The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case
- Autores
- Hirokasu Kikuchi; Lodola, Germán Jorge
- Año de publicación
- 2014
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators’ decisions on national policies? Do legislators’ own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors’ parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators’ office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small.
Fil: Hirokasu Kikuchi. Institute of Developing Economies; Japón
Fil: Lodola, Germán Jorge. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina - Materia
-
ARGENTINA
SENATORIAL BEHAVIOR
GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS
POLITICAL CAREERISM - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/35867
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The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine CaseHirokasu KikuchiLodola, Germán JorgeARGENTINASENATORIAL BEHAVIORGUBERNATORIAL POLITICSPOLITICAL CAREERISMhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators’ decisions on national policies? Do legislators’ own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors’ parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators’ office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small.Fil: Hirokasu Kikuchi. Institute of Developing Economies; JapónFil: Lodola, Germán Jorge. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaGerman Institute of Global and Area Studies2014-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/35867Hirokasu Kikuchi; Lodola, Germán Jorge; The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case; German Institute of Global and Area Studies; Journal of Politics in Latin America; 6; 2; 7-2014; 73-1051866-802X1868-4890CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/763info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:26:44Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/35867instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:26:44.532CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case |
title |
The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case |
spellingShingle |
The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case Hirokasu Kikuchi ARGENTINA SENATORIAL BEHAVIOR GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS POLITICAL CAREERISM |
title_short |
The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case |
title_full |
The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case |
title_fullStr |
The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case |
title_sort |
The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Hirokasu Kikuchi Lodola, Germán Jorge |
author |
Hirokasu Kikuchi |
author_facet |
Hirokasu Kikuchi Lodola, Germán Jorge |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Lodola, Germán Jorge |
author2_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
ARGENTINA SENATORIAL BEHAVIOR GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS POLITICAL CAREERISM |
topic |
ARGENTINA SENATORIAL BEHAVIOR GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS POLITICAL CAREERISM |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators’ decisions on national policies? Do legislators’ own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors’ parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators’ office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small. Fil: Hirokasu Kikuchi. Institute of Developing Economies; Japón Fil: Lodola, Germán Jorge. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina |
description |
What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators’ decisions on national policies? Do legislators’ own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors’ parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators’ office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-07 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/35867 Hirokasu Kikuchi; Lodola, Germán Jorge; The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case; German Institute of Global and Area Studies; Journal of Politics in Latin America; 6; 2; 7-2014; 73-105 1866-802X 1868-4890 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/35867 |
identifier_str_mv |
Hirokasu Kikuchi; Lodola, Germán Jorge; The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case; German Institute of Global and Area Studies; Journal of Politics in Latin America; 6; 2; 7-2014; 73-105 1866-802X 1868-4890 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/763 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
German Institute of Global and Area Studies |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
German Institute of Global and Area Studies |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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