Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina
- Autores
- Hass, Jeffrey K.; Beltran, Gaston Joaquin
- Año de publicación
- 2010
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- Why do some economic elites initially support reform policies that potentially risk their very positions, especially when they apparently do little to address the potential threat or make use of increasingly likely radical changes? To address this question, and to expand our understanding of managerial and business decision-making in periods of fundamental economic change, we compare industrial managers’ and business elites’ reactions to initial economic reform in Argentina and late Soviet/early post-Soviet Russia. Drawing on a stochastic learning model, we suggest three processes shaped decisions to embrace reforms in such as way as to leave themselves vulnerable. First, these elites anchored expectations in experiences of past reforms, including experiences and expectations that reforms would ultimately be limited or would fail. Second, these two groups used reforms to augment gains and autonomy, but in such a way that left them vulnerable to competition and greater fiscal strains alter. Third, market-oriented reforms were initially ambiguous, because of the nature of market systems under construction (which inherently include uncertainty and ambiguity about future outcomes) and because reforms themselves were not entirely coherent. These factors, combined with no initial demonstration by the state that reforms would be carried out to their limit, allowed Soviet managers and Argentine business elites to read a positive future into reforms, leaving them vulnerable. As a result, they supported reforms that ultimately turned into threats.
Fil: Hass, Jeffrey K.. University of Richmond; Estados Unidos
Fil: Beltran, Gaston Joaquin. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; Argentina - Materia
-
ARGENTINA AND RUSSIAN ELITES
ECONOMIC TRANSICION
DECISION MAKING
IRRATIONAL DECISIONS - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/189285
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis ArgentinaHass, Jeffrey K.Beltran, Gaston JoaquinARGENTINA AND RUSSIAN ELITESECONOMIC TRANSICIONDECISION MAKINGIRRATIONAL DECISIONShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.4https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5Why do some economic elites initially support reform policies that potentially risk their very positions, especially when they apparently do little to address the potential threat or make use of increasingly likely radical changes? To address this question, and to expand our understanding of managerial and business decision-making in periods of fundamental economic change, we compare industrial managers’ and business elites’ reactions to initial economic reform in Argentina and late Soviet/early post-Soviet Russia. Drawing on a stochastic learning model, we suggest three processes shaped decisions to embrace reforms in such as way as to leave themselves vulnerable. First, these elites anchored expectations in experiences of past reforms, including experiences and expectations that reforms would ultimately be limited or would fail. Second, these two groups used reforms to augment gains and autonomy, but in such a way that left them vulnerable to competition and greater fiscal strains alter. Third, market-oriented reforms were initially ambiguous, because of the nature of market systems under construction (which inherently include uncertainty and ambiguity about future outcomes) and because reforms themselves were not entirely coherent. These factors, combined with no initial demonstration by the state that reforms would be carried out to their limit, allowed Soviet managers and Argentine business elites to read a positive future into reforms, leaving them vulnerable. As a result, they supported reforms that ultimately turned into threats.Fil: Hass, Jeffrey K.. University of Richmond; Estados UnidosFil: Beltran, Gaston Joaquin. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; ArgentinaCenter for Independent Social Research2010-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/189285Hass, Jeffrey K.; Beltran, Gaston Joaquin; Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina; Center for Independent Social Research; Laboratorium; 2; 2; 6-2010; 123-1602076-82142078-1938CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.soclabo.org/index.php/laboratorium/article/view/199info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:47:45Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/189285instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:47:45.382CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina |
title |
Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina |
spellingShingle |
Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina Hass, Jeffrey K. ARGENTINA AND RUSSIAN ELITES ECONOMIC TRANSICION DECISION MAKING IRRATIONAL DECISIONS |
title_short |
Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina |
title_full |
Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina |
title_fullStr |
Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina |
title_full_unstemmed |
Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina |
title_sort |
Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Hass, Jeffrey K. Beltran, Gaston Joaquin |
author |
Hass, Jeffrey K. |
author_facet |
Hass, Jeffrey K. Beltran, Gaston Joaquin |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Beltran, Gaston Joaquin |
author2_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
ARGENTINA AND RUSSIAN ELITES ECONOMIC TRANSICION DECISION MAKING IRRATIONAL DECISIONS |
topic |
ARGENTINA AND RUSSIAN ELITES ECONOMIC TRANSICION DECISION MAKING IRRATIONAL DECISIONS |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.4 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Why do some economic elites initially support reform policies that potentially risk their very positions, especially when they apparently do little to address the potential threat or make use of increasingly likely radical changes? To address this question, and to expand our understanding of managerial and business decision-making in periods of fundamental economic change, we compare industrial managers’ and business elites’ reactions to initial economic reform in Argentina and late Soviet/early post-Soviet Russia. Drawing on a stochastic learning model, we suggest three processes shaped decisions to embrace reforms in such as way as to leave themselves vulnerable. First, these elites anchored expectations in experiences of past reforms, including experiences and expectations that reforms would ultimately be limited or would fail. Second, these two groups used reforms to augment gains and autonomy, but in such a way that left them vulnerable to competition and greater fiscal strains alter. Third, market-oriented reforms were initially ambiguous, because of the nature of market systems under construction (which inherently include uncertainty and ambiguity about future outcomes) and because reforms themselves were not entirely coherent. These factors, combined with no initial demonstration by the state that reforms would be carried out to their limit, allowed Soviet managers and Argentine business elites to read a positive future into reforms, leaving them vulnerable. As a result, they supported reforms that ultimately turned into threats. Fil: Hass, Jeffrey K.. University of Richmond; Estados Unidos Fil: Beltran, Gaston Joaquin. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; Argentina |
description |
Why do some economic elites initially support reform policies that potentially risk their very positions, especially when they apparently do little to address the potential threat or make use of increasingly likely radical changes? To address this question, and to expand our understanding of managerial and business decision-making in periods of fundamental economic change, we compare industrial managers’ and business elites’ reactions to initial economic reform in Argentina and late Soviet/early post-Soviet Russia. Drawing on a stochastic learning model, we suggest three processes shaped decisions to embrace reforms in such as way as to leave themselves vulnerable. First, these elites anchored expectations in experiences of past reforms, including experiences and expectations that reforms would ultimately be limited or would fail. Second, these two groups used reforms to augment gains and autonomy, but in such a way that left them vulnerable to competition and greater fiscal strains alter. Third, market-oriented reforms were initially ambiguous, because of the nature of market systems under construction (which inherently include uncertainty and ambiguity about future outcomes) and because reforms themselves were not entirely coherent. These factors, combined with no initial demonstration by the state that reforms would be carried out to their limit, allowed Soviet managers and Argentine business elites to read a positive future into reforms, leaving them vulnerable. As a result, they supported reforms that ultimately turned into threats. |
publishDate |
2010 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2010-06 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/189285 Hass, Jeffrey K.; Beltran, Gaston Joaquin; Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina; Center for Independent Social Research; Laboratorium; 2; 2; 6-2010; 123-160 2076-8214 2078-1938 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/189285 |
identifier_str_mv |
Hass, Jeffrey K.; Beltran, Gaston Joaquin; Illusions of market paradise: State, business, and economic reform in post-socialist Russia and post-1980s crisis Argentina; Center for Independent Social Research; Laboratorium; 2; 2; 6-2010; 123-160 2076-8214 2078-1938 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.soclabo.org/index.php/laboratorium/article/view/199 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ |
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application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Center for Independent Social Research |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Center for Independent Social Research |
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reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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