Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism

Autores
Di Tella, Rafael; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Babino, Andrés; Sigman, Mariano
Año de publicación
2015
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83).
Fil: Di Tella, Rafael. Harvard University; Estados Unidos
Fil: Perez-Truglia, Ricardo. Microsoft Research; Estados Unidos
Fil: Babino, Andrés. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
Bias
Altruism
Corruption
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/38566
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruismDi Tella, RafaelPerez-Truglia, RicardoBabino, AndrésSigman, MarianoBiasAltruismCorruptionhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83).Fil: Di Tella, Rafael. Harvard University; Estados UnidosFil: Perez-Truglia, Ricardo. Microsoft Research; Estados UnidosFil: Babino, Andrés. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaAmerican Economic Association2015-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/38566Di Tella, Rafael; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Babino, Andrés; Sigman, Mariano; Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism; American Economic Association; American Economic Review; 105; 11; 11-2015; 3416-34420002-8282CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/aer.20141409info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20141409info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:49:59Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/38566instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:50:00.226CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism
title Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism
spellingShingle Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism
Di Tella, Rafael
Bias
Altruism
Corruption
title_short Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism
title_full Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism
title_fullStr Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism
title_full_unstemmed Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism
title_sort Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Di Tella, Rafael
Perez-Truglia, Ricardo
Babino, Andrés
Sigman, Mariano
author Di Tella, Rafael
author_facet Di Tella, Rafael
Perez-Truglia, Ricardo
Babino, Andrés
Sigman, Mariano
author_role author
author2 Perez-Truglia, Ricardo
Babino, Andrés
Sigman, Mariano
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Bias
Altruism
Corruption
topic Bias
Altruism
Corruption
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83).
Fil: Di Tella, Rafael. Harvard University; Estados Unidos
Fil: Perez-Truglia, Ricardo. Microsoft Research; Estados Unidos
Fil: Babino, Andrés. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83).
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/38566
Di Tella, Rafael; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Babino, Andrés; Sigman, Mariano; Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism; American Economic Association; American Economic Review; 105; 11; 11-2015; 3416-3442
0002-8282
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/38566
identifier_str_mv Di Tella, Rafael; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Babino, Andrés; Sigman, Mariano; Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism; American Economic Association; American Economic Review; 105; 11; 11-2015; 3416-3442
0002-8282
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/aer.20141409
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20141409
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Economic Association
publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Economic Association
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397

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