The dilemma of fiscal federalism: grants and fiscal performance around the world

• Autores: Rodden, Jonathan
• Año de publicación: 2001
• Idioma: inglés
• Tipo de recurso: documento de conferencia
• Materia: Ciencias Económicas; federalismo; política fiscal
• Institución: Universidad Nacional de La Plata

This paper uses cross-national data to examine the effects of federal fiscal and political institutions on the fiscal performance of subnational governments. Balanced budgets among subnational governments are found when either (1) the center imposes strong borrowing restrictions or (2) subnational governments have both wide-ranging taxing and borrowing autonomy. Large and persistent aggregate deficits occur when subnational governments are simultaneously dependent on general-purpose intergovernmental transfers and free to borrow-a combination found most frequently among constituent units in federations. Time-series cross-section analysis reveals that as countries increase their reliance on transfers over time, subnational and overall fiscal performance decline, especially when subnational governments have easy access to credit. These findings illuminate a key dilemma of fiscal federalism and a more precise notion of its dangers: When constitutionally constrained or politically fragmented central governments take on heavy co-financing obligations, they cannot credibly commit to ignore the fiscal problems of lower-level governments.
Departamento de Economía