The effect of social norms on bribe offers
- Autores
- Abbink, Klaus; Freidin, Esteban; Gangadharan, Lata; Moro, Rodrigo
- Año de publicación
- 2018
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior.
Fil: Abbink, Klaus. Monash University; Australia
Fil: Freidin, Esteban. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
Fil: Gangadharan, Lata. Monash University; Australia
Fil: Moro, Rodrigo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina - Materia
-
Experiment
Social norms
Sanctions
Corruption - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/91993
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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The effect of social norms on bribe offersAbbink, KlausFreidin, EstebanGangadharan, LataMoro, RodrigoExperimentSocial normsSanctionsCorruptionhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.9https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior.Fil: Abbink, Klaus. Monash University; AustraliaFil: Freidin, Esteban. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; ArgentinaFil: Gangadharan, Lata. Monash University; AustraliaFil: Moro, Rodrigo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; ArgentinaOxford University Press2018-07-20info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/91993Abbink, Klaus; Freidin, Esteban; Gangadharan, Lata; Moro, Rodrigo; The effect of social norms on bribe offers; Oxford University Press; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; 34; 3; 20-7-2018; 457-4748756-62221465-7341CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/34/3/457/5056968info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/jleo/ewy015info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:47:59Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/91993instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:47:59.411CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The effect of social norms on bribe offers |
title |
The effect of social norms on bribe offers |
spellingShingle |
The effect of social norms on bribe offers Abbink, Klaus Experiment Social norms Sanctions Corruption |
title_short |
The effect of social norms on bribe offers |
title_full |
The effect of social norms on bribe offers |
title_fullStr |
The effect of social norms on bribe offers |
title_full_unstemmed |
The effect of social norms on bribe offers |
title_sort |
The effect of social norms on bribe offers |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Abbink, Klaus Freidin, Esteban Gangadharan, Lata Moro, Rodrigo |
author |
Abbink, Klaus |
author_facet |
Abbink, Klaus Freidin, Esteban Gangadharan, Lata Moro, Rodrigo |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Freidin, Esteban Gangadharan, Lata Moro, Rodrigo |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Experiment Social norms Sanctions Corruption |
topic |
Experiment Social norms Sanctions Corruption |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.9 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior. Fil: Abbink, Klaus. Monash University; Australia Fil: Freidin, Esteban. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina Fil: Gangadharan, Lata. Monash University; Australia Fil: Moro, Rodrigo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina |
description |
We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-07-20 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/91993 Abbink, Klaus; Freidin, Esteban; Gangadharan, Lata; Moro, Rodrigo; The effect of social norms on bribe offers; Oxford University Press; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; 34; 3; 20-7-2018; 457-474 8756-6222 1465-7341 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/91993 |
identifier_str_mv |
Abbink, Klaus; Freidin, Esteban; Gangadharan, Lata; Moro, Rodrigo; The effect of social norms on bribe offers; Oxford University Press; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; 34; 3; 20-7-2018; 457-474 8756-6222 1465-7341 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/34/3/457/5056968 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/jleo/ewy015 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Oxford University Press |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Oxford University Press |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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1844613493449293824 |
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13.070432 |