A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded
- Autores
- Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo Raimundo; Cantamutto, Francisco J.
- Año de publicación
- 2024
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- This article addresses both the need for and the complexities involved in the organization of a club of debtor countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. It begins by explaining that sovereign debt crises are originated and managed in an asymmetric international scenario, which helps understand the scant progress that has been made in terms of coordination among debtor countries. This is followed by a description of the collective action problems that a possible coordination of sovereign debtors would entail, and then a description of the historical experiences of coordinated debtor countries -and possible lessons to be learned-, focusing on the efforts made with the so-called Cartagena Consensus. Some coordination efforts made in Africa are also presented. The article describes the current debt situation in the region and postulates that higher levels of coordination among debtor States would be conducive to facilitating the conditions for their development. Finally, it explains why concerted debtor States’ efforts to negotiate with their creditors would challenge neo-liberal paradigms, based on a remarkable asymmetry between sovereigns deeply indebted and going through financial turbulences, and their creditors; as well as on an absolutist view of the principle pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”) in financial affairs.
Fil: Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo Raimundo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Patagonia Confluencia; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Río Negro; Argentina
Fil: Cantamutto, Francisco J.. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional del Sur; Argentina - Materia
-
STATE BORROWERS
DEBTORS CLUB
CARTAGENA
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/244403
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloadedBohoslavsky, Juan Pablo RaimundoCantamutto, Francisco J.STATE BORROWERSDEBTORS CLUBCARTAGENACOLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5This article addresses both the need for and the complexities involved in the organization of a club of debtor countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. It begins by explaining that sovereign debt crises are originated and managed in an asymmetric international scenario, which helps understand the scant progress that has been made in terms of coordination among debtor countries. This is followed by a description of the collective action problems that a possible coordination of sovereign debtors would entail, and then a description of the historical experiences of coordinated debtor countries -and possible lessons to be learned-, focusing on the efforts made with the so-called Cartagena Consensus. Some coordination efforts made in Africa are also presented. The article describes the current debt situation in the region and postulates that higher levels of coordination among debtor States would be conducive to facilitating the conditions for their development. Finally, it explains why concerted debtor States’ efforts to negotiate with their creditors would challenge neo-liberal paradigms, based on a remarkable asymmetry between sovereigns deeply indebted and going through financial turbulences, and their creditors; as well as on an absolutist view of the principle pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”) in financial affairs.Fil: Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo Raimundo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Patagonia Confluencia; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Río Negro; ArgentinaFil: Cantamutto, Francisco J.. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional del Sur; ArgentinaWorld Economics Association2024-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/244403Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo Raimundo; Cantamutto, Francisco J.; A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded; World Economics Association; Real-World Economics Review; 108; 8-2024; 41-622055-3668CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://rwer.wordpress.com/2024/08/01/new-issue-of-rwer-2/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:52:09Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/244403instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:52:09.73CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded |
title |
A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded |
spellingShingle |
A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo Raimundo STATE BORROWERS DEBTORS CLUB CARTAGENA COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS |
title_short |
A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded |
title_full |
A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded |
title_fullStr |
A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded |
title_sort |
A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo Raimundo Cantamutto, Francisco J. |
author |
Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo Raimundo |
author_facet |
Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo Raimundo Cantamutto, Francisco J. |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Cantamutto, Francisco J. |
author2_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
STATE BORROWERS DEBTORS CLUB CARTAGENA COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS |
topic |
STATE BORROWERS DEBTORS CLUB CARTAGENA COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
This article addresses both the need for and the complexities involved in the organization of a club of debtor countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. It begins by explaining that sovereign debt crises are originated and managed in an asymmetric international scenario, which helps understand the scant progress that has been made in terms of coordination among debtor countries. This is followed by a description of the collective action problems that a possible coordination of sovereign debtors would entail, and then a description of the historical experiences of coordinated debtor countries -and possible lessons to be learned-, focusing on the efforts made with the so-called Cartagena Consensus. Some coordination efforts made in Africa are also presented. The article describes the current debt situation in the region and postulates that higher levels of coordination among debtor States would be conducive to facilitating the conditions for their development. Finally, it explains why concerted debtor States’ efforts to negotiate with their creditors would challenge neo-liberal paradigms, based on a remarkable asymmetry between sovereigns deeply indebted and going through financial turbulences, and their creditors; as well as on an absolutist view of the principle pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”) in financial affairs. Fil: Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo Raimundo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Patagonia Confluencia; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Río Negro; Argentina Fil: Cantamutto, Francisco J.. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional del Sur; Argentina |
description |
This article addresses both the need for and the complexities involved in the organization of a club of debtor countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. It begins by explaining that sovereign debt crises are originated and managed in an asymmetric international scenario, which helps understand the scant progress that has been made in terms of coordination among debtor countries. This is followed by a description of the collective action problems that a possible coordination of sovereign debtors would entail, and then a description of the historical experiences of coordinated debtor countries -and possible lessons to be learned-, focusing on the efforts made with the so-called Cartagena Consensus. Some coordination efforts made in Africa are also presented. The article describes the current debt situation in the region and postulates that higher levels of coordination among debtor States would be conducive to facilitating the conditions for their development. Finally, it explains why concerted debtor States’ efforts to negotiate with their creditors would challenge neo-liberal paradigms, based on a remarkable asymmetry between sovereigns deeply indebted and going through financial turbulences, and their creditors; as well as on an absolutist view of the principle pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”) in financial affairs. |
publishDate |
2024 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2024-08 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/244403 Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo Raimundo; Cantamutto, Francisco J.; A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded; World Economics Association; Real-World Economics Review; 108; 8-2024; 41-62 2055-3668 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/244403 |
identifier_str_mv |
Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo Raimundo; Cantamutto, Francisco J.; A Debtor Countries Club? The Cartagena Consensus reloaded; World Economics Association; Real-World Economics Review; 108; 8-2024; 41-62 2055-3668 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://rwer.wordpress.com/2024/08/01/new-issue-of-rwer-2/ |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
World Economics Association |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
World Economics Association |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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13.070432 |