Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers

Autores
Streb, Jorge Miguel; Lema, Daniel; Torrens, Gustavo
Año de publicación
2005
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de conferencia
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In contrast to previous empirical work on electoral cycles, which implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy, this paper contends that under separation of powers an unaligned legislature may have a moderating role. Focusing on the budget surplus, we find that stronger effective checks and balances explain why cycles are weaker in developed and established democracies. Once the discretional component of executive power is isolated, there are significant cycles in all democracies. Whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary, or the electoral rules are majoritarian or proportional, does not change the basic results.
Departamento de Economía
Materia
Ciencias Económicas
political budget cycles; asymmetric information; discretion; separation of powers; checks and balances; veto players; rule of law
Economía
presupuesto
Recursos presupuestarios
Política económica
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/3816
Acceder
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network_name_str SEDICI (UNLP)
spelling Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powersStreb, Jorge MiguelLema, DanielTorrens, GustavoCiencias Económicaspolitical budget cycles; asymmetric information; discretion; separation of powers; checks and balances; veto players; rule of lawEconomíapresupuestoRecursos presupuestariosPolítica económicaIn contrast to previous empirical work on electoral cycles, which implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy, this paper contends that under separation of powers an unaligned legislature may have a moderating role. Focusing on the budget surplus, we find that stronger effective checks and balances explain why cycles are weaker in developed and established democracies. Once the discretional component of executive power is isolated, there are significant cycles in all democracies. Whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary, or the electoral rules are majoritarian or proportional, does not change the basic results.Departamento de Economía2005-05info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionObjeto de conferenciahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3816enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/jemi/2005/trabajo11.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-10T11:52:45Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/3816Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-10 11:52:45.52SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
title Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
spellingShingle Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
Streb, Jorge Miguel
Ciencias Económicas
political budget cycles; asymmetric information; discretion; separation of powers; checks and balances; veto players; rule of law
Economía
presupuesto
Recursos presupuestarios
Política económica
title_short Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
title_full Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
title_fullStr Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
title_full_unstemmed Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
title_sort Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Streb, Jorge Miguel
Lema, Daniel
Torrens, Gustavo
author Streb, Jorge Miguel
author_facet Streb, Jorge Miguel
Lema, Daniel
Torrens, Gustavo
author_role author
author2 Lema, Daniel
Torrens, Gustavo
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ciencias Económicas
political budget cycles; asymmetric information; discretion; separation of powers; checks and balances; veto players; rule of law
Economía
presupuesto
Recursos presupuestarios
Política económica
topic Ciencias Económicas
political budget cycles; asymmetric information; discretion; separation of powers; checks and balances; veto players; rule of law
Economía
presupuesto
Recursos presupuestarios
Política económica
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In contrast to previous empirical work on electoral cycles, which implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy, this paper contends that under separation of powers an unaligned legislature may have a moderating role. Focusing on the budget surplus, we find that stronger effective checks and balances explain why cycles are weaker in developed and established democracies. Once the discretional component of executive power is isolated, there are significant cycles in all democracies. Whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary, or the electoral rules are majoritarian or proportional, does not change the basic results.
Departamento de Economía
description In contrast to previous empirical work on electoral cycles, which implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy, this paper contends that under separation of powers an unaligned legislature may have a moderating role. Focusing on the budget surplus, we find that stronger effective checks and balances explain why cycles are weaker in developed and established democracies. Once the discretional component of executive power is isolated, there are significant cycles in all democracies. Whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary, or the electoral rules are majoritarian or proportional, does not change the basic results.
publishDate 2005
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2005-05
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Objeto de conferencia
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia
format conferenceObject
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3816
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3816
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/jemi/2005/trabajo11.pdf
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)
instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata
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reponame_str SEDICI (UNLP)
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
instname_str Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron_str UNLP
institution UNLP
repository.name.fl_str_mv SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata
repository.mail.fl_str_mv alira@sedici.unlp.edu.ar
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