Collective action: Experimental evidence

Autores
Anauati, Maria Victoria; Feld, Brian; Galiani, Sebastián; Torrens, Gustavo Federico
Año de publicación
2016
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We conducted a laboratory experiment to test the comparative statics predictions of a new approach to collective action games based on the method of stability sets. We find robust support for the main theoretical predictions. As we increase the payoff of a successful collective action (accruing to all players and only to those who contribute), the share of cooperators increases. The experiment also points to new avenues for refining the theory. We find that, as the payoff of a successful collective action increases, subjects tend to upgrade their prior beliefs as to the expected share of cooperators. Although this does not have a qualitative effect on comparative static predictions, using the reported distribution of beliefs rather than an ad hoc uniform distribution reduces the gap between theoretical predictions and observed outcomes. This finding also allows us to decompose the mechanism that leads to more cooperation into a “belief effect” and a “range of cooperation effect”.
Fil: Anauati, Maria Victoria. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Feld, Brian. University of Illinois. Urbana - Champaign; Estados Unidos
Fil: Galiani, Sebastián. University of Maryland; Estados Unidos
Fil: Torrens, Gustavo Federico. Indiana University; Estados Unidos. Universidad del Cema; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
COLLECTIVE ACTION
LABORATORY EXPERIMENT
MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/115707
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Collective action: Experimental evidenceAnauati, Maria VictoriaFeld, BrianGaliani, SebastiánTorrens, Gustavo FedericoCOLLECTIVE ACTIONLABORATORY EXPERIMENTMULTIPLE EQUILIBRIAhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We conducted a laboratory experiment to test the comparative statics predictions of a new approach to collective action games based on the method of stability sets. We find robust support for the main theoretical predictions. As we increase the payoff of a successful collective action (accruing to all players and only to those who contribute), the share of cooperators increases. The experiment also points to new avenues for refining the theory. We find that, as the payoff of a successful collective action increases, subjects tend to upgrade their prior beliefs as to the expected share of cooperators. Although this does not have a qualitative effect on comparative static predictions, using the reported distribution of beliefs rather than an ad hoc uniform distribution reduces the gap between theoretical predictions and observed outcomes. This finding also allows us to decompose the mechanism that leads to more cooperation into a “belief effect” and a “range of cooperation effect”.Fil: Anauati, Maria Victoria. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Feld, Brian. University of Illinois. Urbana - Champaign; Estados UnidosFil: Galiani, Sebastián. University of Maryland; Estados UnidosFil: Torrens, Gustavo Federico. Indiana University; Estados Unidos. Universidad del Cema; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaAcademic Press Inc.2016-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/115707Anauati, Maria Victoria; Feld, Brian; Galiani, Sebastián; Torrens, Gustavo Federico; Collective action: Experimental evidence; Academic Press Inc.; Games and Economic Behavior; 99; 9-2016; 36-551090-24730899-8256CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.005info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825616300471info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:52:35Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/115707instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:52:36.232CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Collective action: Experimental evidence
title Collective action: Experimental evidence
spellingShingle Collective action: Experimental evidence
Anauati, Maria Victoria
COLLECTIVE ACTION
LABORATORY EXPERIMENT
MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
title_short Collective action: Experimental evidence
title_full Collective action: Experimental evidence
title_fullStr Collective action: Experimental evidence
title_full_unstemmed Collective action: Experimental evidence
title_sort Collective action: Experimental evidence
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Anauati, Maria Victoria
Feld, Brian
Galiani, Sebastián
Torrens, Gustavo Federico
author Anauati, Maria Victoria
author_facet Anauati, Maria Victoria
Feld, Brian
Galiani, Sebastián
Torrens, Gustavo Federico
author_role author
author2 Feld, Brian
Galiani, Sebastián
Torrens, Gustavo Federico
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv COLLECTIVE ACTION
LABORATORY EXPERIMENT
MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
topic COLLECTIVE ACTION
LABORATORY EXPERIMENT
MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We conducted a laboratory experiment to test the comparative statics predictions of a new approach to collective action games based on the method of stability sets. We find robust support for the main theoretical predictions. As we increase the payoff of a successful collective action (accruing to all players and only to those who contribute), the share of cooperators increases. The experiment also points to new avenues for refining the theory. We find that, as the payoff of a successful collective action increases, subjects tend to upgrade their prior beliefs as to the expected share of cooperators. Although this does not have a qualitative effect on comparative static predictions, using the reported distribution of beliefs rather than an ad hoc uniform distribution reduces the gap between theoretical predictions and observed outcomes. This finding also allows us to decompose the mechanism that leads to more cooperation into a “belief effect” and a “range of cooperation effect”.
Fil: Anauati, Maria Victoria. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Feld, Brian. University of Illinois. Urbana - Champaign; Estados Unidos
Fil: Galiani, Sebastián. University of Maryland; Estados Unidos
Fil: Torrens, Gustavo Federico. Indiana University; Estados Unidos. Universidad del Cema; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description We conducted a laboratory experiment to test the comparative statics predictions of a new approach to collective action games based on the method of stability sets. We find robust support for the main theoretical predictions. As we increase the payoff of a successful collective action (accruing to all players and only to those who contribute), the share of cooperators increases. The experiment also points to new avenues for refining the theory. We find that, as the payoff of a successful collective action increases, subjects tend to upgrade their prior beliefs as to the expected share of cooperators. Although this does not have a qualitative effect on comparative static predictions, using the reported distribution of beliefs rather than an ad hoc uniform distribution reduces the gap between theoretical predictions and observed outcomes. This finding also allows us to decompose the mechanism that leads to more cooperation into a “belief effect” and a “range of cooperation effect”.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-09
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/115707
Anauati, Maria Victoria; Feld, Brian; Galiani, Sebastián; Torrens, Gustavo Federico; Collective action: Experimental evidence; Academic Press Inc.; Games and Economic Behavior; 99; 9-2016; 36-55
1090-2473
0899-8256
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/115707
identifier_str_mv Anauati, Maria Victoria; Feld, Brian; Galiani, Sebastián; Torrens, Gustavo Federico; Collective action: Experimental evidence; Academic Press Inc.; Games and Economic Behavior; 99; 9-2016; 36-55
1090-2473
0899-8256
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.005
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825616300471
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Academic Press Inc.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Academic Press Inc.
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397

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