Does the Enforcement of Labor Regulations Reduce Informality? The Case of Peru

Autores
Pinto, María Florencia; Valdivia Rivera, Yulia; Winkler, Hernán Jorge
Año de publicación
2026
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de trabajo
Estado
versión enviada
Descripción
This article examines the effects of strengthened labor regulation enforcement on labor market outcomes in Peru from 2010 to 2019. In 2013, the Peruvian government established a national labor inspection agency, which was progressively rolled out nationwide. This reform led to a substantial increase in the frequency and severity of fines imposed on formal firms. Despite this heightened enforcement, our analysis using extended two-way fixed effects models finds no significant effects on overall employment levels. Moreover, there is no evidence of changes along either the intensive margin—informal employment within formal firms—or the extensive margin—the share of employment in informal firms. These findings suggest that increased enforcement of labor regulations did not lead to measurable shifts in labor informality or employment outcomes during this period.
Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales
Materia
Ciencias Económicas
labor informality
enforcement
regulation
inspections
fines
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/189569
Acceder
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repository_id_str 1329
network_name_str SEDICI (UNLP)
spelling Does the Enforcement of Labor Regulations Reduce Informality? The Case of PeruPinto, María FlorenciaValdivia Rivera, YuliaWinkler, Hernán JorgeCiencias Económicaslabor informalityenforcementregulationinspectionsfinesThis article examines the effects of strengthened labor regulation enforcement on labor market outcomes in Peru from 2010 to 2019. In 2013, the Peruvian government established a national labor inspection agency, which was progressively rolled out nationwide. This reform led to a substantial increase in the frequency and severity of fines imposed on formal firms. Despite this heightened enforcement, our analysis using extended two-way fixed effects models finds no significant effects on overall employment levels. Moreover, there is no evidence of changes along either the intensive margin—informal employment within formal firms—or the extensive margin—the share of employment in informal firms. These findings suggest that increased enforcement of labor regulations did not lead to measurable shifts in labor informality or employment outcomes during this period.Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales2026-01info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionDocumento de trabajohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeTrabajoapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/189569enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/no-363/info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1853-0168info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2026-02-05T12:40:33Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/189569Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292026-02-05 12:40:33.852SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Does the Enforcement of Labor Regulations Reduce Informality? The Case of Peru
title Does the Enforcement of Labor Regulations Reduce Informality? The Case of Peru
spellingShingle Does the Enforcement of Labor Regulations Reduce Informality? The Case of Peru
Pinto, María Florencia
Ciencias Económicas
labor informality
enforcement
regulation
inspections
fines
title_short Does the Enforcement of Labor Regulations Reduce Informality? The Case of Peru
title_full Does the Enforcement of Labor Regulations Reduce Informality? The Case of Peru
title_fullStr Does the Enforcement of Labor Regulations Reduce Informality? The Case of Peru
title_full_unstemmed Does the Enforcement of Labor Regulations Reduce Informality? The Case of Peru
title_sort Does the Enforcement of Labor Regulations Reduce Informality? The Case of Peru
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Pinto, María Florencia
Valdivia Rivera, Yulia
Winkler, Hernán Jorge
author Pinto, María Florencia
author_facet Pinto, María Florencia
Valdivia Rivera, Yulia
Winkler, Hernán Jorge
author_role author
author2 Valdivia Rivera, Yulia
Winkler, Hernán Jorge
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ciencias Económicas
labor informality
enforcement
regulation
inspections
fines
topic Ciencias Económicas
labor informality
enforcement
regulation
inspections
fines
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This article examines the effects of strengthened labor regulation enforcement on labor market outcomes in Peru from 2010 to 2019. In 2013, the Peruvian government established a national labor inspection agency, which was progressively rolled out nationwide. This reform led to a substantial increase in the frequency and severity of fines imposed on formal firms. Despite this heightened enforcement, our analysis using extended two-way fixed effects models finds no significant effects on overall employment levels. Moreover, there is no evidence of changes along either the intensive margin—informal employment within formal firms—or the extensive margin—the share of employment in informal firms. These findings suggest that increased enforcement of labor regulations did not lead to measurable shifts in labor informality or employment outcomes during this period.
Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales
description This article examines the effects of strengthened labor regulation enforcement on labor market outcomes in Peru from 2010 to 2019. In 2013, the Peruvian government established a national labor inspection agency, which was progressively rolled out nationwide. This reform led to a substantial increase in the frequency and severity of fines imposed on formal firms. Despite this heightened enforcement, our analysis using extended two-way fixed effects models finds no significant effects on overall employment levels. Moreover, there is no evidence of changes along either the intensive margin—informal employment within formal firms—or the extensive margin—the share of employment in informal firms. These findings suggest that increased enforcement of labor regulations did not lead to measurable shifts in labor informality or employment outcomes during this period.
publishDate 2026
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2026-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
Documento de trabajo
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeTrabajo
format workingPaper
status_str submittedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/189569
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/189569
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1853-0168
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)
instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata
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reponame_str SEDICI (UNLP)
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
instname_str Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron_str UNLP
institution UNLP
repository.name.fl_str_mv SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata
repository.mail.fl_str_mv alira@sedici.unlp.edu.ar
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