Improving TCP’s Resistance to Blind Attacks through Ephemeral Port Randomization

Autores
Gont, Fernando
Año de publicación
2007
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de conferencia
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Recently, awareness has been raised about a number of “blind” attacks that can be performed against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and similar protocols. The consequences of these attacks range from throughput-reduction to broken connections or data corruption. These attacks rely on the attacker's ability to guess or know the four-tuple (Source Address, Destination Address, Source port, Destination Port) that identifies the transport protocol instance to be attacked. While there have been a number of proposals to mitigate these Vulnerabilities, the most obvious mitigation -- TCP port randomization -- has been the one least engineered. In this paper we analyze a number of approaches for the random selection of client port numbers, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. We discuss the potential interoperability problems that may arise from some port randomization algorithms that have been implemented in a number of popular operating systems, and propose a novel port randomization algorithm that provides the obfuscation while avoiding the interoperability problems that may be caused by other approaches. While port randomization is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead.
II Workshop de Arquitecturas, Redes y Sistemas Operativos
Red de Universidades con Carreras en Informática (RedUNCI)
Materia
Ciencias Informáticas
Informática
Routing protocols
Standards (e.g., TCP/IP)
Internet (e.g., TCP/IP)
Security, integrity, and protection
transport protocols
port randomization
obfuscation
blind attacks
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/21698

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oai_identifier_str oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/21698
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network_name_str SEDICI (UNLP)
spelling Improving TCP’s Resistance to Blind Attacks through Ephemeral Port RandomizationGont, FernandoCiencias InformáticasInformáticaRouting protocolsStandards (e.g., TCP/IP)Internet (e.g., TCP/IP)Security, integrity, and protectiontransport protocolsport randomizationobfuscationblind attacksRecently, awareness has been raised about a number of “blind” attacks that can be performed against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and similar protocols. The consequences of these attacks range from throughput-reduction to broken connections or data corruption. These attacks rely on the attacker's ability to guess or know the four-tuple (Source Address, Destination Address, Source port, Destination Port) that identifies the transport protocol instance to be attacked. While there have been a number of proposals to mitigate these Vulnerabilities, the most obvious mitigation -- TCP port randomization -- has been the one least engineered. In this paper we analyze a number of approaches for the random selection of client port numbers, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. We discuss the potential interoperability problems that may arise from some port randomization algorithms that have been implemented in a number of popular operating systems, and propose a novel port randomization algorithm that provides the obfuscation while avoiding the interoperability problems that may be caused by other approaches. While port randomization is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead.II Workshop de Arquitecturas, Redes y Sistemas OperativosRed de Universidades con Carreras en Informática (RedUNCI)2007info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionObjeto de conferenciahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdf136-146http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/21698enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-17T09:38:09Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/21698Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-17 09:38:09.315SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Improving TCP’s Resistance to Blind Attacks through Ephemeral Port Randomization
title Improving TCP’s Resistance to Blind Attacks through Ephemeral Port Randomization
spellingShingle Improving TCP’s Resistance to Blind Attacks through Ephemeral Port Randomization
Gont, Fernando
Ciencias Informáticas
Informática
Routing protocols
Standards (e.g., TCP/IP)
Internet (e.g., TCP/IP)
Security, integrity, and protection
transport protocols
port randomization
obfuscation
blind attacks
title_short Improving TCP’s Resistance to Blind Attacks through Ephemeral Port Randomization
title_full Improving TCP’s Resistance to Blind Attacks through Ephemeral Port Randomization
title_fullStr Improving TCP’s Resistance to Blind Attacks through Ephemeral Port Randomization
title_full_unstemmed Improving TCP’s Resistance to Blind Attacks through Ephemeral Port Randomization
title_sort Improving TCP’s Resistance to Blind Attacks through Ephemeral Port Randomization
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Gont, Fernando
author Gont, Fernando
author_facet Gont, Fernando
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ciencias Informáticas
Informática
Routing protocols
Standards (e.g., TCP/IP)
Internet (e.g., TCP/IP)
Security, integrity, and protection
transport protocols
port randomization
obfuscation
blind attacks
topic Ciencias Informáticas
Informática
Routing protocols
Standards (e.g., TCP/IP)
Internet (e.g., TCP/IP)
Security, integrity, and protection
transport protocols
port randomization
obfuscation
blind attacks
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Recently, awareness has been raised about a number of “blind” attacks that can be performed against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and similar protocols. The consequences of these attacks range from throughput-reduction to broken connections or data corruption. These attacks rely on the attacker's ability to guess or know the four-tuple (Source Address, Destination Address, Source port, Destination Port) that identifies the transport protocol instance to be attacked. While there have been a number of proposals to mitigate these Vulnerabilities, the most obvious mitigation -- TCP port randomization -- has been the one least engineered. In this paper we analyze a number of approaches for the random selection of client port numbers, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. We discuss the potential interoperability problems that may arise from some port randomization algorithms that have been implemented in a number of popular operating systems, and propose a novel port randomization algorithm that provides the obfuscation while avoiding the interoperability problems that may be caused by other approaches. While port randomization is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead.
II Workshop de Arquitecturas, Redes y Sistemas Operativos
Red de Universidades con Carreras en Informática (RedUNCI)
description Recently, awareness has been raised about a number of “blind” attacks that can be performed against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and similar protocols. The consequences of these attacks range from throughput-reduction to broken connections or data corruption. These attacks rely on the attacker's ability to guess or know the four-tuple (Source Address, Destination Address, Source port, Destination Port) that identifies the transport protocol instance to be attacked. While there have been a number of proposals to mitigate these Vulnerabilities, the most obvious mitigation -- TCP port randomization -- has been the one least engineered. In this paper we analyze a number of approaches for the random selection of client port numbers, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. We discuss the potential interoperability problems that may arise from some port randomization algorithms that have been implemented in a number of popular operating systems, and propose a novel port randomization algorithm that provides the obfuscation while avoiding the interoperability problems that may be caused by other approaches. While port randomization is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2007
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Objeto de conferencia
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia
format conferenceObject
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/21698
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/21698
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
136-146
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)
instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata
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reponame_str SEDICI (UNLP)
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instacron_str UNLP
institution UNLP
repository.name.fl_str_mv SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata
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