The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason

Autores
Moledo, Fernando
Año de publicación
2018
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The aim of this paper is to discuss why and how the teory of the factum of pure reason in the critique of practical reason replaces the deduction of the categorical imperative given a few years earlier in the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. To that purpose I propoose an interpretation as to why Kant rejects the possibility of giving a deduction of the categorical imperative in the critique of practical reason. I focus then on Kant's factum theory and the argue that it does give a justification for the categorical imperative. This justification should be understood, however, as a practical justification because it does not explain the theoretical ground for the validity of the moral law, but relies on the very fact that to act entails awareness of our obligation through moral feeling.
Fil: Moledo, Fernando. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
KANT
DEDUCCIÓN
FACTUM
MORAL
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/179884

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spelling The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reasonMoledo, FernandoKANTDEDUCCIÓNFACTUMMORALhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6The aim of this paper is to discuss why and how the teory of the factum of pure reason in the critique of practical reason replaces the deduction of the categorical imperative given a few years earlier in the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. To that purpose I propoose an interpretation as to why Kant rejects the possibility of giving a deduction of the categorical imperative in the critique of practical reason. I focus then on Kant's factum theory and the argue that it does give a justification for the categorical imperative. This justification should be understood, however, as a practical justification because it does not explain the theoretical ground for the validity of the moral law, but relies on the very fact that to act entails awareness of our obligation through moral feeling.Fil: Moledo, Fernando. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFabrizio Serra2018-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/179884Moledo, Fernando; The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason; Fabrizio Serra; Studi Kantiani; 31; 10-2018; 109-1171123-49381724-1812CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:44:40Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/179884instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:44:40.326CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason
title The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason
spellingShingle The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason
Moledo, Fernando
KANT
DEDUCCIÓN
FACTUM
MORAL
title_short The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason
title_full The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason
title_fullStr The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason
title_full_unstemmed The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason
title_sort The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Moledo, Fernando
author Moledo, Fernando
author_facet Moledo, Fernando
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv KANT
DEDUCCIÓN
FACTUM
MORAL
topic KANT
DEDUCCIÓN
FACTUM
MORAL
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The aim of this paper is to discuss why and how the teory of the factum of pure reason in the critique of practical reason replaces the deduction of the categorical imperative given a few years earlier in the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. To that purpose I propoose an interpretation as to why Kant rejects the possibility of giving a deduction of the categorical imperative in the critique of practical reason. I focus then on Kant's factum theory and the argue that it does give a justification for the categorical imperative. This justification should be understood, however, as a practical justification because it does not explain the theoretical ground for the validity of the moral law, but relies on the very fact that to act entails awareness of our obligation through moral feeling.
Fil: Moledo, Fernando. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description The aim of this paper is to discuss why and how the teory of the factum of pure reason in the critique of practical reason replaces the deduction of the categorical imperative given a few years earlier in the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. To that purpose I propoose an interpretation as to why Kant rejects the possibility of giving a deduction of the categorical imperative in the critique of practical reason. I focus then on Kant's factum theory and the argue that it does give a justification for the categorical imperative. This justification should be understood, however, as a practical justification because it does not explain the theoretical ground for the validity of the moral law, but relies on the very fact that to act entails awareness of our obligation through moral feeling.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-10
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/179884
Moledo, Fernando; The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason; Fabrizio Serra; Studi Kantiani; 31; 10-2018; 109-117
1123-4938
1724-1812
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/179884
identifier_str_mv Moledo, Fernando; The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason; Fabrizio Serra; Studi Kantiani; 31; 10-2018; 109-117
1123-4938
1724-1812
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fabrizio Serra
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fabrizio Serra
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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