An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America
- Autores
- Molina, Ezequiel
- Año de publicación
- 2009
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- tesis de maestría
- Estado
- versión aceptada
- Colaborador/a o director/a de tesis
- Cont, Walter
Porto, Natalia
Cont, Walter
Bebczuk, Ricardo - Descripción
- Although several papers in the political economy literature suggest a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution, the data for Latin America does not support this claim. Countries with more income inequality also have less redistribution. This paper explores how the degree of imperfection in the political institutions influences equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions. A citizen-candidate model is developed (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 and Besley and Coate, 1997) in which candidates face a cost for representing other citizens in politics. Political-economic equilibria for diferent degrees of imperfection of the political system are derived and compared. In particular, two distinct cases are found. Countries where the cost of entry to politics is low can have higher redis tribution and lower inequality if the median run as a candidate or ,when there is a two candidate equilibria, redistribution and inequality could go either way. On the other hand, countries where the cost of entry is high will not be able to translate the will of the people into political action and will end up with little redistribution and high levels of inequality.
Magister en Economía
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas - Materia
-
Ciencias Económicas
economía política
distribución
desigualdad de ingresos
toma de decisiones - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Universidad Nacional de La Plata
- OAI Identificador
- oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/3317
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An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin AmericaUna democracia imperfecta. Redistribución política de ingreso en América LatinaMolina, EzequielCiencias Económicaseconomía políticadistribucióndesigualdad de ingresostoma de decisionesAlthough several papers in the political economy literature suggest a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution, the data for Latin America does not support this claim. Countries with more income inequality also have less redistribution. This paper explores how the degree of imperfection in the political institutions influences equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions. A citizen-candidate model is developed (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 and Besley and Coate, 1997) in which candidates face a cost for representing other citizens in politics. Political-economic equilibria for diferent degrees of imperfection of the political system are derived and compared. In particular, two distinct cases are found. Countries where the cost of entry to politics is low can have higher redis tribution and lower inequality if the median run as a candidate or ,when there is a two candidate equilibria, redistribution and inequality could go either way. On the other hand, countries where the cost of entry is high will not be able to translate the will of the people into political action and will end up with little redistribution and high levels of inequality.Magister en EconomíaUniversidad Nacional de La PlataFacultad de Ciencias EconómicasCont, WalterPorto, NataliaCont, WalterBebczuk, Ricardo2009-06-26info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionTesis de maestriahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdccinfo:ar-repo/semantics/tesisDeMaestriaapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3317https://doi.org/10.35537/10915/3317enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-29T10:49:11Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/3317Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-29 10:49:11.816SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America Una democracia imperfecta. Redistribución política de ingreso en América Latina |
title |
An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America |
spellingShingle |
An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America Molina, Ezequiel Ciencias Económicas economía política distribución desigualdad de ingresos toma de decisiones |
title_short |
An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America |
title_full |
An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America |
title_fullStr |
An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America |
title_full_unstemmed |
An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America |
title_sort |
An imperfect representative democracy political income redistribution in Latin America |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Molina, Ezequiel |
author |
Molina, Ezequiel |
author_facet |
Molina, Ezequiel |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Cont, Walter Porto, Natalia Cont, Walter Bebczuk, Ricardo |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Ciencias Económicas economía política distribución desigualdad de ingresos toma de decisiones |
topic |
Ciencias Económicas economía política distribución desigualdad de ingresos toma de decisiones |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Although several papers in the political economy literature suggest a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution, the data for Latin America does not support this claim. Countries with more income inequality also have less redistribution. This paper explores how the degree of imperfection in the political institutions influences equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions. A citizen-candidate model is developed (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 and Besley and Coate, 1997) in which candidates face a cost for representing other citizens in politics. Political-economic equilibria for diferent degrees of imperfection of the political system are derived and compared. In particular, two distinct cases are found. Countries where the cost of entry to politics is low can have higher redis tribution and lower inequality if the median run as a candidate or ,when there is a two candidate equilibria, redistribution and inequality could go either way. On the other hand, countries where the cost of entry is high will not be able to translate the will of the people into political action and will end up with little redistribution and high levels of inequality. Magister en Economía Universidad Nacional de La Plata Facultad de Ciencias Económicas |
description |
Although several papers in the political economy literature suggest a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution, the data for Latin America does not support this claim. Countries with more income inequality also have less redistribution. This paper explores how the degree of imperfection in the political institutions influences equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions. A citizen-candidate model is developed (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 and Besley and Coate, 1997) in which candidates face a cost for representing other citizens in politics. Political-economic equilibria for diferent degrees of imperfection of the political system are derived and compared. In particular, two distinct cases are found. Countries where the cost of entry to politics is low can have higher redis tribution and lower inequality if the median run as a candidate or ,when there is a two candidate equilibria, redistribution and inequality could go either way. On the other hand, countries where the cost of entry is high will not be able to translate the will of the people into political action and will end up with little redistribution and high levels of inequality. |
publishDate |
2009 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2009-06-26 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Tesis de maestria http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdcc info:ar-repo/semantics/tesisDeMaestria |
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masterThesis |
status_str |
acceptedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3317 https://doi.org/10.35537/10915/3317 |
url |
http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3317 https://doi.org/10.35537/10915/3317 |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5) |
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openAccess |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5) |
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