Can cheap talk overcome information disclosure in buyer-seller communication?

Autores
Coleff, Joaquín
Año de publicación
2015
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de conferencia
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We compare two types of costless communication, Cheap Talk and Information Disclosure, in a buyer-seller interaction where the buyer has private information about his ideal location in the product space and the seller is entitled to make a takeit-or-leave-it offer comprising a product location and a price. We show that Cheap Talk can overcome Information Disclosure in terms of seller’s payoff and, generally, welfare. Under Information Disclosure, the buyer garbles the signal compared to the one in a Cheap Talk equilibrium to persuade a lower price which inevitably reduces profits. However, Information Disclosure may also reduce product attractiveness and, thus, welfare.
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
Materia
Ciencias Económicas
cheap talk
disclosure
incomplete contracts
strategic communication
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/169691
Acceder
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network_name_str SEDICI (UNLP)
spelling Can cheap talk overcome information disclosure in buyer-seller communication?Coleff, JoaquínCiencias Económicascheap talkdisclosureincomplete contractsstrategic communicationWe compare two types of costless communication, Cheap Talk and Information Disclosure, in a buyer-seller interaction where the buyer has private information about his ideal location in the product space and the seller is entitled to make a takeit-or-leave-it offer comprising a product location and a price. We show that Cheap Talk can overcome Information Disclosure in terms of seller’s payoff and, generally, welfare. Under Information Disclosure, the buyer garbles the signal compared to the one in a Cheap Talk equilibrium to persuade a lower price which inevitably reduces profits. However, Information Disclosure may also reduce product attractiveness and, thus, welfare.Facultad de Ciencias Económicas2015-11info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionObjeto de conferenciahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/169691enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/isbn/978-987-28590-3-9info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://bd.aaep.org.ar/anales/works/works2015/Coleff_AAEP2015.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1852-0022info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-10-22T17:24:11Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/169691Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-10-22 17:24:11.725SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Can cheap talk overcome information disclosure in buyer-seller communication?
title Can cheap talk overcome information disclosure in buyer-seller communication?
spellingShingle Can cheap talk overcome information disclosure in buyer-seller communication?
Coleff, Joaquín
Ciencias Económicas
cheap talk
disclosure
incomplete contracts
strategic communication
title_short Can cheap talk overcome information disclosure in buyer-seller communication?
title_full Can cheap talk overcome information disclosure in buyer-seller communication?
title_fullStr Can cheap talk overcome information disclosure in buyer-seller communication?
title_full_unstemmed Can cheap talk overcome information disclosure in buyer-seller communication?
title_sort Can cheap talk overcome information disclosure in buyer-seller communication?
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Coleff, Joaquín
author Coleff, Joaquín
author_facet Coleff, Joaquín
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ciencias Económicas
cheap talk
disclosure
incomplete contracts
strategic communication
topic Ciencias Económicas
cheap talk
disclosure
incomplete contracts
strategic communication
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We compare two types of costless communication, Cheap Talk and Information Disclosure, in a buyer-seller interaction where the buyer has private information about his ideal location in the product space and the seller is entitled to make a takeit-or-leave-it offer comprising a product location and a price. We show that Cheap Talk can overcome Information Disclosure in terms of seller’s payoff and, generally, welfare. Under Information Disclosure, the buyer garbles the signal compared to the one in a Cheap Talk equilibrium to persuade a lower price which inevitably reduces profits. However, Information Disclosure may also reduce product attractiveness and, thus, welfare.
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
description We compare two types of costless communication, Cheap Talk and Information Disclosure, in a buyer-seller interaction where the buyer has private information about his ideal location in the product space and the seller is entitled to make a takeit-or-leave-it offer comprising a product location and a price. We show that Cheap Talk can overcome Information Disclosure in terms of seller’s payoff and, generally, welfare. Under Information Disclosure, the buyer garbles the signal compared to the one in a Cheap Talk equilibrium to persuade a lower price which inevitably reduces profits. However, Information Disclosure may also reduce product attractiveness and, thus, welfare.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Objeto de conferencia
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia
format conferenceObject
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/169691
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/169691
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://bd.aaep.org.ar/anales/works/works2015/Coleff_AAEP2015.pdf
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1852-0022
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)
instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata
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reponame_str SEDICI (UNLP)
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
instname_str Universidad Nacional de La Plata
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repository.name.fl_str_mv SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata
repository.mail.fl_str_mv alira@sedici.unlp.edu.ar
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