinaElsevier2014-10-03info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2017-10-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/5802Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria; Elsevier; Journal Of Economic Theory; 154; 03-10-2014; 187-2150022-0531enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053114001379info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.016info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T10:09:27Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/5802instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 10:09:27.939CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria
title On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria
spellingShingle On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria
Massó, Jordi
Assignment game
Core
Set-wise stability
Competitive equilibrium
title_short On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria
title_full On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria
title_fullStr On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria
title_full_unstemmed On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria
title_sort On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author Massó, Jordi
author_facet Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author_role author
author2 Neme, Alejandro José
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Assignment game
Core
Set-wise stability
Competitive equilibrium
topic Assignment game
Core
Set-wise stability
Competitive equilibrium
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Second, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.
Fil: Massó, Jordi. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina
description We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Second, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-10-03
info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2017-10-31
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/5802
Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria; Elsevier; Journal Of Economic Theory; 154; 03-10-2014; 187-215
0022-0531
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/5802
identifier_str_mv Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria; Elsevier; Journal Of Economic Theory; 154; 03-10-2014; 187-215
0022-0531
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053114001379
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.016
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv embargoedAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397

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