Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
- Autores
- Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Szmuc, Damián Enrique
- Año de publicación
- 2018
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and ¬A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues's interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality.
Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Szmuc, Damián Enrique. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina - Materia
-
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE
EPISTEMOLOGY
PERMISSIVISM - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/97039
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Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logicLo Guercio, Nicolás FranciscoSzmuc, Damián EnriquePARACONSISTENT LOGICBASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCEEPISTEMOLOGYPERMISSIVISMhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and ¬A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues's interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality.Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Szmuc, Damián Enrique. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaUniversidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía2018-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/zipapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/97039Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Szmuc, Damián Enrique; Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic; Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía; Principia; 22; 1; 4-2018; 153-1701414-42471808-1711CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:47:38Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/97039instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:47:39.246CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic |
title |
Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic |
spellingShingle |
Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco PARACONSISTENT LOGIC BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE EPISTEMOLOGY PERMISSIVISM |
title_short |
Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic |
title_full |
Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic |
title_fullStr |
Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic |
title_full_unstemmed |
Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic |
title_sort |
Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco Szmuc, Damián Enrique |
author |
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco |
author_facet |
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco Szmuc, Damián Enrique |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Szmuc, Damián Enrique |
author2_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE EPISTEMOLOGY PERMISSIVISM |
topic |
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE EPISTEMOLOGY PERMISSIVISM |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and ¬A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues's interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality. Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina Fil: Szmuc, Damián Enrique. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina |
description |
In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and ¬A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues's interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-04 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/97039 Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Szmuc, Damián Enrique; Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic; Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía; Principia; 22; 1; 4-2018; 153-170 1414-4247 1808-1711 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/97039 |
identifier_str_mv |
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Szmuc, Damián Enrique; Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic; Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía; Principia; 22; 1; 4-2018; 153-170 1414-4247 1808-1711 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/zip application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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