Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend

Autores
Nadal, J. P.; Gordon, M. B.; Iglesias, J. R.; Semeshenko, Viktoriya
Año de publicación
2010
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We introduce a general framework for modelling the dynamics of the propensity to offend in a population of (possibly interacting) agents. We consider that each agent has an honesty index which parameterizes his probability of abiding by the law. This probability also depends on a composite parameter associated to the attractiveness of the crime outcome and of the crime setting (the context which makes a crime more or less likely to occur, such as the presence or not of a guardian). Within this framework we explore some consequences of the working hypothesis that punishment has a deterrent effect, assuming that, after a criminal act, an agent's honesty index may increase if he is caught and decrease otherwise. We provide both analytical and numerical results. We show that in the space of parameters characterizing the probability of punishment, there are two phases: one corresponding to a population with a low crime rate and the other to a population with a large crime rate. We speculate on the possible existence of a self-organized state in which, due to the society reaction against crime activities, the population dynamics would be stabilized on the critical line, leading to a wide distribution of propensities to offend in the population. In view of empirical works on the causes of the recent evolution of crime rates in developed countries, we discuss how changes of socio-economic conditions may affect the model parameters, and hence the crime rate in the population. We suggest possible extensions of the model that will allow us to take into account more realistic features.
Fil: Nadal, J. P.. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Francia. École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; Francia. Université Pierre et Marie Curie; Francia
Fil: Gordon, M. B.. Université de Grenoble I; Francia
Fil: Iglesias, J. R.. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; Brasil
Fil: Semeshenko, Viktoriya. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Economía; Argentina
Materia
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALITY
EQUILIBRIA
PHASE TRANSITION
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/189105

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spelling Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offendNadal, J. P.Gordon, M. B.Iglesias, J. R.Semeshenko, ViktoriyaCRIME AND PUNISHMENTECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALITYEQUILIBRIAPHASE TRANSITIONhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1We introduce a general framework for modelling the dynamics of the propensity to offend in a population of (possibly interacting) agents. We consider that each agent has an honesty index which parameterizes his probability of abiding by the law. This probability also depends on a composite parameter associated to the attractiveness of the crime outcome and of the crime setting (the context which makes a crime more or less likely to occur, such as the presence or not of a guardian). Within this framework we explore some consequences of the working hypothesis that punishment has a deterrent effect, assuming that, after a criminal act, an agent's honesty index may increase if he is caught and decrease otherwise. We provide both analytical and numerical results. We show that in the space of parameters characterizing the probability of punishment, there are two phases: one corresponding to a population with a low crime rate and the other to a population with a large crime rate. We speculate on the possible existence of a self-organized state in which, due to the society reaction against crime activities, the population dynamics would be stabilized on the critical line, leading to a wide distribution of propensities to offend in the population. In view of empirical works on the causes of the recent evolution of crime rates in developed countries, we discuss how changes of socio-economic conditions may affect the model parameters, and hence the crime rate in the population. We suggest possible extensions of the model that will allow us to take into account more realistic features.Fil: Nadal, J. P.. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Francia. École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; Francia. Université Pierre et Marie Curie; FranciaFil: Gordon, M. B.. Université de Grenoble I; FranciaFil: Iglesias, J. R.. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; BrasilFil: Semeshenko, Viktoriya. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Economía; ArgentinaCambridge University Press2010-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/189105Nadal, J. P.; Gordon, M. B.; Iglesias, J. R.; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend; Cambridge University Press; European Journal Of Applied Mathematics; 21; 4-5; 10-2010; 421-4400956-7925CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-applied-mathematics/article/abs/modelling-the-individual-and-collective-dynamics-of-the-propensity-to-offend/874B0A9FF3BBAC7678FFF01000036F8Einfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1017/S0956792510000173info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2026-04-15T10:17:45Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/189105instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982026-04-15 10:17:45.635CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend
title Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend
spellingShingle Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend
Nadal, J. P.
