Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend
- Autores
- Nadal, J. P.; Gordon, M. B.; Iglesias, J. R.; Semeshenko, Viktoriya
- Año de publicación
- 2010
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- We introduce a general framework for modelling the dynamics of the propensity to offend in a population of (possibly interacting) agents. We consider that each agent has an honesty index which parameterizes his probability of abiding by the law. This probability also depends on a composite parameter associated to the attractiveness of the crime outcome and of the crime setting (the context which makes a crime more or less likely to occur, such as the presence or not of a guardian). Within this framework we explore some consequences of the working hypothesis that punishment has a deterrent effect, assuming that, after a criminal act, an agent's honesty index may increase if he is caught and decrease otherwise. We provide both analytical and numerical results. We show that in the space of parameters characterizing the probability of punishment, there are two phases: one corresponding to a population with a low crime rate and the other to a population with a large crime rate. We speculate on the possible existence of a self-organized state in which, due to the society reaction against crime activities, the population dynamics would be stabilized on the critical line, leading to a wide distribution of propensities to offend in the population. In view of empirical works on the causes of the recent evolution of crime rates in developed countries, we discuss how changes of socio-economic conditions may affect the model parameters, and hence the crime rate in the population. We suggest possible extensions of the model that will allow us to take into account more realistic features.
Fil: Nadal, J. P.. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Francia. École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; Francia. Université Pierre et Marie Curie; Francia
Fil: Gordon, M. B.. Université de Grenoble I; Francia
Fil: Iglesias, J. R.. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; Brasil
Fil: Semeshenko, Viktoriya. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Economía; Argentina - Materia
-
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALITY
EQUILIBRIA
PHASE TRANSITION - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
.jpg)
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/189105
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offendNadal, J. P.Gordon, M. B.Iglesias, J. R.Semeshenko, ViktoriyaCRIME AND PUNISHMENTECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALITYEQUILIBRIAPHASE TRANSITIONhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1We introduce a general framework for modelling the dynamics of the propensity to offend in a population of (possibly interacting) agents. We consider that each agent has an honesty index which parameterizes his probability of abiding by the law. This probability also depends on a composite parameter associated to the attractiveness of the crime outcome and of the crime setting (the context which makes a crime more or less likely to occur, such as the presence or not of a guardian). Within this framework we explore some consequences of the working hypothesis that punishment has a deterrent effect, assuming that, after a criminal act, an agent's honesty index may increase if he is caught and decrease otherwise. We provide both analytical and numerical results. We show that in the space of parameters characterizing the probability of punishment, there are two phases: one corresponding to a population with a low crime rate and the other to a population with a large crime rate. We speculate on the possible existence of a self-organized state in which, due to the society reaction against crime activities, the population dynamics would be stabilized on the critical line, leading to a wide distribution of propensities to offend in the population. In view of empirical works on the causes of the recent evolution of crime rates in developed countries, we discuss how changes of socio-economic conditions may affect the model parameters, and hence the crime rate in the population. We suggest possible extensions of the model that will allow us to take into account more realistic features.Fil: Nadal, J. P.. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Francia. École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; Francia. Université Pierre et Marie Curie; FranciaFil: Gordon, M. B.. Université de Grenoble I; FranciaFil: Iglesias, J. R.. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; BrasilFil: Semeshenko, Viktoriya. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Economía; ArgentinaCambridge University Press2010-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/189105Nadal, J. P.; Gordon, M. B.; Iglesias, J. R.; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend; Cambridge University Press; European Journal Of Applied Mathematics; 21; 4-5; 10-2010; 421-4400956-7925CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-applied-mathematics/article/abs/modelling-the-individual-and-collective-dynamics-of-the-propensity-to-offend/874B0A9FF3BBAC7678FFF01000036F8Einfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1017/S0956792510000173info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2026-04-15T10:17:45Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/189105instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982026-04-15 10:17:45.635CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend |
| title |
Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend |
| spellingShingle |
Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend Nadal, J. P. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALITY EQUILIBRIA PHASE TRANSITION |
| title_short |
Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend |
