An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America

Autores
Molina, Ezequiel
Año de publicación
2009
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
tesis de maestría
Estado
versión aceptada
Colaborador/a o director/a de tesis
Cont, Walter
Porto, Natalia
Cont, Walter
Bebczuk, Ricardo
Descripción
Although several papers in the political economy literature suggest a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution, the data for Latin America does not support this claim. Countries with more income inequality also have less redistribution. This paper explores how the degree of imperfection in the political institutions influences equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions. A citizen-candidate model is developed (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 and Besley and Coate, 1997) in which candidates face a cost for representing other citizens in politics. Political-economic equilibria for diferent degrees of imperfection of the political system are derived and compared. In particular, two distinct cases are found. Countries where the cost of entry to politics is low can have higher redis tribution and lower inequality if the median run as a candidate or ,when there is a two candidate equilibria, redistribution and inequality could go either way. On the other hand, countries where the cost of entry is high will not be able to translate the will of the people into political action and will end up with little redistribution and high levels of inequality.
Magister en Economía
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
Materia
Ciencias Económicas
economía política
distribución
desigualdad de ingresos
toma de decisiones
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/3317

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spelling An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin AmericaUna democracia imperfecta. Redistribución política de ingreso en América LatinaMolina, EzequielCiencias Económicaseconomía políticadistribucióndesigualdad de ingresostoma de decisionesAlthough several papers in the political economy literature suggest a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution, the data for Latin America does not support this claim. Countries with more income inequality also have less redistribution. This paper explores how the degree of imperfection in the political institutions influences equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions. A citizen-candidate model is developed (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 and Besley and Coate, 1997) in which candidates face a cost for representing other citizens in politics. Political-economic equilibria for diferent degrees of imperfection of the political system are derived and compared. In particular, two distinct cases are found. Countries where the cost of entry to politics is low can have higher redis tribution and lower inequality if the median run as a candidate or ,when there is a two candidate equilibria, redistribution and inequality could go either way. On the other hand, countries where the cost of entry is high will not be able to translate the will of the people into political action and will end up with little redistribution and high levels of inequality.Magister en EconomíaUniversidad Nacional de La PlataFacultad de Ciencias EconómicasCont, WalterPorto, NataliaCont, WalterBebczuk, Ricardo2009-06-26info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionTesis de maestriahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdccinfo:ar-repo/semantics/tesisDeMaestriaapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3317https://doi.org/10.35537/10915/3317enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-29T10:49:11Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/3317Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-29 10:49:11.816SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America
Una democracia imperfecta. Redistribución política de ingreso en América Latina
title An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America
spellingShingle An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America
Molina, Ezequiel
Ciencias Económicas
economía política
distribución
desigualdad de ingresos
toma de decisiones
title_short An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America
title_full An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America
title_fullStr An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America
title_full_unstemmed An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America
title_sort An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Molina, Ezequiel
author Molina, Ezequiel
author_facet Molina, Ezequiel
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Cont, Walter
Porto, Natalia
Cont, Walter
Bebczuk, Ricardo
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ciencias Económicas
economía política
distribución
desigualdad de ingresos
toma de decisiones
topic Ciencias Económicas
economía política
distribución
desigualdad de ingresos
toma de decisiones
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Although several papers in the political economy literature suggest a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution, the data for Latin America does not support this claim. Countries with more income inequality also have less redistribution. This paper explores how the degree of imperfection in the political institutions influences equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions. A citizen-candidate model is developed (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 and Besley and Coate, 1997) in which candidates face a cost for representing other citizens in politics. Political-economic equilibria for diferent degrees of imperfection of the political system are derived and compared. In particular, two distinct cases are found. Countries where the cost of entry to politics is low can have higher redis tribution and lower inequality if the median run as a candidate or ,when there is a two candidate equilibria, redistribution and inequality could go either way. On the other hand, countries where the cost of entry is high will not be able to translate the will of the people into political action and will end up with little redistribution and high levels of inequality.
Magister en Economía
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
description Although several papers in the political economy literature suggest a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution, the data for Latin America does not support this claim. Countries with more income inequality also have less redistribution. This paper explores how the degree of imperfection in the political institutions influences equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions. A citizen-candidate model is developed (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 and Besley and Coate, 1997) in which candidates face a cost for representing other citizens in politics. Political-economic equilibria for diferent degrees of imperfection of the political system are derived and compared. In particular, two distinct cases are found. Countries where the cost of entry to politics is low can have higher redis tribution and lower inequality if the median run as a candidate or ,when there is a two candidate equilibria, redistribution and inequality could go either way. On the other hand, countries where the cost of entry is high will not be able to translate the will of the people into political action and will end up with little redistribution and high levels of inequality.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2009-06-26
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdcc
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https://doi.org/10.35537/10915/3317
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3317
https://doi.org/10.35537/10915/3317
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)
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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
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