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALITY
EQUILIBRIA
PHASE TRANSITION
title_short Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend
title_full Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend
title_fullStr Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend
title_full_unstemmed Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend
title_sort Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Nadal, J. P.
Gordon, M. B.
Iglesias, J. R.
Semeshenko, Viktoriya
author Nadal, J. P.
author_facet Nadal, J. P.
Gordon, M. B.
Iglesias, J. R.
Semeshenko, Viktoriya
author_role author
author2 Gordon, M. B.
Iglesias, J. R.
Semeshenko, Viktoriya
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALITY
EQUILIBRIA
PHASE TRANSITION
topic CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALITY
EQUILIBRIA
PHASE TRANSITION
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We introduce a general framework for modelling the dynamics of the propensity to offend in a population of (possibly interacting) agents. We consider that each agent has an honesty index which parameterizes his probability of abiding by the law. This probability also depends on a composite parameter associated to the attractiveness of the crime outcome and of the crime setting (the context which makes a crime more or less likely to occur, such as the presence or not of a guardian). Within this framework we explore some consequences of the working hypothesis that punishment has a deterrent effect, assuming that, after a criminal act, an agent's honesty index may increase if he is caught and decrease otherwise. We provide both analytical and numerical results. We show that in the space of parameters characterizing the probability of punishment, there are two phases: one corresponding to a population with a low crime rate and the other to a population with a large crime rate. We speculate on the possible existence of a self-organized state in which, due to the society reaction against crime activities, the population dynamics would be stabilized on the critical line, leading to a wide distribution of propensities to offend in the population. In view of empirical works on the causes of the recent evolution of crime rates in developed countries, we discuss how changes of socio-economic conditions may affect the model parameters, and hence the crime rate in the population. We suggest possible extensions of the model that will allow us to take into account more realistic features.
Fil: Nadal, J. P.. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Francia. École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; Francia. Université Pierre et Marie Curie; Francia
Fil: Gordon, M. B.. Université de Grenoble I; Francia
Fil: Iglesias, J. R.. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; Brasil
Fil: Semeshenko, Viktoriya. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Economía; Argentina
description We introduce a general framework for modelling the dynamics of the propensity to offend in a population of (possibly interacting) agents. We consider that each agent has an honesty index which parameterizes his probability of abiding by the law. This probability also depends on a composite parameter associated to the attractiveness of the crime outcome and of the crime setting (the context which makes a crime more or less likely to occur, such as the presence or not of a guardian). Within this framework we explore some consequences of the working hypothesis that punishment has a deterrent effect, assuming that, after a criminal act, an agent's honesty index may increase if he is caught and decrease otherwise. We provide both analytical and numerical results. We show that in the space of parameters characterizing the probability of punishment, there are two phases: one corresponding to a population with a low crime rate and the other to a population with a large crime rate. We speculate on the possible existence of a self-organized state in which, due to the society reaction against crime activities, the population dynamics would be stabilized on the critical line, leading to a wide distribution of propensities to offend in the population. In view of empirical works on the causes of the recent evolution of crime rates in developed countries, we discuss how changes of socio-economic conditions may affect the model parameters, and hence the crime rate in the population. We suggest possible extensions of the model that will allow us to take into account more realistic features.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010-10
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/189105
Nadal, J. P.; Gordon, M. B.; Iglesias, J. R.; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend; Cambridge University Press; European Journal Of Applied Mathematics; 21; 4-5; 10-2010; 421-440
0956-7925
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/189105
identifier_str_mv Nadal, J. P.; Gordon, M. B.; Iglesias, J. R.; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend; Cambridge University Press; European Journal Of Applied Mathematics; 21; 4-5; 10-2010; 421-440
0956-7925
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-applied-mathematics/article/abs/modelling-the-individual-and-collective-dynamics-of-the-propensity-to-offend/874B0A9FF3BBAC7678FFF01000036F8E
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1017/S0956792510000173
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cambridge University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cambridge University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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