Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law
- Autores
- Maisley, Nahuel
- Año de publicación
- 2024
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- People disagree about international law. To help them work through these disagreements, the discipline has developed a series of rules on the interpretation of its various sources—most notably, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the standards developed by the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission for the identification of custom. The problem, however, is that these norms are themselves subject to disagreement, thereby creating a meta-debate about how to interpret the rules on interpretation. This Article delves into this meta-debate, focusing specifically on the views adopted by the “traditional approaches to international law”—that is, the mainstream, the default paradigm in the minds of most international lawyers. The Article makes two claims, one descriptive and one evaluative. Descriptively, it argues that the common trait among these seemingly uncoordinated views is that they see every discrepancy regarding the interpretation of international law ultimately as a purely empirical disagreement, meaning that it can be fully resolved through the verification of the existence or inexistence of certain social facts. Evaluatively, the Article argues that this empirical approach causes theoretical shortcomings, as it struggles to explain typical interpretive disputes in international law. This, in turn, leads to practical challenges in identifying genuine points of contention and facilitating resolution. These limitations, the Article concludes, diminish the interpretive usefulness of the traditional approaches and call for an alternative account. To process their disagreements, people typically need more than just facts: they need, instead, to exchange arguments about international law. Then, they may convince each other, and build agreements. Or, at least, quite importantly, they may agree to disagree.
Fil: Maisley, Nahuel. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales "Dr. Ambrosio L. Gioja"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho; Argentina - Materia
-
Interpretation
International Law
Traditional Approaches
Constructive Argumentation - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/234522
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Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International LawMaisley, NahuelInterpretationInternational LawTraditional ApproachesConstructive Argumentationhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5People disagree about international law. To help them work through these disagreements, the discipline has developed a series of rules on the interpretation of its various sources—most notably, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the standards developed by the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission for the identification of custom. The problem, however, is that these norms are themselves subject to disagreement, thereby creating a meta-debate about how to interpret the rules on interpretation. This Article delves into this meta-debate, focusing specifically on the views adopted by the “traditional approaches to international law”—that is, the mainstream, the default paradigm in the minds of most international lawyers. The Article makes two claims, one descriptive and one evaluative. Descriptively, it argues that the common trait among these seemingly uncoordinated views is that they see every discrepancy regarding the interpretation of international law ultimately as a purely empirical disagreement, meaning that it can be fully resolved through the verification of the existence or inexistence of certain social facts. Evaluatively, the Article argues that this empirical approach causes theoretical shortcomings, as it struggles to explain typical interpretive disputes in international law. This, in turn, leads to practical challenges in identifying genuine points of contention and facilitating resolution. These limitations, the Article concludes, diminish the interpretive usefulness of the traditional approaches and call for an alternative account. To process their disagreements, people typically need more than just facts: they need, instead, to exchange arguments about international law. Then, they may convince each other, and build agreements. Or, at least, quite importantly, they may agree to disagree.Fil: Maisley, Nahuel. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales "Dr. Ambrosio L. Gioja"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho; ArgentinaFordham University2024-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/234522Maisley, Nahuel; Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law; Fordham University; Fordham International Law Journal; 47; 2; 4-2024; 77-1350747-9395CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol47/iss2/1/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:44:48Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/234522instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:44:48.488CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law |
title |
Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law |
spellingShingle |
Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law Maisley, Nahuel Interpretation International Law Traditional Approaches Constructive Argumentation |
title_short |
Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law |
title_full |
Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law |
title_fullStr |
Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law |
title_full_unstemmed |
Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law |
title_sort |
Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Maisley, Nahuel |
author |
Maisley, Nahuel |
author_facet |
Maisley, Nahuel |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Interpretation International Law Traditional Approaches Constructive Argumentation |
topic |
Interpretation International Law Traditional Approaches Constructive Argumentation |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
People disagree about international law. To help them work through these disagreements, the discipline has developed a series of rules on the interpretation of its various sources—most notably, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the standards developed by the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission for the identification of custom. The problem, however, is that these norms are themselves subject to disagreement, thereby creating a meta-debate about how to interpret the rules on interpretation. This Article delves into this meta-debate, focusing specifically on the views adopted by the “traditional approaches to international law”—that is, the mainstream, the default paradigm in the minds of most international lawyers. The Article makes two claims, one descriptive and one evaluative. Descriptively, it argues that the common trait among these seemingly uncoordinated views is that they see every discrepancy regarding the interpretation of international law ultimately as a purely empirical disagreement, meaning that it can be fully resolved through the verification of the existence or inexistence of certain social facts. Evaluatively, the Article argues that this empirical approach causes theoretical shortcomings, as it struggles to explain typical interpretive disputes in international law. This, in turn, leads to practical challenges in identifying genuine points of contention and facilitating resolution. These limitations, the Article concludes, diminish the interpretive usefulness of the traditional approaches and call for an alternative account. To process their disagreements, people typically need more than just facts: they need, instead, to exchange arguments about international law. Then, they may convince each other, and build agreements. Or, at least, quite importantly, they may agree to disagree. Fil: Maisley, Nahuel. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales "Dr. Ambrosio L. Gioja"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho; Argentina |
description |
People disagree about international law. To help them work through these disagreements, the discipline has developed a series of rules on the interpretation of its various sources—most notably, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the standards developed by the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission for the identification of custom. The problem, however, is that these norms are themselves subject to disagreement, thereby creating a meta-debate about how to interpret the rules on interpretation. This Article delves into this meta-debate, focusing specifically on the views adopted by the “traditional approaches to international law”—that is, the mainstream, the default paradigm in the minds of most international lawyers. The Article makes two claims, one descriptive and one evaluative. Descriptively, it argues that the common trait among these seemingly uncoordinated views is that they see every discrepancy regarding the interpretation of international law ultimately as a purely empirical disagreement, meaning that it can be fully resolved through the verification of the existence or inexistence of certain social facts. Evaluatively, the Article argues that this empirical approach causes theoretical shortcomings, as it struggles to explain typical interpretive disputes in international law. This, in turn, leads to practical challenges in identifying genuine points of contention and facilitating resolution. These limitations, the Article concludes, diminish the interpretive usefulness of the traditional approaches and call for an alternative account. To process their disagreements, people typically need more than just facts: they need, instead, to exchange arguments about international law. Then, they may convince each other, and build agreements. Or, at least, quite importantly, they may agree to disagree. |
publishDate |
2024 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2024-04 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/234522 Maisley, Nahuel; Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law; Fordham University; Fordham International Law Journal; 47; 2; 4-2024; 77-135 0747-9395 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/234522 |
identifier_str_mv |
Maisley, Nahuel; Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law; Fordham University; Fordham International Law Journal; 47; 2; 4-2024; 77-135 0747-9395 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
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eng |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol47/iss2/1/ |
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openAccess |
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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application/pdf application/pdf |
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Fordham University |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fordham University |
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