Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic

Autores
Paissan, Gabriel Hernan; Abramson, Guillermo
Año de publicación
2013
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We study a model of traffic where drivers adopt different behavioral strategies. These can becooperative or defective according to a driver abiding or not by a traffic rule. Drivers can change their strategy by imitating the majority, with a rule that depends on the strategies with which they have interacted. These interactions occur at intersections, where vehicles pay a temporal cost according to their strategy. We analyze the conditions under which different strategy compositions represent an advantage in the system velocity. We found that the cooperators? mean speed is higher than the defectors? even when the vehicle density is large. However, defectors can obtain benefits in their mean speed when they are a minority in an essentially cooperative population. The presence of a core of educated drivers, who persist firmly in a cooperative behavior, optimizes the speed in the system, especially for intermediate values of vehicular density and higher temporal costs.
Fil: Paissan, Gabriel Hernan. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Centro Atómico Bariloche; Argentina
Fil: Abramson, Guillermo. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Gerencia del Area de Investigación y Aplicaciones No Nucleares. Gerencia de Física (Centro Atómico Bariloche); Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Gerencia del Área de Energía Nuclear. Instituto Balseiro; Argentina
Materia
Tansportation
Game theory
Computational techniques
Simulations
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/102110
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Imitation dynamics in a game of trafficPaissan, Gabriel HernanAbramson, GuillermoTansportationGame theoryComputational techniquesSimulationshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1We study a model of traffic where drivers adopt different behavioral strategies. These can becooperative or defective according to a driver abiding or not by a traffic rule. Drivers can change their strategy by imitating the majority, with a rule that depends on the strategies with which they have interacted. These interactions occur at intersections, where vehicles pay a temporal cost according to their strategy. We analyze the conditions under which different strategy compositions represent an advantage in the system velocity. We found that the cooperators? mean speed is higher than the defectors? even when the vehicle density is large. However, defectors can obtain benefits in their mean speed when they are a minority in an essentially cooperative population. The presence of a core of educated drivers, who persist firmly in a cooperative behavior, optimizes the speed in the system, especially for intermediate values of vehicular density and higher temporal costs.Fil: Paissan, Gabriel Hernan. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Centro Atómico Bariloche; ArgentinaFil: Abramson, Guillermo. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Gerencia del Area de Investigación y Aplicaciones No Nucleares. Gerencia de Física (Centro Atómico Bariloche); Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Gerencia del Área de Energía Nuclear. Instituto Balseiro; ArgentinaSpringer2013-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/102110Paissan, Gabriel Hernan; Abramson, Guillermo; Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic; Springer; European Physical Journal B - Condensed Matter; 86; 4; 4-2013; 153-1581434-6028CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1140/epjb/e2013-30372-5info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1140%2Fepjb%2Fe2013-30372-5info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-11-12T09:40:55Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/102110instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-11-12 09:40:55.779CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic
title Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic
spellingShingle Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic
Paissan, Gabriel Hernan
Tansportation
Game theory
Computational techniques
Simulations
title_short Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic
title_full Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic
title_fullStr Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic
title_full_unstemmed Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic
title_sort Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Paissan, Gabriel Hernan
Abramson, Guillermo
author Paissan, Gabriel Hernan
author_facet Paissan, Gabriel Hernan
Abramson, Guillermo
author_role author
author2 Abramson, Guillermo
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Tansportation
Game theory
Computational techniques
Simulations
topic Tansportation
Game theory
Computational techniques
Simulations
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We study a model of traffic where drivers adopt different behavioral strategies. These can becooperative or defective according to a driver abiding or not by a traffic rule. Drivers can change their strategy by imitating the majority, with a rule that depends on the strategies with which they have interacted. These interactions occur at intersections, where vehicles pay a temporal cost according to their strategy. We analyze the conditions under which different strategy compositions represent an advantage in the system velocity. We found that the cooperators? mean speed is higher than the defectors? even when the vehicle density is large. However, defectors can obtain benefits in their mean speed when they are a minority in an essentially cooperative population. The presence of a core of educated drivers, who persist firmly in a cooperative behavior, optimizes the speed in the system, especially for intermediate values of vehicular density and higher temporal costs.
Fil: Paissan, Gabriel Hernan. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Centro Atómico Bariloche; Argentina
Fil: Abramson, Guillermo. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Gerencia del Area de Investigación y Aplicaciones No Nucleares. Gerencia de Física (Centro Atómico Bariloche); Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Gerencia del Área de Energía Nuclear. Instituto Balseiro; Argentina
description We study a model of traffic where drivers adopt different behavioral strategies. These can becooperative or defective according to a driver abiding or not by a traffic rule. Drivers can change their strategy by imitating the majority, with a rule that depends on the strategies with which they have interacted. These interactions occur at intersections, where vehicles pay a temporal cost according to their strategy. We analyze the conditions under which different strategy compositions represent an advantage in the system velocity. We found that the cooperators? mean speed is higher than the defectors? even when the vehicle density is large. However, defectors can obtain benefits in their mean speed when they are a minority in an essentially cooperative population. The presence of a core of educated drivers, who persist firmly in a cooperative behavior, optimizes the speed in the system, especially for intermediate values of vehicular density and higher temporal costs.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-04
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/102110
Paissan, Gabriel Hernan; Abramson, Guillermo; Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic; Springer; European Physical Journal B - Condensed Matter; 86; 4; 4-2013; 153-158
1434-6028
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/102110
identifier_str_mv Paissan, Gabriel Hernan; Abramson, Guillermo; Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic; Springer; European Physical Journal B - Condensed Matter; 86; 4; 4-2013; 153-158
1434-6028
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1140/epjb/e2013-30372-5
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1140%2Fepjb%2Fe2013-30372-5
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.24909

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