Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland

Autores
Machuca, Diego Emanuel
Año de publicación
2015
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes "to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief on a certain issue even if one´s current evidence is not neutral (or even close to neutral)". My aim in this paper is to point to a number of problems in Wieland´s position, some of which in connection with the account of Pyrrhonian skepticism found in the extant works of Sextus Empiricus.
Fil: Machuca, Diego Emanuel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
Skepticism
Suspension
Equipollence
Inquiry
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
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oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/52708
Acceder
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spelling Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to WielandMachuca, Diego EmanuelSkepticismSuspensionEquipollenceInquiryhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes "to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief on a certain issue even if one´s current evidence is not neutral (or even close to neutral)". My aim in this paper is to point to a number of problems in Wieland´s position, some of which in connection with the account of Pyrrhonian skepticism found in the extant works of Sextus Empiricus.Fil: Machuca, Diego Emanuel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaWiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc2015-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/52708Machuca, Diego Emanuel; Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Analytic Philosophy; 56; 2; 6-2015; 177-1872153-9596CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phib.12060info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/phib.12060info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:57:14Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/52708instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:57:15.13CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland
title Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland
spellingShingle Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland
Machuca, Diego Emanuel
Skepticism
Suspension
Equipollence
Inquiry
title_short Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland
title_full Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland
title_fullStr Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland
title_full_unstemmed Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland
title_sort Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Machuca, Diego Emanuel
author Machuca, Diego Emanuel
author_facet Machuca, Diego Emanuel
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Skepticism
Suspension
Equipollence
Inquiry
topic Skepticism
Suspension
Equipollence
Inquiry
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes "to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief on a certain issue even if one´s current evidence is not neutral (or even close to neutral)". My aim in this paper is to point to a number of problems in Wieland´s position, some of which in connection with the account of Pyrrhonian skepticism found in the extant works of Sextus Empiricus.
Fil: Machuca, Diego Emanuel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes "to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief on a certain issue even if one´s current evidence is not neutral (or even close to neutral)". My aim in this paper is to point to a number of problems in Wieland´s position, some of which in connection with the account of Pyrrhonian skepticism found in the extant works of Sextus Empiricus.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-06
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/52708
Machuca, Diego Emanuel; Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Analytic Philosophy; 56; 2; 6-2015; 177-187
2153-9596
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/52708
identifier_str_mv Machuca, Diego Emanuel; Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Analytic Philosophy; 56; 2; 6-2015; 177-187
2153-9596
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phib.12060
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/phib.12060
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397

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