Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case

Autores
Alderete, Maria Veronica
Año de publicación
2011
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This paper analyzes the creation of an export consortium among small and medium sized enterprises (SME) by the State. A hidden information principal agent model is introduced to explain the presence of SME export consortiums. The State (principal) can not observe the random realization of the firm’s (agent) disutility from effort. We introduce a setting where the informational asymmetry is post-contractual. The contract specifies the subsidy and effort levels that result from different announcements of the state by the firm. By means of the subsidy payments, the revelation of firms’ competitiveness can be achieved. The results obtained are that subsidies are ex post inefficient and they can constraint the participation of the less competitive firms to the export consortium.
Fil: Alderete, Maria Veronica. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
Materia
COOPERATION
PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
MECHANISM DESIGN
SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/102426
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/102426
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium CaseAlderete, Maria VeronicaCOOPERATIONPRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELMECHANISM DESIGNSMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISEShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5This paper analyzes the creation of an export consortium among small and medium sized enterprises (SME) by the State. A hidden information principal agent model is introduced to explain the presence of SME export consortiums. The State (principal) can not observe the random realization of the firm’s (agent) disutility from effort. We introduce a setting where the informational asymmetry is post-contractual. The contract specifies the subsidy and effort levels that result from different announcements of the state by the firm. By means of the subsidy payments, the revelation of firms’ competitiveness can be achieved. The results obtained are that subsidies are ex post inefficient and they can constraint the participation of the less competitive firms to the export consortium.Fil: Alderete, Maria Veronica. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; ArgentinaUniversa2011-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/102426Alderete, Maria Veronica; Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case; Universa; Revista Brasilera de Economía de Empresas; 10; 2; 5-2011; 70-861676-8000CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/rbee/article/view/3102/1879info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:58:20Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/102426instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:58:21.062CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case
title Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case
spellingShingle Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case
Alderete, Maria Veronica
COOPERATION
PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
MECHANISM DESIGN
SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES
title_short Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case
title_full Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case
title_fullStr Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case
title_full_unstemmed Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case
title_sort Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Alderete, Maria Veronica
author Alderete, Maria Veronica
author_facet Alderete, Maria Veronica
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv COOPERATION
PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
MECHANISM DESIGN
SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES
topic COOPERATION
PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
MECHANISM DESIGN
SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This paper analyzes the creation of an export consortium among small and medium sized enterprises (SME) by the State. A hidden information principal agent model is introduced to explain the presence of SME export consortiums. The State (principal) can not observe the random realization of the firm’s (agent) disutility from effort. We introduce a setting where the informational asymmetry is post-contractual. The contract specifies the subsidy and effort levels that result from different announcements of the state by the firm. By means of the subsidy payments, the revelation of firms’ competitiveness can be achieved. The results obtained are that subsidies are ex post inefficient and they can constraint the participation of the less competitive firms to the export consortium.
Fil: Alderete, Maria Veronica. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
description This paper analyzes the creation of an export consortium among small and medium sized enterprises (SME) by the State. A hidden information principal agent model is introduced to explain the presence of SME export consortiums. The State (principal) can not observe the random realization of the firm’s (agent) disutility from effort. We introduce a setting where the informational asymmetry is post-contractual. The contract specifies the subsidy and effort levels that result from different announcements of the state by the firm. By means of the subsidy payments, the revelation of firms’ competitiveness can be achieved. The results obtained are that subsidies are ex post inefficient and they can constraint the participation of the less competitive firms to the export consortium.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011-05
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/102426
Alderete, Maria Veronica; Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case; Universa; Revista Brasilera de Economía de Empresas; 10; 2; 5-2011; 70-86
1676-8000
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/102426
identifier_str_mv Alderete, Maria Veronica; Optimal Contracts with Hidden Information: An Export Consortium Case; Universa; Revista Brasilera de Economía de Empresas; 10; 2; 5-2011; 70-86
1676-8000
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/rbee/article/view/3102/1879
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universa
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universa
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1844613739359240192
score 13.070432

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