Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control
- Autores
- Porto, Alberto; Porto, Natalia
- Año de publicación
- 2000
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- This paper investigates, empirically, the voters’ choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance. The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past. Municipal elections are not a mere rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we can trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option than fiscal centralization.
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas - Materia
-
Ciencias Económicas
Fiscal decentralization
Local governments
Fiscal performance
Voters’ choices - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
- Repositorio
.jpg)
- Institución
- Universidad Nacional de La Plata
- OAI Identificador
- oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/123638
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Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as controlPorto, AlbertoPorto, NataliaCiencias EconómicasFiscal decentralizationLocal governmentsFiscal performanceVoters’ choicesThis paper investigates, empirically, the voters’ choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance. The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past. Municipal elections are not a mere rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we can trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option than fiscal centralization.Facultad de Ciencias Económicas2000info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArticulohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdf135-167http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/123638enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1514-0326info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1667-6726info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/15140326.2000.12040548info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-17T10:12:14Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/123638Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-17 10:12:14.782SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control |
| title |
Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control |
| spellingShingle |
Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control Porto, Alberto Ciencias Económicas Fiscal decentralization Local governments Fiscal performance Voters’ choices |
| title_short |
Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control |
| title_full |
Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control |
| title_fullStr |
Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control |
| title_sort |
Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Porto, Alberto Porto, Natalia |
| author |
Porto, Alberto |
| author_facet |
Porto, Alberto Porto, Natalia |
| author_role |
author |
| author2 |
Porto, Natalia |
| author2_role |
author |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Ciencias Económicas Fiscal decentralization Local governments Fiscal performance Voters’ choices |
| topic |
Ciencias Económicas Fiscal decentralization Local governments Fiscal performance Voters’ choices |
| dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
This paper investigates, empirically, the voters’ choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance. The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past. Municipal elections are not a mere rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we can trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option than fiscal centralization. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas |
| description |
This paper investigates, empirically, the voters’ choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance. The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past. Municipal elections are not a mere rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we can trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option than fiscal centralization. |
| publishDate |
2000 |
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2000 |
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eng |
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