Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law

Autores
Maisley, Nahuel
Año de publicación
2024
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
People disagree about international law. To help them work through these disagreements, the discipline has developed a series of rules on the interpretation of its various sources—most notably, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the standards developed by the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission for the identification of custom. The problem, however, is that these norms are themselves subject to disagreement, thereby creating a meta-debate about how to interpret the rules on interpretation. This Article delves into this meta-debate, focusing specifically on the views adopted by the “traditional approaches to international law”—that is, the mainstream, the default paradigm in the minds of most international lawyers. The Article makes two claims, one descriptive and one evaluative. Descriptively, it argues that the common trait among these seemingly uncoordinated views is that they see every discrepancy regarding the interpretation of international law ultimately as a purely empirical disagreement, meaning that it can be fully resolved through the verification of the existence or inexistence of certain social facts. Evaluatively, the Article argues that this empirical approach causes theoretical shortcomings, as it struggles to explain typical interpretive disputes in international law. This, in turn, leads to practical challenges in identifying genuine points of contention and facilitating resolution. These limitations, the Article concludes, diminish the interpretive usefulness of the traditional approaches and call for an alternative account. To process their disagreements, people typically need more than just facts: they need, instead, to exchange arguments about international law. Then, they may convince each other, and build agreements. Or, at least, quite importantly, they may agree to disagree.
Fil: Maisley, Nahuel. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales "Dr. Ambrosio L. Gioja"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho; Argentina
Materia
Interpretation
International Law
Traditional Approaches
Constructive Argumentation
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/234522

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spelling Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International LawMaisley, NahuelInterpretationInternational LawTraditional ApproachesConstructive Argumentationhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5People disagree about international law. To help them work through these disagreements, the discipline has developed a series of rules on the interpretation of its various sources—most notably, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the standards developed by the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission for the identification of custom. The problem, however, is that these norms are themselves subject to disagreement, thereby creating a meta-debate about how to interpret the rules on interpretation. This Article delves into this meta-debate, focusing specifically on the views adopted by the “traditional approaches to international law”—that is, the mainstream, the default paradigm in the minds of most international lawyers. The Article makes two claims, one descriptive and one evaluative. Descriptively, it argues that the common trait among these seemingly uncoordinated views is that they see every discrepancy regarding the interpretation of international law ultimately as a purely empirical disagreement, meaning that it can be fully resolved through the verification of the existence or inexistence of certain social facts. Evaluatively, the Article argues that this empirical approach causes theoretical shortcomings, as it struggles to explain typical interpretive disputes in international law. This, in turn, leads to practical challenges in identifying genuine points of contention and facilitating resolution. These limitations, the Article concludes, diminish the interpretive usefulness of the traditional approaches and call for an alternative account. To process their disagreements, people typically need more than just facts: they need, instead, to exchange arguments about international law. Then, they may convince each other, and build agreements. Or, at least, quite importantly, they may agree to disagree.Fil: Maisley, Nahuel. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales "Dr. Ambrosio L. Gioja"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho; ArgentinaFordham University2024-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/234522Maisley, Nahuel; Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law; Fordham University; Fordham International Law Journal; 47; 2; 4-2024; 77-1350747-9395CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol47/iss2/1/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:44:48Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/234522instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:44:48.488CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law
title Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law
spellingShingle Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law
Maisley, Nahuel
Interpretation
International Law
Traditional Approaches
Constructive Argumentation
title_short Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law
title_full Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law
title_fullStr Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law
title_full_unstemmed Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law
title_sort Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Maisley, Nahuel
author Maisley, Nahuel
author_facet Maisley, Nahuel
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Interpretation
International Law
Traditional Approaches
Constructive Argumentation
topic Interpretation
International Law
Traditional Approaches
Constructive Argumentation
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv People disagree about international law. To help them work through these disagreements, the discipline has developed a series of rules on the interpretation of its various sources—most notably, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the standards developed by the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission for the identification of custom. The problem, however, is that these norms are themselves subject to disagreement, thereby creating a meta-debate about how to interpret the rules on interpretation. This Article delves into this meta-debate, focusing specifically on the views adopted by the “traditional approaches to international law”—that is, the mainstream, the default paradigm in the minds of most international lawyers. The Article makes two claims, one descriptive and one evaluative. Descriptively, it argues that the common trait among these seemingly uncoordinated views is that they see every discrepancy regarding the interpretation of international law ultimately as a purely empirical disagreement, meaning that it can be fully resolved through the verification of the existence or inexistence of certain social facts. Evaluatively, the Article argues that this empirical approach causes theoretical shortcomings, as it struggles to explain typical interpretive disputes in international law. This, in turn, leads to practical challenges in identifying genuine points of contention and facilitating resolution. These limitations, the Article concludes, diminish the interpretive usefulness of the traditional approaches and call for an alternative account. To process their disagreements, people typically need more than just facts: they need, instead, to exchange arguments about international law. Then, they may convince each other, and build agreements. Or, at least, quite importantly, they may agree to disagree.
Fil: Maisley, Nahuel. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales "Dr. Ambrosio L. Gioja"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho; Argentina
description People disagree about international law. To help them work through these disagreements, the discipline has developed a series of rules on the interpretation of its various sources—most notably, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the standards developed by the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission for the identification of custom. The problem, however, is that these norms are themselves subject to disagreement, thereby creating a meta-debate about how to interpret the rules on interpretation. This Article delves into this meta-debate, focusing specifically on the views adopted by the “traditional approaches to international law”—that is, the mainstream, the default paradigm in the minds of most international lawyers. The Article makes two claims, one descriptive and one evaluative. Descriptively, it argues that the common trait among these seemingly uncoordinated views is that they see every discrepancy regarding the interpretation of international law ultimately as a purely empirical disagreement, meaning that it can be fully resolved through the verification of the existence or inexistence of certain social facts. Evaluatively, the Article argues that this empirical approach causes theoretical shortcomings, as it struggles to explain typical interpretive disputes in international law. This, in turn, leads to practical challenges in identifying genuine points of contention and facilitating resolution. These limitations, the Article concludes, diminish the interpretive usefulness of the traditional approaches and call for an alternative account. To process their disagreements, people typically need more than just facts: they need, instead, to exchange arguments about international law. Then, they may convince each other, and build agreements. Or, at least, quite importantly, they may agree to disagree.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024-04
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/234522
Maisley, Nahuel; Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law; Fordham University; Fordham International Law Journal; 47; 2; 4-2024; 77-135
0747-9395
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/234522
identifier_str_mv Maisley, Nahuel; Agreeing to Disagree: The Problems of the Traditional Approaches to the Interpretation of International Law; Fordham University; Fordham International Law Journal; 47; 2; 4-2024; 77-135
0747-9395
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol47/iss2/1/
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fordham University
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fordham University
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
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reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
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