A note on optimal insurance in an information constrained federal economy with incomplete degree of enforceability and negotiation costs

Autores
Espino, Emilio
Año de publicación
1999
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de trabajo
Estado
versión enviada
Descripción
This paper studies the optimal insurance contract between a state and the central government in a federal economy with moral hazard, risk of repudiation (given some enforceability technology) and aggregate uncertainty. Also, it considers date 0 negotiation costs to implement this contract. The distribution of the fiscal resources locally collected by the province at t+1 are affected by period t state´s effort to collect taxes. Also, every period a state has the right to get a fixed proportion of the taxes nationally collected by the central government. These resources are identically and independently distributed across time. Using a recursive formulation of the allocation problem (following Atkeson (1991)), some basic properties of the optimal insurance contract are discussed showing when, in particular, it is actually optimal just to give up any attempt to provide insurance to the province.
Departamento de Economía
Materia
Ciencias Económicas
economía
análisis de costes
contrato
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/3510
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/3510
network_acronym_str SEDICI
repository_id_str 1329
network_name_str SEDICI (UNLP)
spelling A note on optimal insurance in an information constrained federal economy with incomplete degree of enforceability and negotiation costsEspino, EmilioCiencias Económicaseconomíaanálisis de costescontratoThis paper studies the optimal insurance contract between a state and the central government in a federal economy with moral hazard, risk of repudiation (given some enforceability technology) and aggregate uncertainty. Also, it considers date 0 negotiation costs to implement this contract. The distribution of the fiscal resources locally collected by the province at t+1 are affected by period t state´s effort to collect taxes. Also, every period a state has the right to get a fixed proportion of the taxes nationally collected by the central government. These resources are identically and independently distributed across time. Using a recursive formulation of the allocation problem (following Atkeson (1991)), some basic properties of the optimal insurance contract are discussed showing when, in particular, it is actually optimal just to give up any attempt to provide insurance to the province.Departamento de Economía1999-11info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionDocumento de trabajohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeTrabajoapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3510enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/doctrab/doc18.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1853-3930info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-29T10:49:12Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/3510Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-29 10:49:12.82SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A note on optimal insurance in an information constrained federal economy with incomplete degree of enforceability and negotiation costs
title A note on optimal insurance in an information constrained federal economy with incomplete degree of enforceability and negotiation costs
spellingShingle A note on optimal insurance in an information constrained federal economy with incomplete degree of enforceability and negotiation costs
Espino, Emilio
Ciencias Económicas
economía
análisis de costes
contrato
title_short A note on optimal insurance in an information constrained federal economy with incomplete degree of enforceability and negotiation costs
title_full A note on optimal insurance in an information constrained federal economy with incomplete degree of enforceability and negotiation costs
title_fullStr A note on optimal insurance in an information constrained federal economy with incomplete degree of enforceability and negotiation costs
title_full_unstemmed A note on optimal insurance in an information constrained federal economy with incomplete degree of enforceability and negotiation costs
title_sort A note on optimal insurance in an information constrained federal economy with incomplete degree of enforceability and negotiation costs
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Espino, Emilio
author Espino, Emilio
author_facet Espino, Emilio
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ciencias Económicas
economía
análisis de costes
contrato
topic Ciencias Económicas
economía
análisis de costes
contrato
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This paper studies the optimal insurance contract between a state and the central government in a federal economy with moral hazard, risk of repudiation (given some enforceability technology) and aggregate uncertainty. Also, it considers date 0 negotiation costs to implement this contract. The distribution of the fiscal resources locally collected by the province at t+1 are affected by period t state´s effort to collect taxes. Also, every period a state has the right to get a fixed proportion of the taxes nationally collected by the central government. These resources are identically and independently distributed across time. Using a recursive formulation of the allocation problem (following Atkeson (1991)), some basic properties of the optimal insurance contract are discussed showing when, in particular, it is actually optimal just to give up any attempt to provide insurance to the province.
Departamento de Economía
description This paper studies the optimal insurance contract between a state and the central government in a federal economy with moral hazard, risk of repudiation (given some enforceability technology) and aggregate uncertainty. Also, it considers date 0 negotiation costs to implement this contract. The distribution of the fiscal resources locally collected by the province at t+1 are affected by period t state´s effort to collect taxes. Also, every period a state has the right to get a fixed proportion of the taxes nationally collected by the central government. These resources are identically and independently distributed across time. Using a recursive formulation of the allocation problem (following Atkeson (1991)), some basic properties of the optimal insurance contract are discussed showing when, in particular, it is actually optimal just to give up any attempt to provide insurance to the province.
publishDate 1999
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1999-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
Documento de trabajo
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeTrabajo
format workingPaper
status_str submittedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3510
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3510
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/doctrab/doc18.pdf
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1853-3930
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)
instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron:UNLP
reponame_str SEDICI (UNLP)
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
instname_str Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron_str UNLP
institution UNLP
repository.name.fl_str_mv SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata
repository.mail.fl_str_mv alira@sedici.unlp.edu.ar
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