The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case

Autores
Hirokasu Kikuchi; Lodola, Germán Jorge
Año de publicación
2014
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators’ decisions on national policies? Do legislators’ own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors’ parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators’ office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small.
Fil: Hirokasu Kikuchi. Institute of Developing Economies; Japón
Fil: Lodola, Germán Jorge. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
ARGENTINA
SENATORIAL BEHAVIOR
GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS
POLITICAL CAREERISM
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/35867

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spelling The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine CaseHirokasu KikuchiLodola, Germán JorgeARGENTINASENATORIAL BEHAVIORGUBERNATORIAL POLITICSPOLITICAL CAREERISMhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators’ decisions on national policies? Do legislators’ own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors’ parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators’ office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small.Fil: Hirokasu Kikuchi. Institute of Developing Economies; JapónFil: Lodola, Germán Jorge. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaGerman Institute of Global and Area Studies2014-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/35867Hirokasu Kikuchi; Lodola, Germán Jorge; The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case; German Institute of Global and Area Studies; Journal of Politics in Latin America; 6; 2; 7-2014; 73-1051866-802X1868-4890CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/763info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:26:44Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/35867instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:26:44.532CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case
title The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case
spellingShingle The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case
Hirokasu Kikuchi
ARGENTINA
SENATORIAL BEHAVIOR
GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS
POLITICAL CAREERISM
title_short The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case
title_full The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case
title_fullStr The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case
title_full_unstemmed The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case
title_sort The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Hirokasu Kikuchi
Lodola, Germán Jorge
author Hirokasu Kikuchi
author_facet Hirokasu Kikuchi
Lodola, Germán Jorge
author_role author
author2 Lodola, Germán Jorge
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv ARGENTINA
SENATORIAL BEHAVIOR
GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS
POLITICAL CAREERISM
topic ARGENTINA
SENATORIAL BEHAVIOR
GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS
POLITICAL CAREERISM
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators’ decisions on national policies? Do legislators’ own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors’ parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators’ office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small.
Fil: Hirokasu Kikuchi. Institute of Developing Economies; Japón
Fil: Lodola, Germán Jorge. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators’ decisions on national policies? Do legislators’ own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors’ parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators’ office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-07
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/35867
Hirokasu Kikuchi; Lodola, Germán Jorge; The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case; German Institute of Global and Area Studies; Journal of Politics in Latin America; 6; 2; 7-2014; 73-105
1866-802X
1868-4890
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/35867
identifier_str_mv Hirokasu Kikuchi; Lodola, Germán Jorge; The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case; German Institute of Global and Area Studies; Journal of Politics in Latin America; 6; 2; 7-2014; 73-105
1866-802X
1868-4890
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/763
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv German Institute of Global and Area Studies
publisher.none.fl_str_mv German Institute of Global and Area Studies
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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