The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies

Autores
Pilotti, Pablo Emiliano; Casali, Ana; Chesñevar, Carlos Ivan
Año de publicación
2014
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This paper presents a novel approach to the well-known Knapsack problem, extending it as a bilateral negotiating problem with default information where each of the two agents has a knapsack and there is a set of items distributed between them. The agents can exchange items in order to reach their goal: fill their knapsacks with items without exceeding their capacity with the aim of maximizing their utility function. Initially the agents do not have any information about their counterpart, e.g. the exact weight of their items and their associated values, so that they consider default assignments for them. This default information can change as the negotiation progresses. A sequential negotiation protocol is proposed, along with different strategies of information exchange and the results obtained when the agents negotiate using them. Information transfer efficiency is assessed in terms of the overall usefulness, quantity of information disclosed and negotiation duration.
Fil: Pilotti, Pablo Emiliano. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Rosario. Centro Internacional Franco Argentino de Ciencias de la Información y Sistemas; Argentina
Fil: Casali, Ana . Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Rosario. Centro Internacional Franco Argentino de Ciencias de la Información y Sistemas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Rosario; Argentina
Fil: Chesñevar, Carlos Ivan. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Ciencias E Ingeniería de la Computacion; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Bahia Blanca; Argentina
Materia
Automatic Negotiation
Bilateral Negotiation
Knapsack Problem
Default Knowledge
Negotiation Strategies
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/12393
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation StrategiesPilotti, Pablo EmilianoCasali, Ana Chesñevar, Carlos IvanAutomatic NegotiationBilateral NegotiationKnapsack ProblemDefault KnowledgeNegotiation Strategieshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1This paper presents a novel approach to the well-known Knapsack problem, extending it as a bilateral negotiating problem with default information where each of the two agents has a knapsack and there is a set of items distributed between them. The agents can exchange items in order to reach their goal: fill their knapsacks with items without exceeding their capacity with the aim of maximizing their utility function. Initially the agents do not have any information about their counterpart, e.g. the exact weight of their items and their associated values, so that they consider default assignments for them. This default information can change as the negotiation progresses. A sequential negotiation protocol is proposed, along with different strategies of information exchange and the results obtained when the agents negotiate using them. Information transfer efficiency is assessed in terms of the overall usefulness, quantity of information disclosed and negotiation duration.Fil: Pilotti, Pablo Emiliano. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Rosario. Centro Internacional Franco Argentino de Ciencias de la Información y Sistemas; ArgentinaFil: Casali, Ana . Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Rosario. Centro Internacional Franco Argentino de Ciencias de la Información y Sistemas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Rosario; ArgentinaFil: Chesñevar, Carlos Ivan. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Ciencias E Ingeniería de la Computacion; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Bahia Blanca; ArgentinaSpringer2014-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/12393Pilotti, Pablo Emiliano; Casali, Ana ; Chesñevar, Carlos Ivan; The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies; Springer; Lecture Notes In Computer Science; 8864; 8-2014; 548-5590302-9743enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-12027-0_44info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12027-0_44info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:37:01Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/12393instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:37:01.339CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies
title The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies
spellingShingle The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies
Pilotti, Pablo Emiliano
Automatic Negotiation
Bilateral Negotiation
Knapsack Problem
Default Knowledge
Negotiation Strategies
title_short The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies
title_full The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies
title_fullStr The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies
title_full_unstemmed The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies
title_sort The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Pilotti, Pablo Emiliano
Casali, Ana
Chesñevar, Carlos Ivan
author Pilotti, Pablo Emiliano
author_facet Pilotti, Pablo Emiliano
Casali, Ana
Chesñevar, Carlos Ivan
author_role author
author2 Casali, Ana
Chesñevar, Carlos Ivan
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Automatic Negotiation
Bilateral Negotiation
Knapsack Problem
Default Knowledge
Negotiation Strategies
topic Automatic Negotiation
Bilateral Negotiation
Knapsack Problem
Default Knowledge
Negotiation Strategies
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This paper presents a novel approach to the well-known Knapsack problem, extending it as a bilateral negotiating problem with default information where each of the two agents has a knapsack and there is a set of items distributed between them. The agents can exchange items in order to reach their goal: fill their knapsacks with items without exceeding their capacity with the aim of maximizing their utility function. Initially the agents do not have any information about their counterpart, e.g. the exact weight of their items and their associated values, so that they consider default assignments for them. This default information can change as the negotiation progresses. A sequential negotiation protocol is proposed, along with different strategies of information exchange and the results obtained when the agents negotiate using them. Information transfer efficiency is assessed in terms of the overall usefulness, quantity of information disclosed and negotiation duration.
Fil: Pilotti, Pablo Emiliano. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Rosario. Centro Internacional Franco Argentino de Ciencias de la Información y Sistemas; Argentina
Fil: Casali, Ana . Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Rosario. Centro Internacional Franco Argentino de Ciencias de la Información y Sistemas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Rosario; Argentina
Fil: Chesñevar, Carlos Ivan. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Ciencias E Ingeniería de la Computacion; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Bahia Blanca; Argentina
description This paper presents a novel approach to the well-known Knapsack problem, extending it as a bilateral negotiating problem with default information where each of the two agents has a knapsack and there is a set of items distributed between them. The agents can exchange items in order to reach their goal: fill their knapsacks with items without exceeding their capacity with the aim of maximizing their utility function. Initially the agents do not have any information about their counterpart, e.g. the exact weight of their items and their associated values, so that they consider default assignments for them. This default information can change as the negotiation progresses. A sequential negotiation protocol is proposed, along with different strategies of information exchange and the results obtained when the agents negotiate using them. Information transfer efficiency is assessed in terms of the overall usefulness, quantity of information disclosed and negotiation duration.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-08
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/12393
Pilotti, Pablo Emiliano; Casali, Ana ; Chesñevar, Carlos Ivan; The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies; Springer; Lecture Notes In Computer Science; 8864; 8-2014; 548-559
0302-9743
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/12393
identifier_str_mv Pilotti, Pablo Emiliano; Casali, Ana ; Chesñevar, Carlos Ivan; The Double Knapsack Negotiation Problem: Modeling Cooperative Agents and Experimenting Negotiation Strategies; Springer; Lecture Notes In Computer Science; 8864; 8-2014; 548-559
0302-9743
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-12027-0_44
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12027-0_44
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.069144

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