On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness

Autores
Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José
Año de publicación
2017
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.
Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; España
Fil: Massó, Jordi. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
Materia
Games Theory
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/65178
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/65178
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repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofnessBergantiños, GustavoMassó, JordiNeme, Alejandro JoséGames Theoryhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.4https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; EspañaFil: Massó, Jordi. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; EspañaFil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; ArgentinaSpringer2017-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/65178Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness; Springer; Social Choice And Welfare; 48; 4; 4-2017; 857-8750176-1714CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T10:02:14Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/65178instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 10:02:15.156CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
title On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
spellingShingle On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
Bergantiños, Gustavo
Games Theory
title_short On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
title_full On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
title_fullStr On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
title_full_unstemmed On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
title_sort On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Bergantiños, Gustavo
Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author Bergantiños, Gustavo
author_facet Bergantiños, Gustavo
Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author_role author
author2 Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Games Theory
topic Games Theory
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.4
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.
Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; España
Fil: Massó, Jordi. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
description We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-04
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/65178
Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness; Springer; Social Choice And Welfare; 48; 4; 4-2017; 857-875
0176-1714
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/65178
identifier_str_mv Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness; Springer; Social Choice And Welfare; 48; 4; 4-2017; 857-875
0176-1714
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1842269746498633728
score 13.13397

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