Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic

Autores
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Szmuc, Damián Enrique
Año de publicación
2018
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and ¬A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues's interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality.
Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Szmuc, Damián Enrique. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE
EPISTEMOLOGY
PERMISSIVISM
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/97039

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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logicLo Guercio, Nicolás FranciscoSzmuc, Damián EnriquePARACONSISTENT LOGICBASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCEEPISTEMOLOGYPERMISSIVISMhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and ¬A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues's interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality.Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Szmuc, Damián Enrique. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaUniversidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía2018-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/zipapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/97039Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Szmuc, Damián Enrique; Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic; Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía; Principia; 22; 1; 4-2018; 153-1701414-42471808-1711CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:47:38Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/97039instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:47:39.246CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
title Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
spellingShingle Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE
EPISTEMOLOGY
PERMISSIVISM
title_short Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
title_full Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
title_fullStr Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
title_full_unstemmed Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
title_sort Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
Szmuc, Damián Enrique
author Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
author_facet Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
Szmuc, Damián Enrique
author_role author
author2 Szmuc, Damián Enrique
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE
EPISTEMOLOGY
PERMISSIVISM
topic PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE
EPISTEMOLOGY
PERMISSIVISM
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and ¬A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues's interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality.
Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Szmuc, Damián Enrique. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and ¬A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues's interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-04
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/97039
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Szmuc, Damián Enrique; Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic; Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía; Principia; 22; 1; 4-2018; 153-170
1414-4247
1808-1711
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/97039
identifier_str_mv Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Szmuc, Damián Enrique; Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic; Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía; Principia; 22; 1; 4-2018; 153-170
1414-4247
1808-1711
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/zip
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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