Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries
- Autores
- Ronconi, Lucas
- Año de publicación
- 2019
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers’ access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions.
Fil: Ronconi, Lucas. Centro de Investigación y Acción Social; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina - Materia
-
LABOR
ENFORCEMENT
INFORMALITY
REGULATION
INSPECTIONS
FINES - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/121394
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countriesRonconi, LucasLABORENFORCEMENTINFORMALITYREGULATIONINSPECTIONSFINEShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers’ access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions.Fil: Ronconi, Lucas. Centro de Investigación y Acción Social; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaIZA-Institute of Labor Economics2019-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/121394Ronconi, Lucas; Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries; IZA-Institute of Labor Economics; IZA World of Labor; 457; 3-2019; 1-92054-9571CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.15185/izawol.457info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://wol.iza.org/articles/enforcement-of-labor-regulations-in-developing-countries/longinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T10:00:20Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/121394instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 10:00:20.758CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries |
title |
Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries |
spellingShingle |
Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries Ronconi, Lucas LABOR ENFORCEMENT INFORMALITY REGULATION INSPECTIONS FINES |
title_short |
Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries |
title_full |
Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries |
title_fullStr |
Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries |
title_full_unstemmed |
Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries |
title_sort |
Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Ronconi, Lucas |
author |
Ronconi, Lucas |
author_facet |
Ronconi, Lucas |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
LABOR ENFORCEMENT INFORMALITY REGULATION INSPECTIONS FINES |
topic |
LABOR ENFORCEMENT INFORMALITY REGULATION INSPECTIONS FINES |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers’ access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions. Fil: Ronconi, Lucas. Centro de Investigación y Acción Social; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina |
description |
More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers’ access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-03 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/121394 Ronconi, Lucas; Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries; IZA-Institute of Labor Economics; IZA World of Labor; 457; 3-2019; 1-9 2054-9571 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/121394 |
identifier_str_mv |
Ronconi, Lucas; Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries; IZA-Institute of Labor Economics; IZA World of Labor; 457; 3-2019; 1-9 2054-9571 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.15185/izawol.457 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://wol.iza.org/articles/enforcement-of-labor-regulations-in-developing-countries/long |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
IZA-Institute of Labor Economics |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
IZA-Institute of Labor Economics |
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reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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1842269632829849600 |
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13.13397 |