Grounding and logical basing permissions

Autores
Tajer, Diego
Año de publicación
2016
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The relation between logic and rationality has recently re-emerged as an important topic of discussion. Following the ideas of Broome [1999] and MacFarlane [2004], the debate focused on providing rational requirements, which work as bridges between logic and epistemic norms. Ho-wever, as Broome [2014] and Way [2011] observed, the usual requirements cannot capture some important aspects of rationality, such as how one can rationally believe something on the basis of believing something else. Broome [2014] proposed a few additional principles ("basing permis-sions") for this purpose. In this paper I develop a more systematic family of basing permissions using the recent notion of grounding (Fine [2012], Correia [2014]). In particular, I claim that if G (logically) grounds A, and you believe Γ, then rationality permits you to believe A on the basis of believing γ.
Fil: Tajer, Diego. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Materia
BASING PERMISSIONS
BRIDGE PRINCIPLES
GROUNDING
LOGIC AND RATIONALITY
RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/179622
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Grounding and logical basing permissionsTajer, DiegoBASING PERMISSIONSBRIDGE PRINCIPLESGROUNDINGLOGIC AND RATIONALITYRATIONAL REQUIREMENTShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6The relation between logic and rationality has recently re-emerged as an important topic of discussion. Following the ideas of Broome [1999] and MacFarlane [2004], the debate focused on providing rational requirements, which work as bridges between logic and epistemic norms. Ho-wever, as Broome [2014] and Way [2011] observed, the usual requirements cannot capture some important aspects of rationality, such as how one can rationally believe something on the basis of believing something else. Broome [2014] proposed a few additional principles ("basing permis-sions") for this purpose. In this paper I develop a more systematic family of basing permissions using the recent notion of grounding (Fine [2012], Correia [2014]). In particular, I claim that if G (logically) grounds A, and you believe Γ, then rationality permits you to believe A on the basis of believing γ.Fil: Tajer, Diego. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaUniwersytet Jagiellonski. Instytut Filozofii2016-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/179622Tajer, Diego; Grounding and logical basing permissions; Uniwersytet Jagiellonski. Instytut Filozofii; Diametros; 50; 12-2016; 102-1171733-5566CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://diametros.uj.edu.pl/diametros/article/view/979info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.13153/diam.50.2016.979info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:26:06Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/179622instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:26:06.454CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Grounding and logical basing permissions
title Grounding and logical basing permissions
spellingShingle Grounding and logical basing permissions
Tajer, Diego
BASING PERMISSIONS
BRIDGE PRINCIPLES
GROUNDING
LOGIC AND RATIONALITY
RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
title_short Grounding and logical basing permissions
title_full Grounding and logical basing permissions
title_fullStr Grounding and logical basing permissions
title_full_unstemmed Grounding and logical basing permissions
title_sort Grounding and logical basing permissions
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Tajer, Diego
author Tajer, Diego
author_facet Tajer, Diego
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv BASING PERMISSIONS
BRIDGE PRINCIPLES
GROUNDING
LOGIC AND RATIONALITY
RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
topic BASING PERMISSIONS
BRIDGE PRINCIPLES
GROUNDING
LOGIC AND RATIONALITY
RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The relation between logic and rationality has recently re-emerged as an important topic of discussion. Following the ideas of Broome [1999] and MacFarlane [2004], the debate focused on providing rational requirements, which work as bridges between logic and epistemic norms. Ho-wever, as Broome [2014] and Way [2011] observed, the usual requirements cannot capture some important aspects of rationality, such as how one can rationally believe something on the basis of believing something else. Broome [2014] proposed a few additional principles ("basing permis-sions") for this purpose. In this paper I develop a more systematic family of basing permissions using the recent notion of grounding (Fine [2012], Correia [2014]). In particular, I claim that if G (logically) grounds A, and you believe Γ, then rationality permits you to believe A on the basis of believing γ.
Fil: Tajer, Diego. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina
description The relation between logic and rationality has recently re-emerged as an important topic of discussion. Following the ideas of Broome [1999] and MacFarlane [2004], the debate focused on providing rational requirements, which work as bridges between logic and epistemic norms. Ho-wever, as Broome [2014] and Way [2011] observed, the usual requirements cannot capture some important aspects of rationality, such as how one can rationally believe something on the basis of believing something else. Broome [2014] proposed a few additional principles ("basing permis-sions") for this purpose. In this paper I develop a more systematic family of basing permissions using the recent notion of grounding (Fine [2012], Correia [2014]). In particular, I claim that if G (logically) grounds A, and you believe Γ, then rationality permits you to believe A on the basis of believing γ.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-12
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/179622
Tajer, Diego; Grounding and logical basing permissions; Uniwersytet Jagiellonski. Instytut Filozofii; Diametros; 50; 12-2016; 102-117
1733-5566
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/179622
identifier_str_mv Tajer, Diego; Grounding and logical basing permissions; Uniwersytet Jagiellonski. Instytut Filozofii; Diametros; 50; 12-2016; 102-117
1733-5566
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://diametros.uj.edu.pl/diametros/article/view/979
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.13153/diam.50.2016.979
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Uniwersytet Jagiellonski. Instytut Filozofii
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Uniwersytet Jagiellonski. Instytut Filozofii
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1844614261329887232
score 13.070432

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