The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason
- Autores
- Moledo, Fernando
- Año de publicación
- 2018
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- The aim of this paper is to discuss why and how the teory of the factum of pure reason in the critique of practical reason replaces the deduction of the categorical imperative given a few years earlier in the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. To that purpose I propoose an interpretation as to why Kant rejects the possibility of giving a deduction of the categorical imperative in the critique of practical reason. I focus then on Kant's factum theory and the argue that it does give a justification for the categorical imperative. This justification should be understood, however, as a practical justification because it does not explain the theoretical ground for the validity of the moral law, but relies on the very fact that to act entails awareness of our obligation through moral feeling.
Fil: Moledo, Fernando. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina - Materia
-
KANT
DEDUCCIÓN
FACTUM
MORAL - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/179884
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The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reasonMoledo, FernandoKANTDEDUCCIÓNFACTUMMORALhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6The aim of this paper is to discuss why and how the teory of the factum of pure reason in the critique of practical reason replaces the deduction of the categorical imperative given a few years earlier in the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. To that purpose I propoose an interpretation as to why Kant rejects the possibility of giving a deduction of the categorical imperative in the critique of practical reason. I focus then on Kant's factum theory and the argue that it does give a justification for the categorical imperative. This justification should be understood, however, as a practical justification because it does not explain the theoretical ground for the validity of the moral law, but relies on the very fact that to act entails awareness of our obligation through moral feeling.Fil: Moledo, Fernando. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFabrizio Serra2018-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/179884Moledo, Fernando; The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason; Fabrizio Serra; Studi Kantiani; 31; 10-2018; 109-1171123-49381724-1812CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:44:40Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/179884instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:44:40.326CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason |
title |
The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason |
spellingShingle |
The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason Moledo, Fernando KANT DEDUCCIÓN FACTUM MORAL |
title_short |
The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason |
title_full |
The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason |
title_fullStr |
The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason |
title_full_unstemmed |
The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason |
title_sort |
The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Moledo, Fernando |
author |
Moledo, Fernando |
author_facet |
Moledo, Fernando |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
KANT DEDUCCIÓN FACTUM MORAL |
topic |
KANT DEDUCCIÓN FACTUM MORAL |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
The aim of this paper is to discuss why and how the teory of the factum of pure reason in the critique of practical reason replaces the deduction of the categorical imperative given a few years earlier in the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. To that purpose I propoose an interpretation as to why Kant rejects the possibility of giving a deduction of the categorical imperative in the critique of practical reason. I focus then on Kant's factum theory and the argue that it does give a justification for the categorical imperative. This justification should be understood, however, as a practical justification because it does not explain the theoretical ground for the validity of the moral law, but relies on the very fact that to act entails awareness of our obligation through moral feeling. Fil: Moledo, Fernando. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina |
description |
The aim of this paper is to discuss why and how the teory of the factum of pure reason in the critique of practical reason replaces the deduction of the categorical imperative given a few years earlier in the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. To that purpose I propoose an interpretation as to why Kant rejects the possibility of giving a deduction of the categorical imperative in the critique of practical reason. I focus then on Kant's factum theory and the argue that it does give a justification for the categorical imperative. This justification should be understood, however, as a practical justification because it does not explain the theoretical ground for the validity of the moral law, but relies on the very fact that to act entails awareness of our obligation through moral feeling. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-10 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/179884 Moledo, Fernando; The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason; Fabrizio Serra; Studi Kantiani; 31; 10-2018; 109-117 1123-4938 1724-1812 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/179884 |
identifier_str_mv |
Moledo, Fernando; The fact of pure reason: the foundation of the categorical imperative in Kant's critique of practical reason; Fabrizio Serra; Studi Kantiani; 31; 10-2018; 109-117 1123-4938 1724-1812 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fabrizio Serra |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fabrizio Serra |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
reponame_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
collection |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
instname_str |
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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1842268682025172992 |
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13.13397 |