| title_full |
Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend |
| title_fullStr |
Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend |
| title_sort |
Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Nadal, J. P. Gordon, M. B. Iglesias, J. R. Semeshenko, Viktoriya |
| author |
Nadal, J. P. |
| author_facet |
Nadal, J. P. Gordon, M. B. Iglesias, J. R. Semeshenko, Viktoriya |
| author_role |
author |
| author2 |
Gordon, M. B. Iglesias, J. R. Semeshenko, Viktoriya |
| author2_role |
author author author |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALITY EQUILIBRIA PHASE TRANSITION |
| topic |
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALITY EQUILIBRIA PHASE TRANSITION |
| purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1 |
| dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
We introduce a general framework for modelling the dynamics of the propensity to offend in a population of (possibly interacting) agents. We consider that each agent has an honesty index which parameterizes his probability of abiding by the law. This probability also depends on a composite parameter associated to the attractiveness of the crime outcome and of the crime setting (the context which makes a crime more or less likely to occur, such as the presence or not of a guardian). Within this framework we explore some consequences of the working hypothesis that punishment has a deterrent effect, assuming that, after a criminal act, an agent's honesty index may increase if he is caught and decrease otherwise. We provide both analytical and numerical results. We show that in the space of parameters characterizing the probability of punishment, there are two phases: one corresponding to a population with a low crime rate and the other to a population with a large crime rate. We speculate on the possible existence of a self-organized state in which, due to the society reaction against crime activities, the population dynamics would be stabilized on the critical line, leading to a wide distribution of propensities to offend in the population. In view of empirical works on the causes of the recent evolution of crime rates in developed countries, we discuss how changes of socio-economic conditions may affect the model parameters, and hence the crime rate in the population. We suggest possible extensions of the model that will allow us to take into account more realistic features. Fil: Nadal, J. P.. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Francia. École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; Francia. Université Pierre et Marie Curie; Francia Fil: Gordon, M. B.. Université de Grenoble I; Francia Fil: Iglesias, J. R.. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; Brasil Fil: Semeshenko, Viktoriya. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Economía; Argentina |
| description |
We introduce a general framework for modelling the dynamics of the propensity to offend in a population of (possibly interacting) agents. We consider that each agent has an honesty index which parameterizes his probability of abiding by the law. This probability also depends on a composite parameter associated to the attractiveness of the crime outcome and of the crime setting (the context which makes a crime more or less likely to occur, such as the presence or not of a guardian). Within this framework we explore some consequences of the working hypothesis that punishment has a deterrent effect, assuming that, after a criminal act, an agent's honesty index may increase if he is caught and decrease otherwise. We provide both analytical and numerical results. We show that in the space of parameters characterizing the probability of punishment, there are two phases: one corresponding to a population with a low crime rate and the other to a population with a large crime rate. We speculate on the possible existence of a self-organized state in which, due to the society reaction against crime activities, the population dynamics would be stabilized on the critical line, leading to a wide distribution of propensities to offend in the population. In view of empirical works on the causes of the recent evolution of crime rates in developed countries, we discuss how changes of socio-economic conditions may affect the model parameters, and hence the crime rate in the population. We suggest possible extensions of the model that will allow us to take into account more realistic features. |
| publishDate |
2010 |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2010-10 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
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article |
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publishedVersion |
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http://hdl.handle.net/11336/189105 Nadal, J. P.; Gordon, M. B.; Iglesias, J. R.; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend; Cambridge University Press; European Journal Of Applied Mathematics; 21; 4-5; 10-2010; 421-440 0956-7925 CONICET Digital CONICET |
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http://hdl.handle.net/11336/189105 |
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Nadal, J. P.; Gordon, M. B.; Iglesias, J. R.; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend; Cambridge University Press; European Journal Of Applied Mathematics; 21; 4-5; 10-2010; 421-440 0956-7925 CONICET Digital CONICET |
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eng |
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eng |
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openAccess |
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Cambridge University Press |
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Cambridge University Press |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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