Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos

Autores
Danon, Laura; Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
Año de publicación
2022
Idioma
español castellano
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
According to intellectualist approaches to reasons and normativity, non-human animals lack a genuine sensitivity to reasons. In that sense, in contrast to human beings, they cannot be considered normative creatures. Against intellectualism, in this paper, we hold that when a creature arrives at a new doxastic state by carrying out a certain type of reasoning, the premises of it constitute genuine reasons for her. We are interested in reasoning as a personal level process, which requires a certain kind of intelligence, implicit knowledge, and some (partial) understanding of the reasons by which the creature arrives at a new belief. However, this sort of reasoning requires neither the possession of epistemic concepts nor the possession of meta-representational competencies, as the intellectualists hold. Thus, if some non-human animals –such as great apes— have the capacity to carry out this kind of reasoning, they can be credited with a practical ability to use reasons and a (partial) cognitive access to them. In this sense, they could also be taken to be normative animals.
Fil: Danon, Laura. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
Materia
INTELECTULISMO
RAZONAMIENTO
REFLEXIÓN
NORMATIVIDAD ANIMAL
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/203034
Acceder
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spelling Razones y normatividad en animales no humanosReasons and Normativity in Non-human AnimalsDanon, LauraKalpokas, Daniel EnriqueINTELECTULISMORAZONAMIENTOREFLEXIÓNNORMATIVIDAD ANIMALhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6According to intellectualist approaches to reasons and normativity, non-human animals lack a genuine sensitivity to reasons. In that sense, in contrast to human beings, they cannot be considered normative creatures. Against intellectualism, in this paper, we hold that when a creature arrives at a new doxastic state by carrying out a certain type of reasoning, the premises of it constitute genuine reasons for her. We are interested in reasoning as a personal level process, which requires a certain kind of intelligence, implicit knowledge, and some (partial) understanding of the reasons by which the creature arrives at a new belief. However, this sort of reasoning requires neither the possession of epistemic concepts nor the possession of meta-representational competencies, as the intellectualists hold. Thus, if some non-human animals –such as great apes— have the capacity to carry out this kind of reasoning, they can be credited with a practical ability to use reasons and a (partial) cognitive access to them. In this sense, they could also be taken to be normative animals.Fil: Danon, Laura. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaFil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaFondazione Gentile Onlus2022-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/203034Danon, Laura; Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos; Fondazione Gentile Onlus; L'Ircocervo; 2; 2-2022; 146-1621722-392XCONICET DigitalCONICETspahttps://ri.conicet.gov.ar/handle/11336/119676info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://lircocervo.it/?p=5370info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T12:12:47Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/203034instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 12:12:47.867CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos
Reasons and Normativity in Non-human Animals
title Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos
spellingShingle Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos
Danon, Laura
INTELECTULISMO
RAZONAMIENTO
REFLEXIÓN
NORMATIVIDAD ANIMAL
title_short Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos
title_full Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos
title_fullStr Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos
title_full_unstemmed Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos
title_sort Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Danon, Laura
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author Danon, Laura
author_facet Danon, Laura
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author_role author
author2 Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv INTELECTULISMO
RAZONAMIENTO
REFLEXIÓN
NORMATIVIDAD ANIMAL
topic INTELECTULISMO
RAZONAMIENTO
REFLEXIÓN
NORMATIVIDAD ANIMAL
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv According to intellectualist approaches to reasons and normativity, non-human animals lack a genuine sensitivity to reasons. In that sense, in contrast to human beings, they cannot be considered normative creatures. Against intellectualism, in this paper, we hold that when a creature arrives at a new doxastic state by carrying out a certain type of reasoning, the premises of it constitute genuine reasons for her. We are interested in reasoning as a personal level process, which requires a certain kind of intelligence, implicit knowledge, and some (partial) understanding of the reasons by which the creature arrives at a new belief. However, this sort of reasoning requires neither the possession of epistemic concepts nor the possession of meta-representational competencies, as the intellectualists hold. Thus, if some non-human animals –such as great apes— have the capacity to carry out this kind of reasoning, they can be credited with a practical ability to use reasons and a (partial) cognitive access to them. In this sense, they could also be taken to be normative animals.
Fil: Danon, Laura. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
description According to intellectualist approaches to reasons and normativity, non-human animals lack a genuine sensitivity to reasons. In that sense, in contrast to human beings, they cannot be considered normative creatures. Against intellectualism, in this paper, we hold that when a creature arrives at a new doxastic state by carrying out a certain type of reasoning, the premises of it constitute genuine reasons for her. We are interested in reasoning as a personal level process, which requires a certain kind of intelligence, implicit knowledge, and some (partial) understanding of the reasons by which the creature arrives at a new belief. However, this sort of reasoning requires neither the possession of epistemic concepts nor the possession of meta-representational competencies, as the intellectualists hold. Thus, if some non-human animals –such as great apes— have the capacity to carry out this kind of reasoning, they can be credited with a practical ability to use reasons and a (partial) cognitive access to them. In this sense, they could also be taken to be normative animals.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-02
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/203034
Danon, Laura; Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos; Fondazione Gentile Onlus; L'Ircocervo; 2; 2-2022; 146-162
1722-392X
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/203034
identifier_str_mv Danon, Laura; Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos; Fondazione Gentile Onlus; L'Ircocervo; 2; 2-2022; 146-162
1722-392X
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/handle/11336/119676
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://lircocervo.it/?p=5370
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fondazione Gentile Onlus
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fondazione Gentile Onlus
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 12.982451

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