Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos
- Autores
- Danon, Laura; Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
- Año de publicación
- 2022
- Idioma
- español castellano
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- According to intellectualist approaches to reasons and normativity, non-human animals lack a genuine sensitivity to reasons. In that sense, in contrast to human beings, they cannot be considered normative creatures. Against intellectualism, in this paper, we hold that when a creature arrives at a new doxastic state by carrying out a certain type of reasoning, the premises of it constitute genuine reasons for her. We are interested in reasoning as a personal level process, which requires a certain kind of intelligence, implicit knowledge, and some (partial) understanding of the reasons by which the creature arrives at a new belief. However, this sort of reasoning requires neither the possession of epistemic concepts nor the possession of meta-representational competencies, as the intellectualists hold. Thus, if some non-human animals –such as great apes— have the capacity to carry out this kind of reasoning, they can be credited with a practical ability to use reasons and a (partial) cognitive access to them. In this sense, they could also be taken to be normative animals.
Fil: Danon, Laura. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina - Materia
-
INTELECTULISMO
RAZONAMIENTO
REFLEXIÓN
NORMATIVIDAD ANIMAL - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/203034
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Razones y normatividad en animales no humanosReasons and Normativity in Non-human AnimalsDanon, LauraKalpokas, Daniel EnriqueINTELECTULISMORAZONAMIENTOREFLEXIÓNNORMATIVIDAD ANIMALhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6According to intellectualist approaches to reasons and normativity, non-human animals lack a genuine sensitivity to reasons. In that sense, in contrast to human beings, they cannot be considered normative creatures. Against intellectualism, in this paper, we hold that when a creature arrives at a new doxastic state by carrying out a certain type of reasoning, the premises of it constitute genuine reasons for her. We are interested in reasoning as a personal level process, which requires a certain kind of intelligence, implicit knowledge, and some (partial) understanding of the reasons by which the creature arrives at a new belief. However, this sort of reasoning requires neither the possession of epistemic concepts nor the possession of meta-representational competencies, as the intellectualists hold. Thus, if some non-human animals –such as great apes— have the capacity to carry out this kind of reasoning, they can be credited with a practical ability to use reasons and a (partial) cognitive access to them. In this sense, they could also be taken to be normative animals.Fil: Danon, Laura. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaFil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaFondazione Gentile Onlus2022-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/203034Danon, Laura; Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos; Fondazione Gentile Onlus; L'Ircocervo; 2; 2-2022; 146-1621722-392XCONICET DigitalCONICETspahttps://ri.conicet.gov.ar/handle/11336/119676info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://lircocervo.it/?p=5370info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:40:22Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/203034instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:40:22.372CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos Reasons and Normativity in Non-human Animals |
title |
Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos |
spellingShingle |
Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos Danon, Laura INTELECTULISMO RAZONAMIENTO REFLEXIÓN NORMATIVIDAD ANIMAL |
title_short |
Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos |
title_full |
Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos |
title_fullStr |
Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos |
title_full_unstemmed |
Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos |
title_sort |
Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Danon, Laura Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author |
Danon, Laura |
author_facet |
Danon, Laura Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author2_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
INTELECTULISMO RAZONAMIENTO REFLEXIÓN NORMATIVIDAD ANIMAL |
topic |
INTELECTULISMO RAZONAMIENTO REFLEXIÓN NORMATIVIDAD ANIMAL |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
According to intellectualist approaches to reasons and normativity, non-human animals lack a genuine sensitivity to reasons. In that sense, in contrast to human beings, they cannot be considered normative creatures. Against intellectualism, in this paper, we hold that when a creature arrives at a new doxastic state by carrying out a certain type of reasoning, the premises of it constitute genuine reasons for her. We are interested in reasoning as a personal level process, which requires a certain kind of intelligence, implicit knowledge, and some (partial) understanding of the reasons by which the creature arrives at a new belief. However, this sort of reasoning requires neither the possession of epistemic concepts nor the possession of meta-representational competencies, as the intellectualists hold. Thus, if some non-human animals –such as great apes— have the capacity to carry out this kind of reasoning, they can be credited with a practical ability to use reasons and a (partial) cognitive access to them. In this sense, they could also be taken to be normative animals. Fil: Danon, Laura. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina |
description |
According to intellectualist approaches to reasons and normativity, non-human animals lack a genuine sensitivity to reasons. In that sense, in contrast to human beings, they cannot be considered normative creatures. Against intellectualism, in this paper, we hold that when a creature arrives at a new doxastic state by carrying out a certain type of reasoning, the premises of it constitute genuine reasons for her. We are interested in reasoning as a personal level process, which requires a certain kind of intelligence, implicit knowledge, and some (partial) understanding of the reasons by which the creature arrives at a new belief. However, this sort of reasoning requires neither the possession of epistemic concepts nor the possession of meta-representational competencies, as the intellectualists hold. Thus, if some non-human animals –such as great apes— have the capacity to carry out this kind of reasoning, they can be credited with a practical ability to use reasons and a (partial) cognitive access to them. In this sense, they could also be taken to be normative animals. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-02 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
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publishedVersion |
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http://hdl.handle.net/11336/203034 Danon, Laura; Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos; Fondazione Gentile Onlus; L'Ircocervo; 2; 2-2022; 146-162 1722-392X CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/203034 |
identifier_str_mv |
Danon, Laura; Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos; Fondazione Gentile Onlus; L'Ircocervo; 2; 2-2022; 146-162 1722-392X CONICET Digital CONICET |
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https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/handle/11336/119676 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://lircocervo.it/?p=5370 |
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Fondazione Gentile Onlus |
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Fondazione Gentile Onlus |
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