The effect of social norms on bribe offers

Autores
Abbink, Klaus; Freidin, Esteban; Gangadharan, Lata; Moro, Rodrigo
Año de publicación
2018
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior.
Fil: Abbink, Klaus. Monash University; Australia
Fil: Freidin, Esteban. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
Fil: Gangadharan, Lata. Monash University; Australia
Fil: Moro, Rodrigo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
Materia
Experiment
Social norms
Sanctions
Corruption
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/91993

id CONICETDig_797645a227a4754099e979df6daa99cd
oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/91993
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling The effect of social norms on bribe offersAbbink, KlausFreidin, EstebanGangadharan, LataMoro, RodrigoExperimentSocial normsSanctionsCorruptionhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.9https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior.Fil: Abbink, Klaus. Monash University; AustraliaFil: Freidin, Esteban. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; ArgentinaFil: Gangadharan, Lata. Monash University; AustraliaFil: Moro, Rodrigo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; ArgentinaOxford University Press2018-07-20info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/91993Abbink, Klaus; Freidin, Esteban; Gangadharan, Lata; Moro, Rodrigo; The effect of social norms on bribe offers; Oxford University Press; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; 34; 3; 20-7-2018; 457-4748756-62221465-7341CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/34/3/457/5056968info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/jleo/ewy015info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:47:59Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/91993instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:47:59.411CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The effect of social norms on bribe offers
title The effect of social norms on bribe offers
spellingShingle The effect of social norms on bribe offers
Abbink, Klaus
Experiment
Social norms
Sanctions
Corruption
title_short The effect of social norms on bribe offers
title_full The effect of social norms on bribe offers
title_fullStr The effect of social norms on bribe offers
title_full_unstemmed The effect of social norms on bribe offers
title_sort The effect of social norms on bribe offers
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Abbink, Klaus
Freidin, Esteban
Gangadharan, Lata
Moro, Rodrigo
author Abbink, Klaus
author_facet Abbink, Klaus
Freidin, Esteban
Gangadharan, Lata
Moro, Rodrigo
author_role author
author2 Freidin, Esteban
Gangadharan, Lata
Moro, Rodrigo
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Experiment
Social norms
Sanctions
Corruption
topic Experiment
Social norms
Sanctions
Corruption
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.9
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior.
Fil: Abbink, Klaus. Monash University; Australia
Fil: Freidin, Esteban. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
Fil: Gangadharan, Lata. Monash University; Australia
Fil: Moro, Rodrigo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
description We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-07-20
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/91993
Abbink, Klaus; Freidin, Esteban; Gangadharan, Lata; Moro, Rodrigo; The effect of social norms on bribe offers; Oxford University Press; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; 34; 3; 20-7-2018; 457-474
8756-6222
1465-7341
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/91993
identifier_str_mv Abbink, Klaus; Freidin, Esteban; Gangadharan, Lata; Moro, Rodrigo; The effect of social norms on bribe offers; Oxford University Press; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; 34; 3; 20-7-2018; 457-474
8756-6222
1465-7341
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/34/3/457/5056968
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/jleo/ewy015
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1844613493449293824
score 13.070432