Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries

Autores
Ronconi, Lucas
Año de publicación
2019
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers’ access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions.
Fil: Ronconi, Lucas. Centro de Investigación y Acción Social; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
LABOR
ENFORCEMENT
INFORMALITY
REGULATION
INSPECTIONS
FINES
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/121394
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countriesRonconi, LucasLABORENFORCEMENTINFORMALITYREGULATIONINSPECTIONSFINEShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers’ access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions.Fil: Ronconi, Lucas. Centro de Investigación y Acción Social; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaIZA-Institute of Labor Economics2019-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/121394Ronconi, Lucas; Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries; IZA-Institute of Labor Economics; IZA World of Labor; 457; 3-2019; 1-92054-9571CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.15185/izawol.457info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://wol.iza.org/articles/enforcement-of-labor-regulations-in-developing-countries/longinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:11:49Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/121394instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:11:50.052CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries
title Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries
spellingShingle Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries
Ronconi, Lucas
LABOR
ENFORCEMENT
INFORMALITY
REGULATION
INSPECTIONS
FINES
title_short Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries
title_full Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries
title_fullStr Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries
title_full_unstemmed Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries
title_sort Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Ronconi, Lucas
author Ronconi, Lucas
author_facet Ronconi, Lucas
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv LABOR
ENFORCEMENT
INFORMALITY
REGULATION
INSPECTIONS
FINES
topic LABOR
ENFORCEMENT
INFORMALITY
REGULATION
INSPECTIONS
FINES
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers’ access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions.
Fil: Ronconi, Lucas. Centro de Investigación y Acción Social; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers’ access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-03
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/121394
Ronconi, Lucas; Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries; IZA-Institute of Labor Economics; IZA World of Labor; 457; 3-2019; 1-9
2054-9571
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/121394
identifier_str_mv Ronconi, Lucas; Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries; IZA-Institute of Labor Economics; IZA World of Labor; 457; 3-2019; 1-9
2054-9571
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.15185/izawol.457
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://wol.iza.org/articles/enforcement-of-labor-regulations-in-developing-countries/long
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv IZA-Institute of Labor Economics
publisher.none.fl_str_mv IZA-Institute of Labor Economics
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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